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UNITED NATIONS 
PROGRESS TOWARDS THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
The Working Group on the Latin American Regional Market, set up under resolution 116 (VII) of the Commission, met at 
Santiago, Chile, for the first time in February 1958 with a view to taking a more decisive step towards the objective set forth 
in the relevant resolutions previously adopted by the Trade Committee. The Bulletin published the Bases for the formation 
of the Latin American regional market, which constituted the main conclusions of the Group's discussions embodied in its 
report.l 
A year later, from 16 to 27 February 1959, the Working Group held its second session in Mexico City to consider those 
bases more specifically and to make recommendations to Governments through the Secretariat of the Commission which collaborat-
ed closely with the Group, both in the preparation of documents and in the discussions themselves. The following members 
attended the session, which was opened by Mr. Philippe de Seynes, under-Secretary for Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations; Carlos D'Ascoli, Senator (Venezuela); José Garrido Torres, Executive Director of the Department of Currency and 
Credit of Brazil; Rodrigo Gómez, Director-General of the Banco de México; Flavian Levine, Director of the Banco Central de 
Chile, Professor of the University of Chile and Manager of the Compañía de Acero de Pacifico; Carlos Lleras Restrepo, Senator 
(Colombia) ; Eustaquio Méndez Delfino, President of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange and former President of the Honorary 
National Commission of Economy and Finance of Argentina; Raymond F. Mikesell, Professor of the Economics Department 
of the University of Oregon, United States; Juan Pardo Heeren, former Minister of Finance of Peru, and Galo Plaza, former 
President of the Republic of Ecuador. 
The Group elected Mr. Galo Plaza and Mr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo Chairman and Rapporteur respectively. It began its 
•work on the basis of the report Possible alternatives for the establishment of the Latin American regional market? which the 
ECLA Secretariat submitted for its consideration. The results of its discussions are contained in the report entitled Recom-
mendations concerning the structure and the basic principles of the Latin American common market. (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/10). 
In view of the importance of this document, the Secretariat considers it necessary to give it the widest possible publicity 
and to include it in this Bullletin, excluding only the pages dealing with the background data, which in any case are summarized 
sufficiently in this note. 
The Working Group's report has already been transmitted by the ECLA Secretariat to member Governments and will be 
submitted to the Trade Committee at its second session to be held at Panama City in May 1959, immedii)tely prior to the eighth 
session of the Commission. The report contains the Group's recommendations on the structure of the common market and the 
basic principles which might govern its operation. Further progress on this project will depend on the attention which Govern-
ments devote to these recommendations and on the decisions taken with regard to them at the next session of ECLA. Indeed, 
should the Governments at Panama City approve the structure and basic principles recommended by the Group in its report, 
sound bases will be established for drawing up the common market agreement, and as the idea of the common market 
matures in the minds of the Latin American public, the time will have come for practical action. 
1 See Vol. Ill, No. 1, March 1958, p. 1 et seq. The note 
preceding the Bases contains all the background data for 
the session mentioned. The complete text of the Group's 
report was published in document E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/6. 
2 See document E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/7. The session 
also had before it two other documents: Informe sobre la 
marcha de los trabajos relativos al inventario de la indus-
tria latinoamericana (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/8) and Govern-
ment policies affecting prívate foreign investment in a 
Latin American, regional market (E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/9) . 
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERMNG THE STRUCTURE AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At its first session, the Working Group prepared a 
series of bases or points of view designed to serve as 
a guide for further studies on the gradual and progres-
sive establishment of the Latin American common market. 
At the same time, it requested the Secretariat of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America to carry out 
additional studies and research which would help the 
Group to continue its work during its recently completed 
second session. 
The Secretariat's contribution proved highly useful 
during that session and enabled the members of the 
Group to crystallize, in the form described in this report, 
their ideas on the structure which the common market 
should assume and on the basic principles which should 
govern its operation. 
The Group feels that if, at the eighth session of ECLA 
to be held at Panama City in May 1959, member Govern-
ments give their general approval to the recommendations 
set out in this report, the Secretariat could then prepare, 
in close collaboration with the Governments concerned, 
an initial common market draft agreement which would 
help to bring together those countries interested in put-
ting the idea into immediate effect. 
The task is not easy. But the existence of a ready-
made structure and of some clearly-defined working 
principles, approved by Governments, would make it less 
difficult. Even so, the method of expressing this struc-
ture in terms of specific projects and of setting targets 
for reductions in duties and similar taxes and restrictions 
will require an effort of considerable magnitude as 
regards both time and concentration. However, this work 
must be done, and one of the advantages of approving 
these recommendations would be that a specific model 
would be provided. Otherwise, the work would prove 
extremely complicated and time-consuming. 
Given the essential character of these recommenda-
tions, which are presented to the Secretariat for transmis-
sion to member Governments, and given the Group's 
terms of reference, the members of the Group have 
never had any intention of formulating a specific agree-
ment. ^ The definition of terms and their scope, required 
in such a draft, have not been considered in this case. 
It was felt preferable to put forward basic ideas, bring 
out their general content and avoid those special cases 
or problems which require individual interpretation. The 
Group feels that what is required at the moment is to 
sketch the general outline of the common market so as 
to provide the Secretariat with a basis for entering upon 
a new stage in its work. Governments, with this clear 
outline before them, will be in a better position to weigh 
the advantages of the common market and its repercus-
sions on their respective economies. Progress towards 
an agreement for actually setting up such a market will 
thus be facilitated. 
Of course, more time than was available to the Group 
at this second session would have been needed to tackle 
further problems of the common market's establishment 
and operation. Approval of these recommendations by 
Governments would constitute the essential starting-point 
for entering into these other matters. 
Mr. Raymond Mikesell stated that he was unable to 
agree with every point of detail in the report. 
1 Trade Committee resolution 3 ( I ) , under which the Work-
ing Group was set up, assigned to it the following functions: 
(a) To define the characteristics of the regional market, 
bearing in mind the differing degrees to which the countries of 
the region are industrialized; 
(b) To study its possibilities and projections; 
( c ) To submit recommendations on basic principles and 
procedures for its establishment, within the terms of reference 
of the Trade Committee as defined in resolution 101 (VI) (E/CN, 
12/410). 
II. BASES FOR A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT SETTING UP THE LATIN . . ''í ÍCAN COMMON MARKET 
A . STRUCTURE 
I. Objectives 
1. The agreement setting up the common market is 
designed to help expedite the balanced economic develop-
ment of Latin America, its progressive industrialization 
and the introduction of improved techniques in its agri-
culture and other primary activities, with a view to 
promoting higher levels of living for its peoples, through: 
(a) The establishment of a preferential system for 
trade among Latin American countries; and 
(b) The growth of its foreign trade as a result of the 
expansion of industrial exports and the promotion of 
exports of agricultural and other primary commodities, 
both within Latin America and with the rest of the 
world. 
II. Juridical form 
2. The juridical form contemplated in this agreement 
is that of a free-trade zone designed to be transformed 
gradually into a customs union, it being understood that 
this form may be adapted to the actual requirements of 
Latin America. 
III. Customs and liberalization regime 
3. In order to establish the common market gradually 
and progressively for all products included in the inter-
national trade of the Latin American countries, the re-
duction of customs duties and other similar taxes and 
restrictions will be carried out in two stages. 
The first stage, lasting ten years, will involve the 
substantial reduction, among the parties to the agree-
ment, of customs duties and other taxes similar in their 
effect and the elimination of other restrictions converted, 
where necessary, into customs duties. 
The reductions referred to in this section will be 
irrevocable, except as provided in sections II and VIII 
of the Basic Principles, and will be effected in the follow-
ing manner: 
(a) Within one year from the entry into force of 
the agreement, a uniform percentage reduction will be 
applied to each of the customs duties, together with an 
equivalent reduction of other restrictions; 
(b) Within five years from the entry into force of 
the agreement, non-tariff restrictions will be eliminated 
or converted into customs duties, except as provided in 
section VIII of the Basic Principles; and 
(c) During the first stage of ten years, customs 
duties and other taxes similar in their effect will continue 
to be reduced to the point where they reach the average 
levels fixed in accordance with the criteria laid down in 
paragraphs 5 and 8 below. 
The Committee will supervise the implementation of 
the provisions set forth in this section and of any ad-
ditional pacts entered into by member countries in 
carrying out the agreement, for the purpose of effecting 
gradually and progressively the reductions whicli are 
specified. 
4. During the second stage, the reduction of duties 
and similar taxes will proceed further, and, as this 
reduction progresses, the preferences referred to in para-
graph 10 will be gradually abolished in order to com-
plete the organization of the common market. 
Before the end of the first stage, the Committee will 
make arrangements for negotiations to fulfil the above 
purpose. 
IV. Classification of products 
With a view to carrying out the measures referred 
to in paragraph 3, products will be divided into the fol-
lowing three categories: 
Category 1. Primary goods; 
Category II. Capital goods, motor vehicles, other 
durable goods, intermediate articles and others for which 
demand tends to grow relatively intensively or a large 
import substitution margin exists; 
Category III. Manufactured goods for current con-
sumption in respect of which demand tends to grow 
relatively slowly and import substitution possibilities may 
become exhausted or considerably strained, except for 
the import substitution margin in those countries which 
are in the incipient stage of development referred to in 
paragraph 7. 
V. Programme for the first stage 
6. During the first stage, the reduction of customs 
duties and of other taxes similar in their effect will be 
carried out in the following manner: 
fa) Abolition of such duties and taxes in the case of 
products in category I, with the exceptions to be agreed 
upon —when they are indispensable and with particular 
reference to agricultural commodities— in order not to 
affect certain branches of production so long as it is 
impossible to put the productive factors involved to more 
economic use; 
(b) For products in category II, the target will be 
reduction or abolition of customs duties to the point 
where, within this category, the lowest possible average 
is achieved in order to intensify regional trade in these 
items; 
(c) For products in category III, the target for the 
reduction of customs duties will be lower than that for 
category II to ensure that the specialization of existing 
industries and their adaptation to common market con-
ditions is effected gradually and without creating dif-
ficulties which impede the regular employment of the 
productive factors involved. 
VI. Regime for relatively less developed countries 
7. In order to encourage the development of countries 
in the early stages of industrialization and to make the 
benefits of the common market available to them on bases 
of effective reciprocity with the industrially more ad-
vanced countries, they will be given differential treat-
ment. 
For this purpose, the Latin American countries will 
be classified as follows according to their respective 
available margins of import substitution and their re-
spective export possibilities in each of the categories of 
goods listed in paragraph 5: 
Group A. Countries of more advanced development 
in categories II and III. 
Group B. Countries of relatively advanced develop-
ment as regards manufactured goods for current con-
sumption (category III) , and whose production of capi-
tal goods and other goods in category II is incipient or 
non-existent. 
Group C. Countries of incipient development as re-
gards manufactured goods for current consumption (cate-
gory III) and undeveloped as regards capital goods and 
other goods in category II. 
8. The following procedure will be adopted for ac-
cording differential treatment to countries of incipient 
development in groups B and C: 
(a) The agreement will establish their reduction tar-
gets during the first stage, for categories of products in 
which their development is incipient, at average levels 
of duty moderately higher than those generally laid down 
for parties to the agreement; 
(b) Negotiations will be held within the Committee 
whereby a given group of countries will grant special 
concessions to countries whose develonment is incipient 
as regards products in categories II and III. (Such 
concessions may be made by countries in group A to 
those in group B or C or by countries in group B 
to those in group C). If the concession is made to a 
country in group C, it will be automatically extended 
to the other countries of this group; if it is granted by 
a country in group B, it will be extended automatically 
to countries in groups B and C. 
In return for these special concessions, countries in 
the early stages of development may in turn grant facil-
ities for imports of capital goods or other soods in 
Category II from countries in group A or B or for 
imports of current consumer goods from countries in 
group B, either by reducing customs duties below or 
within the average level fixed for them or by increasinsr 
their duties vis-a-vis the rest of the world if that should 
prove necessary to establish an effective preference in 
respect of given items. The facilities which countries 
in groups A and B receive by virtue of this reciprocity 
will be extended automatically to all the parties to this 
agreement. 
VII. Size of the market and initial groupings 
9. The common market must include all the Latin 
American countries or the greatest possible number of 
them. This aim will not prevent an initial group of coun-
tries from launching the common market provided (a) all 
the countries of Latin America are invited to the initial 
negotiations; and (b) those that do not sign the agree-
ment at the outset are allowed to do so later in one of the 
following ways: 
(i) within the first year of operation of the agree-
ment, in which case the new members will be allowed 
the same periods of time for reducing their customs 
duties as those fixed for the original signatories; 
(ii) after the agreement has been in operation for 
more than one year, in which case the new members 
will be allowed the periods of time still remaining to the 
original signatories for achieving the targets specified. 
However, it may be agreed upon after negotiation that 
the period of ten years laid down in paragraph 3 should 
start from the date of accession of the new signatory, 
both as regards the reductions it is to grant and those 
to be granted to it by the other signatories. 
VIII. Specific complementarity and specialization agree-
ments 
10. For the purpose of promoting industrial comple-
mentarity or specialization, two or more participants, 
linked by geographical proximity or common economic 
interests, may, with the Committee's approval, agree 
upon reduction or abolitions in respect of customs duties 
which are not designed to be extended automatically to 
the other members. Such reductions or abolitions will 
not be calculated at the average level of customs duties 
laid down as a general target for all parties to the agree-
ment. 
IX. Treaties on trade or economic matters not covered 
by the agreement 
11. Member countries which consider it necessary 
may conclude treaties among themselves for settling 
specific trade or economic matters not covered by the 
agreement, such as those relating to their border trade 
or the pooling of natural resources from adjacent natio-
nal zones. 
Such treaties must be submitted for the Committee's 
approval. 
X. Most-favoured-nation treatment 
12. In each signatory country, the products and ser-
vices originating in the other signatory countries, or 
exported to them, will enjoy in all respects treatment 
no less favourable than that granted to any country, 
whether a party to the agreement or not. 
Hence, all the reductions of customs duties —as well 
as the reduction or abolition of taxes and other restric-
tions which, in fulfilment of the established targets or 
of any higher ones, a country may make unilaterally, 
bilaterally or multilaterally— will be extended to the 
other signatories, except for the following: 
(a) Special concessions granted reciprocally to coun-
tries in the early stages of industrial development, in 
accordance with paragraph 8; 
(b) Reductions resulting from the industrial comple-
mentarity and specialization agreements referred to in pa-
ragraph 10, and the treaties mentioned in paragraph 11; 
(c) Existing preferential concessions, the elimination 
of which must be brought about gradually in order to 
avoid disrupting normal trade channels; 
(d) The concessions provided for in the instruments 
of the Central American common market. 
The temporary differences in customs duties resulting 
from the accession of additional countries to the agree-
ment, in accordance with paragraph 9, will not be af-
fected by the application of the rules set forth in the 
first and second sub-paragraphs of this section. 
XI. Committee 
13. For the purpose of administering the agreement 
and facilitating the attainment of its ends, a Committee 
on Trade Policy and Payments composed of representa-
tives of all the member countries will be set up to carry 
out the negotiations arising from the agreement. 
B. BASIC PRINCIPLES 
The Working Group considers that the structure 
which has been recommended for the establishment of 
the Latin American common market should be supple-
mented with a series of basic principles which cover 
various aspects of the actual operation of the market, so 
as to ensure the successful attainment of its aims. 
For this purpose, the Working Group recommends 
the adoption of tiie following basic principles which will 
have to be worked out in further detail during the nego-
tiations required for the adoption of the agreement itself: 
I. Reciprocal trade benefits of the common market 
1. For the success of the common market it is impor-
tant that all the member countries should have the op-
portunity of expanding their exports at the same time as 
^ they take action to reduce their duties, taxes and other 
restrictions on imports. To this end, member countries 
which, as a result of the facilities granted to them, in-
crease their exports to the common market without a 
proportionate increase in their imports, should accelerate 
the rate at which they reduce their duties, taxes and 
other restrictions. 
The Committee, after consulting member countries, 
will submit recommendations for the attainment of this 
objective. 
II. Stability in reciprocal treatment 
2. Member countries will not increase among them-
selves the duties, taxes and other restrictions in force in 
each of them at the time of their accession to the agree-
ment nor those resulting from the reductions and aboli-
tions they may subsequently make, either in fulfilment 
of the targets set in the agreement or within the regime of 
special concessions referred to in paragraph 8 of this 
report relating to the structure. 
The following cases will constitute exceptions to this 
rule: 
(a) Cases in which a member country wishes to modify 
its customs tariff in order to enable the tariff to absorb 
the effects of non-tariff restrictions. Such a transfer may 
be effected only during the first five years of operation 
of the agreement; 
(b) Emergency cases provided for in section VIII of 
the Basic Principles; 
(c) Other exceptional cases agreed upon among the 
member countries during their negotiations preceding 
the conclusion of the agreement. 
III. Determination of the oHgin of goods 
3. As soon as it has been constituted, the Committee 
will lay down the criteria or principles to be followed 
for determining when a product originates from one of 
the member countries, for the purposes of applying the 
preferential treatment accorded in the free-trade zone. 
IV. Equalization of customs duties 
4. At regular intervals, the Committee will specify 
the products in respect of which it will be necessary to 
arrange for the equalization of customs duties for imports 
from third countries, either for the purpose of esta-
blishing an adequate regional preference or in order to 
solve other problems resulting from lack of uniformity 
in existing duties. As regards these products, member 
countries will agree, through negotiations in the Com-
mittee and bearing in mind the Committee's recommenda-
tions, upon the common duties to be adopted and the 
form and time-limit or gradual stages for their adoption. 
V. Co-ordination of trade policy 
5. Through the Committee, the member countries will 
endeavour to conduct jointly or, if this is not possible, in 
co-ordination, trade negotiations with third countries to 
ensure the common protection of their interests and to see 
that any concessions which may be granted to third coun-
tries do not preclude a suitable margin of preference 
within the common market or that such concessions do 
not impede the application of the agreement and the 
attainment of its objectives. 
VI. Special programme for the reduction of high customs 
duties 
6. The Committee will consider the desirability of 
drawing up regulations to secure the reduction among 
member countries of very high customs duties. To this 
end, the Committee may establish a periodic compulsory 
percentage reduction of those customs duties which exceed 
the value of the products in question by a certain per-
centage. 
VII. Rules of competition 
7. In order to contribute to the smooth working of 
the common market, exports from one member country 
should not be allowed to interfere, through unfair com-
petitive practices, with the activities of other participants, 
either as a result of competitive currency depreciation 
or in any other way. 
Member countries must also refrain from discrimina-
tory practices, so that the export prices of each article 
remain the same irrespective of the market of destination. 
The Committee will be the judge of when a member 
country is engaging in discriminatory or unfair practices 
in its trade with the others and will take action to remedy 
the situation. 
VIII. Measures to remedy h(dance-of-payments disequi-
librium 
Member countries whose over-all balance-of-payments 
has improved as a result of the reduction policy will ac-
celerate the rate at which they lower their duties, taxes 
and other restrictions. The Committee will make recom-
mendations for the achievement of this objective. 
Those members which, as a result of this reduction 
policy, have incurred a deficit, or increased an existing 
one, may temporarily slow down the rate of reduction 
after consulting the Committee. However, this slowing 
down will not absolve the debtor countries from the 
obligation of taking action to correct their disequilibrium. 
IX. Emergency measures (safeguard clauses) 
8. If the application of the measures for reducing 
customs duties and other taxes and restrictions provided 
for in the agreement should give rise to serious distur-
bances in any important sector of a country's economic 
activity, or cause considerable unemployment of labour 
which cannot be absorbed in other activities, the country 
concerned may suspend temporarily, as an emergency 
measure, the application of concessions already granted 
as well as the granting of new concessions. At the same 
time, it may put into effect special measures to protect 
the national interests involved. 
The Committee will be duly informed of the suspen-
sion, will promptly examine the underlying causes and 
will initiate whatever collective measures it deems neces-
sary for remedying it. 
If the suspension of concessions should be prolonged 
for more than one year, negotiations will be held, at the 
request of any member country, with a view to re-
establishing the reciprocal situation prevailing before, 
or to finding new ways and means of ensuring equi-
librium. 
IX. Customs and statistical co-ordination 
9. Within five years from the entry into force of the 
agreement, member countries wiU adopt a standard cus-
toms nomenclature, as well as common customs defini-
tions, procedures and regulations, and will co-ordinate 
their national statistics, bearing in mind the different 
needs which will arise from the implementation of the 
agreement and the operation of the common market. 
The Committee will lay down the necessary criteria 
in order to facilitate the implementation of this provision. 
X. Participation of representatives of economic activities 
10. In the organization and operation of the common 
market, the Committee will maintain close contact with 
representatives of the different economic activities and 
enlist their help in the preparation of appropriate 
measures. 
XI. Payments regime 
11. The effective operation and development of the 
common market will require the organization of a 
payments and credit regime to facilitate the multilateral 
liquidation of transactions among member countries. 
The criteria to be adopted in this respect should 
envisage the opening of sufficient credit to encourage 
a substantial growth of trade within the common market. 
III. COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
A . COMMENTS ON THE STRUCTURE 
1. Objectives 
In support of the conclusions reached by the Working 
Group during its first session at Santiago in February 
1958, the report recommends to Governments the gradual 
and progressive formation of a Latin American preference 
zone as a further step towards constituting the common 
market. In this zone, all products, both primary and 
industrial, of Latin American origin should receive, in 
trade among the various countries, preferential treat-
ment vis-a-vis the rest of the world.^ 
The Group considers that, at the present stage of Latin 
American economic development, this preferential system 
is essential to boost industrialization. Apart from the 
beneficial effects which it will have on the level of living 
of the population, it will enable Latin American industry 
to develop its industrial exports to the rest of the world 
and thus invigorate its international trade. 
2. Juridical form 
The Group considered that, to begin with, the common 
market should be legally constituted as a free-trade zone. 
It thus does not explicitly recommend the immediate 
establishment of a common customs tariff for all the 
Latin American countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world, 
as in the case of a customs union, although gradual pro-
gress must be made towards this objective to facilitate 
the development of the common market.® 
In this respect the Group feels that Latin America 
should work out a solution suited to its actual require-
ments, i.e., in harmony both with the conditions and with 
the possibilities of its economic development. Conse-
quently, the choice of the free-trade zone and its gradual 
evolution towards a customs union does not in any way 
imply strict adherence to pre-conceived formulae but an 
effort to adapt these formulae to the actual Latin Ame-
rican situation. 
3. Specific objectives and stages for their attainment 
The final objective of the common market is the 
elimination of all duties and restrictions among the 
Latin American countries. 
2 As regards this trade in traditional commodities, the Trade 
Committee in its resolution 4 ( I ) , paragraphs 2 (a) and (b ) , 
recommends to Governments: 
"That such products be marketed among the Latin American 
countries at international prices and on terms similar to those 
prevailing for the region's trade with the rest of the world; and 
that, prices and other conditions being equal, the commodities in 
question be purchased as far as possible within Latin America, 
to the extent permitted by the foreign trade regime of the coun-
tries of the region; 
"That, in accordance with prevailing world market conditions, 
countries which cannot meet their own needs purchase such prod-
ucts as far as possible from the usual sources of supply within 
Latin America, in so far as the producer countries are in a posi-
tion to meet the requirements of their regular customers, and, in 
the case of countries maintaining payments agreements, when the 
oayment availabilities created in the consumer countries so permit." 
8 Under Basic Principle IV, the Committee is to specify at 
regular intervals the products in respect of which customs duties 
on imports from outside the common market should be equalized or 
standardized in the member countries. 
The Group began by considering in detail whether: 
(a) an attempt should be made from the outset to secure 
an absolute undertaking by all the participating Govern-
ments to abolish completely customs duties and other 
similar restrictions within a given period; or (b) whether 
it would be more desirable to divide the common market 
process into stages and to try to fix limited objectives 
for an initial stage, leaving for subsequent negotiation, 
during a second stage, whatever measures seem advisable 
in the light of the experience gained. 
To accept an absolute undertaking from the outset 
in a field in which Latin America is completely lacking in 
experience might prove to be a real leap in the dark. 
Fortunately, such a course is unnecessary. The final aim 
of achieving the common market and the possibility of 
reaching initial agreement on limited but very specific 
and weU-defined objectives are perfectly compatible. The 
gradual attainment of such objectives should provide 
Governments with experience of the best way of reaching 
the final objective within a more or less short period. 
In this context, it is felt —and this report so recom-
mends— that the most suitable type of agreement would 
be one under which participating Governments would un-
dertake to eliminate all their restrictions or convert 
them into customs duties and reduce the amount of 
these duties in such a way that, after a period of ten 
years, the average level of customs protection does not 
exceed a certain level. Once this aim has been achieved, 
the Governments, profiting from the experience gained, 
would enter into new general negotiations with a view to 
agreeing in what form, to what extent and within what 
period oí time the reduction of duties could be continued 
during a second stage. 
The main advantage of a formula of this kind is that 
it combines a cautious attitude with a firm decision to 
reduce the present levels of protection among the Latin 
American countries. Even though the undertaking is only 
a partial one, it nevertheless sets specific objectives which 
pave the way towards the common market. The idea 
would court failure in actual practice if Governments 
merely expressed pious intentions without any agreement 
on a substantial reduction of present tariff levels. In the 
Group's opinion, such an undertaking is the minimum 
required as a starting-point for the formation of the com-
mon market. 
Reference has just been made to the idea of reducing 
import duties to a certain average level, after a period 
consisting of a given number of years.^ This procedure 
offers two essential advantages: (a) it will allow Govern-
ments great flexibility in the application of reductions; 
and (b) it will facilitate negotiations for the accession of 
new countries. 
So far as flexibility is concerned, the average will 
enable each Government to initiate and continue the reduc-
tion of duties and restrictions in the form best suited to 
its interests, always provided that the average level agreed 
upon is finally reached. Within the margin of flexibility 
* It should be emphasized that what is contemplated under 
the average-level procedure is not an undertaking to reduce the 
initial level of duties by a given percentage but an undertaking 
to bring those duties to a certain agreed average level on the 
completion of a stipulated period of years. 
of this average-level procedure, each Government would 
be free to continue introducing unilaterally the reduc-
tions to be effected in fulfilment of the undertaking 
made, or to negotiate such reductions bilaterally or multi-
laterally with other contracting countries. However, it 
is important to stress again that these reductions would 
not be carried out haphazardly but according to a clear-
cut plan: that of not exceeding, at the end of the first 
stage, the average level of import duties agreed upon. 
An example will throw further light on this idea. 
Suppose that, within a given category of goods, the 
present level of customs duties in a given country is 40 
per cent and that the Governments agree to reduce the 
average in question to 10 per cent at the end of the ten-
year period. This in no way signifies that customs duties 
will have to be reduced to 10 per cent for all the products 
in that category. On the contrary, the Government of 
the country in question may reduce duties in the manner 
it considers most convenient. It is conceivable, for exam-
ple, that for a third of the imports in this category 
duties may be eliminated altogether; for another third, 
the average might be reduced to 5 per cent; and hence 
for the remaining third an average of 25 per cent could 
be maintained.® This latter average would include duties 
higher than 25 per cent to compensate for other relatively 
low duties. In other words, the system is extremely 
flexible and will enable Governments to take expedient 
measures without infringing the undertaking to reduce 
the average level to the agreed figure. 
In order to achieve even greater flexibility, the man-
ner in which these reductions in the average are to be 
carried out periodically would not be laid down in the 
agreement but would be left for a subsequent decision by 
Governments in a committee of representatives, whose 
establishment is also recommended by the Working 
Group. In this way, if the gradual reduction of import 
duties among member countries were not proceeding at 
the proper speed for the purposes of the agreement, 
measures might be worked out for increasing the tempo 
and intermediate targets might even be adopted. 
The averages system also offers great advantages in 
connexion with the accession of new countries. For if an 
initial group of countries had begun to form the common 
market, any country wishing to join it later could be 
incorporated simply by accepting the averages agreed 
on by the others. 
If this procedure were not followed, the incorporation 
of a new country would give rise to difficult and trouble-
some negotiations, negotiations which would be the 
more protracted the greater the number of contracting 
countries. Moreover, it would be difficult to determine 
the equivalence of concessions between the countries 
already in the common market and the one wishing to 
join it. 
All this is avoided by the averages system. The new 
participant will merely have to undertake to reduce 
average customs duties in the manner agreed on by the 
other parties to the agreement to become a member. 
The Working Group did not consider it advisable to 
specify the amount of the desirable reduction in duties 
in exact terms. It believes that for the moment it is 
enough to establish the procedure for making the reduc-
tion, and the stages by which the plan should be carried 
out. If at the forthcoming session at Panama, Govern-
ments should take a decision with regard to the procedure 
recommended in this report, the problem of the actual 
target figure for the reduction of import duties can then 
be taken up. Once the relevant recommendation had 
been approved by Governments, the secretariat, together 
with such experts as it may be decided to appoint, would 
carry out a careful investigation with a view to submit-
ting to Governments for their consideration, the alter-
natives considered most suitable. 
In addition to the averages system as a means of 
reducing customs duties and equivalent charges within a 
period of ten years, the Working Group recommends 
that this process should be initiated at once, within the 
first year of operation of the agreement, by means of an 
initial reduction (not in the form of an average) of each 
and every customs duty and restriction (of the order say 
of 5 to 10 per cent) with a view to introducing the 
preferential system forthwith and giving it an initial 
impetus which might perhaps be decisive for Latin 
American trade. These cuts would later be counted as 
part of the reductions towards the average to which 
reference has already been made. 
Similarly, the Group recommends to Governments 
that within the first five years of operation of the 
agreement all currency, quota or financial difficulties, etc. 
hampering Latin American trade should be lifted. Since 
these restrictions are due, in a number of countries, to 
the fact that the customs tariff has lost its effectiveness 
in practice, partly as a result of inflation, the Group 
recommends that Governments should be left to decide 
whether or not and to what extent, to convert these restric-
tions into customs duties before abolishing them.® Natur-
ally, the customs duties thus increased would be subject 
to the levels agreed on and to the reduction rate or 
procedure fixed for the gradual attainment of those 
levels. 
The Group recommends that in principle the reduc-
tion of customs duties and other equivalent charges (as 
also the elimination of other restrictions) should be irrevo-
cable, so as to ensure the stability of the reciprocal 
treatment —with exceptions which will be dealt with in 
the appropriate place."' 
4 & 5. Classification of products and programme for the 
the first stage 
The Group considered it advisable to recommend to 
Governments tliat in the initial common market agree-
ment products should be divided into three categories 
according to their nature and to the degree of develop-
ment of the industries concerned in the various Latin 
American countries. These three categories are as follows: 
Category I. Primary goods. 
5 This would happen if the import figure, and hence the weight-
ing in the average, is equal for each of the three parts into which 
the products in this category have been divided for the purpose 
of the illustration. 
6 See sub-paragraph (a) of Basic Principle II. 
T Basic Principle II provides more specifically for an obliga-
tion not to increase the duties, charges and restrictions referred to, 
whether original or already reduced, but indicates certain excep-
tions which should be made, in the Group's opinion, to this rule. 
Category II. Capital goods, motor vehicles, other 
durable goods, intermediate articles and others for which 
demand tends to grow relatively intensively or a large 
import substitution margin exists; and 
Category III. Manufactured goods for current con-
sumption in respect of which demand tends to grow-
relatively slowly and import substitution possibilities 
may become exhausted or considerably strained. 
The position of these three groups from the point of 
view of possibilities for the reduction of duties and the 
addition of restrictions recommended for the first ten 
years stage is very different. Thus, for example, the pri-
mary goods which are for the most part traditional 
items in inter-Latin American trade offer the greatest 
importance possibilities, in the Group's view. Many of 
them, especially mineral products and other raw materials, 
could in a relatively short time be freed from tariff and 
other restrictions. 
In the sphere of agriculture, however, there are im-
portant instances in which the Working Group urges 
proceeding with caution, for the two reasons given in 
the comments on Basis II in its previous report.® In the 
case of some of these products, the gradual improvement 
of agricultural techniques would be a first step towards 
their full incorporation in the common market, with a 
view to establishing satisfactory conditions of inter-Latin 
American competition. As regards other articles, it is 
possible that future increases in their consumption will 
in some cases tend to reduce the exportable surpluses of 
producing countries in Latin America and that will 
compel other Latin American countries to maintain or 
increase their production even at costs above international 
prices, with a consequent need for protection against the 
rest of the world.® 
To look at the matter from another point of view, 
the rapid growth of the population of Latin America 
and the absolute need to improve the quality of their 
diet call more and more urgently for the better use of 
the land available through a gradual improvement of tech-
niques. The common market will greatly assist this 
productive development by permitting countries which, 
owing to unsuitable ecological conditions, are able to 
produce certain foods (or raw materials) only at rela-
tively high costs, to obtain them on more favourable 
terms from other Latin American countries and use their 
land for other types of production. 
The lack of a common market, and more particu-
larly the lack of satisfactory payments arrangements 
among the Latin American countries, has been one of 
the factors hampering this better use of the productive 
capacity of the land. To change this situation will require 
a careful combination of measures of trade policy with 
adequate programmes of agricultural development. 
It will be seen from the foregoing that special at-
tention needs to be given to the agricultural products 
8 See document E/CN.12/C.1/WG.2/6, page 10. 
9 Since the Working Group made this observation, recent 
studies by the Secretariat have shown that this is in fact taking 
clace in such important products as wheat, with regard to which 
it is very unlikely that the present supply-deficit of Latin America 
as a whole can be reduced in the next twenty years. It would be 
unwise therefore to drop the present system of protection without 
introducing other measures to stimulate domestic production of 
this and of other foodstuffs. 
at present subject to duties or restrictions, and that they 
should be dealt with, in view of their small number and 
special problems they present, through product by prod-
uct negotiations. 
The other two categories relate to industrial products. 
Category II comprises products of industries which might 
be described as dynamic, in view of the intensive ex-
pansion which may be expected of them in coming 
decades in the industrially more advanced countries of 
Latin America without, however, excluding the possibility 
that they may take root and prosper in the hitherto less 
developed countries. 
The dynamic industries are in the main those produc-
ing capital goods, intermediate or semi-finished products 
and certain durable consumer goods (in particular the 
products of the metal transforming industries). These 
industries are characterized by their high degree of capi-
tal intensity, their reliance on a substantially expanding 
market —by virtue both of the growth of demand and 
of the extensive possibilities such goods offer for import 
substitution— and by the fact that they are new industries 
or industries which do not yet exist in Latin America. 
They thus have rapid growth prospects and offer broad 
and immediate possibilities of complementarity, speciali-
zation and reconstruction without the serious adjustment 
problems which the regional market would entail for 
already established and consolidated industries or indus-
tries limited to a vegetative rate of growth. In other 
words, it is in these dynamic industries that the greatest 
benefits could be derived with the fewest disturbances 
and adverse reactions. 
This fact is of decisive importance for the common 
market. It is not a matter of one country —in any static 
sense— increasing its production at the expense of others; 
there is room for all, if the basic conditions are created 
which will permit the specialization of production; and 
this will be the easier the more rapid the growth of 
demand and production in the dynamic development 
of the common market. 
The position of the dynamic industries would thus 
seem to be highly suited to a policy of relatively rapid 
reductions of tariffs and restrictions, subject to the 
differential treatment provided for in the case of coun-
tries in which these industries are at an early stage of 
development. 
The situation is quite different as regards the indus-
tries included in Category III, industries producing goods 
for current consumption. In the more developed coun-
tries, these industries are already fully established; in 
many of them, import substitution has been completed 
for some time, and the growth of production will tend 
to be slower Üian in the dynamic industries, gradually 
following the population growth. It is clear, however, 
that if a common market is established and export pos-
sibilities are opened up, some of these industries might 
receive a strong impetus towards expansion. 
With regard to the less developed countries, although 
they offer room for the expansion of these industries 
because the import substitution margin has not yet been 
closed —on the contrary, it remains very wide in some 
of them— the competition of the more developed coun-
tries could, if caution is not exercised, have unfavourable 
immediate consequences for certain branches of industry. 
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These considerations induced the Working Group to 
recommend different targets for these two different 
groups of industrial products. For Category 11, which 
covers capital goods and other products of the dynamic 
industries, it recommends as a target a low average rate 
of duties which will stimulate Latin American trade in 
these products to the greatest extent possible. For Cate-
gory III, consisting of manufactured goods for current 
consumption, a higher average is recommended, in order 
not to force during the initial stage of ten years a 
reduction of duties which could perhaps cause disturb-
ances to existing industries. The reduction will have to 
be graduated in such a way as to facilitate the progressive 
development of these industries towards forms of spe-
cialization and greater productivity which will enable 
them to develop within a broad system of inter-Latin 
American competition. 
Furthermore, to set a higher average rate of duties 
as the target for this category of products would not 
prevent those countries in which tíie manufacture of 
certain goods of current consumption showed dynamic 
characteristics from obtaining from others —^with respect 
to such products and within the general programme of 
reductions— substantial tariff cuts, perhaps even greater 
than those fixed for products in Category IL 
6. System for less developed countries 
It will be recalled that the main concern of the 
Working Group at its first session was to arrive at 
common market formulae which, far from placing dif-
ficulties in the way of the industrial growth of the less 
developed Latin American countries, would give them a 
vigorous impetus towards industrialization; at the present 
session the Working Group reached final conclusions on 
this very important aspect of the matter. The Group 
accordingly considers it advisable that the agreement 
should contain a classification of countries according 
to the degree of development in them of the industries in 
Categories II and III, as follows: 
Group A should comprise the countries which might 
be called the economically more advanced countries of 
Latin America, countries in which the industries pro-
ducing goods for current consumption —those in Cate-
gory III— are in full process of development, while the 
capital and other durable goods industries —those in 
Category II— are already making steady progress in re-
sponse to the demands of their economic development. 
Group B comprises those countries in which tlie in-
dustries manufacturing goods for current consumption 
have also developed in a manner similar to those of 
countries in the previous group, while yet retaining a 
wider import substitution margin, but in which, on the 
other hand, the capital-goods and other industries in 
Category II are either incipient or non-existent. Group C 
comprises countries in which the industries producing 
goods for current consumption are still in the early stages 
of development and in which there is a wide import-
substitution margin and no capital-goods industries— 
apart from certain exceptions, usually concerned with 
intermediate products. 
The Working Group believes that differential treat-
ment should be given for the benefit of countries in 
groups B and C. To this end, it proposes that in the 
common market agreement, with respect to these two 
groups of countries, and as a target to be achieved 
during the first stage, a moderately higher average level 
of duties should be established for the categories of 
goods produced by industries at the incipient stage of de-
velopment. Thus, for instance, if it were established as 
a general target for the capital and other goods in Cate-
gory II that in ten years a level of customs duties should 
be reached of not more, on an average, than 10 per cent 
of the value of imports, then for the countries in groups 
B and C an average level of duties of, for instance, 15 
per cent could be established for this category of prod-
ucts. The same could be done with respect to consumer 
goods in category III; in the case of these, an average 
level could be established for countries in group C 
higher than that generally agreed on for countries in 
groups A and B.^ ® 
The Working Group attaches considerable impor-
tance to such differential treatment, for if all countries 
were considered equal from the point of view of eco-
nomic development the common market agreement would 
embody a manifest inequality of treatment. In point 
of fact, if treatment is to be equal the inequality of 
countries must be fully recognized. But this is not the 
only way in which the Group has tried to provide for 
favourable treatment of the less developed countries; it 
also recommends that Governments should make special 
concessions in favour of these groups of countries. 
This requires some explanation. 
In establishing a higher level of customs duties as 
the target for the less developed countries the Working 
Group, while not wanting to encourage them to adopt 
anti-economic forms of industrialization, wishes to re-
cognize the fact that owing to their lower productivity 
and their smaller over-all resources —in comparison 
with the more advanced countries— they require a 
greater degree of protection for the time being. These 
countries, however, will have to be given strong ad-
ditional incentives in order to ensure that, while re-
ceiving this greater degree of average protection, they are 
able to embark on vigorous industrialization with the 
common market in mind. This is the idea behind 
the special concessions. An example will help give a 
clearer idea of the scope and purposes of the latter. 
Let us suppose that a country in group C at an early 
stage of development agrees by negotiation —through 
the Committee— with one or more advanced countries 
in group A to abolish customs duties for certain capital 
goods in which the latter are interested, either within 
the average applicable to them or within a lower average, 
if the country in question considered that desirable. In 
exchange for the facilities it thus granted, the group C 
country would receive special concessions from the more 
advanced countries, for example, exemption from duties 
for the entry into their territory of certain products 
which the group C country was in a position to produce 
10 One member of the "Working Group particularly urged the 
Secretariat, in its report to Governments, to consider the case of 
countries with a high level of internal costs. He felt that it would 
be advisable, in order to facilitate the incorporation of these coun-
tries in the common market agreement, for them to be allowed 
the average fixed for countries in group C, even if they had well-
developed consumer industries. 
economically and to export to the group A countries' 
market. In order that the concession thus received by 
the group C country should be effective, it would be ex-
tended automatically only to other countries at an early 
stage of development in the same group, and not to 
countries in groups A and B. Thus, the group C countries 
would have available to them the broad and growing 
market of the group A country as a stimulus to their 
industrialization and their industrial export trade. 
For their part, the group B countries which have 
made considerable advances in their consumer industries 
could similarly enter into special negotiations with the 
countries at an early stage of development in these goods 
—those in group C— in order to arrange reciprocal 
concessions of the same kind. 
All this means that within the preferential Latin 
American system there would be a system of special 
preferences for the relatively small countries, with a view 
to creating conditions likely to attract domestic or foreign 
capital and to ensuring the use of their skills in their 
industrialization programmes, not only for the benefit of 
their domestic markets but also for that of the common 
market. It should, however, be pointed out that these 
preferences would be in their favour only and that what-
ever facility an industrially advanced —group A — or 
moderately advanced —group B— country received in 
return for these concessions would automatically be ex-
tended to all member countries by virtue of the most-
favoured-nation clause. 
7. Extent of the market and initial groupings 
The Working Group has already, in its first report, 
expressed the view that the common market should em-
brace the largest possible number of countries. This does 
not necessarily mean that it could not begin with an initial 
nucleus of countries having a more active interest in its 
formation. But in order that the market should from the 
very outset be of the kind desired, the Working Group 
considers it of vital importance to put two proposals 
before Governments: the first, that all Latin American 
countries should be invited to the initial drafting of the 
agreement; the second, that countries which for one 
reason or another decide not to participate at the begin-
ning should be enabled to do so at any later stage without 
entering into complicated negotiations. This possibility 
has already been referred to in commenting on the advan-
tages offered by the averages system in connexion with 
the accession of new countries. 
There are possible identities of interest which might 
facilitate the formation of a broad orbit of countries. 
Thus, the fact that the trade of seven countries in the 
southern area makes up about 90 per cent of the total 
trade among Latin American countries (petroleum ex-
cluded) readily suggests that these countries might act 
as the initial nucleus of the common market. But there 
are other countries geographically remote from them 
which, for reasons of common interests, might wish to 
participate in this nucleus. The area of identity of in-
terest might still be found in the field of the dynamic 
industries. Apart from other things, this common denom-
inator would be a very strong factor, both for the 
present and for the future, in broadening the initial 
nucleus of the common market, and in the opinion of 
the Working Group everything should be done to prevent 
any weakening of this constructive force. 
Nothing of all this, however, can be hoped for if a 
static viewpoint is adopted. The common market is not 
intended as a means for freezing present trade relations; 
on the contrary the intention is to create a new pattern 
of trade in accordance with the profound structural 
changes which the Latin American economy must undergo 
in coming decades if it is to show vigorous growth. And 
geographical distance in a rapidly industrializing Latin 
America cannot have the same significance as it had 
when the countries of Latin America concentrated almost 
entirely on primary production for the large industrial 
centres. All this tends to reinforce the idea of the broad-
est possible grouping. 
The Working Group believes that the formation of 
other types of groupings of countries, through exclusive 
arrangements, could be an obstacle to the creation of a 
Latin American common market. On the other hand, it 
is clear that geographical proximity will create, within 
the common market, very tightly-knit trading areas among 
certain groups of countries; this, however, must be the 
spontaneous result of the facts themselves, and not 
the consequence of a policy of excluding other Latin 
American countries solely because of their remoteness 
—a remoteness which will, in any case, be overcome as 
transport improves. 
8. Specific agreements for complementarity and speciali-
zation 
The above considerations should not prevent coun-
tries which are closely linked by their geographical 
proximity or by an identity of interests from making 
complementarity of specialization arrangements among 
themselves in order to increase the productivity and 
reduce the costs of certain industries. These arrange-
ments would not —as would be desirable— be easy to 
put into effect if the exemptions from or reductions of 
customs duties agreed on among the countries concerned 
were at once extended to other countries by virtue of 
the most-favoured-nation clause. Hence, the latter clause 
should not be applied in such cases. This situation would, 
of course, have to be temporary in character, lasting until 
such time as the industries in question had been able 
to strengthen themselves through their complementarity 
or specialization. In addition, the Working Group con-
siders it essential that the customs duties thus abolished 
or reduced should not be counted in connexion with the 
average levels laid down in the agreement; they would, 
in other words, be additional to those granted generally 
and would in no way affect the obligation to fulfil prom-
ises undertaken in the agreement. 
9. Other special agreements 
In addition to the special arrangements just men-
tioned, the Working Group considers that the agreement 
should permit other special agreements among countries 
designed to stimulate border trade of the development 
of zones or basins of interest to two or more of them. 
It therefore recommends that such agreements should be 
permitted, subject, however, to the Committee's approval. 
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10. Most-favoured-nation treatment 
The members of the Working Group are convinced 
that the sound operation of the regional market depends 
on the granting of equality of opportunity to all partici-
pating countries, apart from the differential treatment to 
be accorded, for the reasons already explained, to coun-
tries at the earliest stage of industrial development and 
that resulting from specialization and complementarity 
agreements and other arrangements of a temporary 
nature. In addition, the Group explicitly recognized an 
exception in favour of the preferences and other conces-
sions resulting from Central American economic integra-
tion —which amounts to considering the Central American 
countries as an economic unity. 
11. Trade and payments policy committee 
The common market agreement will have to lay the 
foundations of a policy for the gradual and continuous 
economic integration of Latin America within the market. 
But in addition this policy must pursue constant aims 
and must be continuously adapted to changing circum-
stances. With this end in view the Group considers it 
advisable that there should be set up an inter-governmental 
committee formed of high-ranking representatives of the 
contracting countries. This committee would be respon-
sible for considering problems of trade policy, payments 
and the administration of the agreement. Mention has 
been made in the course of this report of the need for 
countries to undertake negotiations on particular matters 
dealt with in the agreement; it would be useful if these 
negotiations could take place within the committee even 
if they were to be carried on between restricted groups of 
countries, in order to ensure the correlation of common 
interests. Owing to the nature of the Working Group, 
this report does not go into detail regarding the functions 
of the committee; it would be desirable that in preparing 
the draft agreement the Secretariat should expressly 
enumerate these functions and clearly specify which 
matters should be decided by a simple majority and 
which should require the unanimous assent of the member 
countries. 
B. COMMENTS ON THE BASIC PRINCIPLES 
As they supplement or amplify the principles recom-
mended in the part of this report dealing with the 
structure, the meaning and purpose of most of the so-
called "basic principles" proposed are obvious. However, 
the Group felt that some comments were called for on 
certain of them to which it has given special attention. 
I. Reciprocal trade benefits of the common market 
The Group considered the possibility that the progres-
sive establishment of the common market through the 
gradual reduction or abolition of customs duties and 
other taxes and restrictions might bring substantially 
greater benefits to some countries than to others. These 
greater benefits would probably be reflected in a persis-
tent tendency, on the part of those to whom this was 
more advantageous, to export more to other common-
market countries than they imported from them. In the 
Group's view the countries which find themselves in this 
position should increase the rate of reduction of their 
duties and other taxes and restrictions in order to pro-
mote their imports and so offer the others greater 
opportunities of participating adequately in the reciprocal 
trade benefits of the common market. 
II. Co-ordination of trade policy 
Apart from the recommendation concerning the need 
for member countries to carry out their trade negotiations 
in co-ordination with third countries, the Working Group 
agreed to recommend that the Latin American countries 
should endeavour forthwith to initiate negotiations with 
a view to securing recognition of regional preference 
through the inclusion of a Latin American waiver clause 
in the agreements in force, or in process of approval, 
with third countries; and that they should also bear the 
advantages of this objective in mind in the negotiations 
they will have to undertake with the members of the 
European Common Market or with other countries mem-
bers of GATT. 
III. Special programme for the reduction of high customs 
duties 
Customs duties which, because they are too high, 
restrict or even render impossible the importation of the 
products on which they are levied will have very little 
effect on the determination of the weighted average level 
of duties, and perhaps none at all, since such weighting 
is based precisely on actual imports of each product. It 
might thus be possible for a member country, by the end 
of the first stage contemplated in the agreement, to 
reach the duty averages set as the target, or even much 
lower ones, while maintaining high duties on a large 
number of items. Furthermore, it is conceivable that 
the average level of duties reached by a given country 
(calculated in the manner described) will rise as that 
country reduces the duties on certain items, if the volume 
of imports of these is thereby increased to any great 
extent. 
It is for this reason that the Working Group stresses 
the advisability of the Committee's laying down rules 
designed to ensure or promote the effective reduction of 
very high duties, for example by establishing a com-
pulsory periodic percentage reduction for customs duties 
whose effect on the value of the products concerned 
exceeds a certain percentage. 
IV. Measures to remedy balance-of-payments disequilib-
rium 
The success of measures to reduce duties, taxes and 
restrictions will depend to a large extent on the attitude 
of the contracting countries towards the achievement and 
maintenance of their balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
It is possible that, as a result of such a policy, a contrac-
ting country might improve its balance-of-payments sit-
uation. In that event, the Committee should advise it to 
adopt further liberalization measures so that, through the 
resultant increase in its imports, it can help the debtor 
countries in their development. 
11 
Similarly, these countries could, after consulting the 
Committee, take steps to reduce the rate of liberalization 
if that proved necessary. 
V. Escape or safeguard clauses 
As has already been said, the countries whose exports 
inside the common market increase more than their 
imports as a result of the concessions granted to them 
ought, in the view of the Working Group, to increase 
the rate of reduction of duties and other restrictions in 
order to allow other member countries to participate 
more fully in the benefits of trade liberalization. Simi-
larly, the Group considered the possibility of the reverse 
situation, in which the concessions granted by a member 
country within the common market cause it serious bal-
ance-of-payments problems or provoke serious distur-
bances in some important industry or substantial unem-
ployment among workers who cannot be absorbed in 
other branches of economic activity. In this case it 
recommends that the agreement should contain safeguard 
or escape clauses to allow countries in this kind of 
situation temporarily to suspend the concessions granted, 
or to withhold the granting of further rebates, without 
prejudice to any other measures which it may or ought 
to take to correct its imbalance, especially if it is of a 
structural kind. 
VI. Payments system 
The Group also noted with satisfaction the efforts 
of the Secretariat to formulate a draft payments system 
among the Latin American countries, and hopes that 
it will be possible, at the next session of the Central 
Banks, to reach definitive formulae, because an effective 
payments arrangement and the smooth working of the 
common market are closely interrelated. Without wishing 
to interfere in the deliberations of the Central Banks, 
the Working Group would like to stress the desirability 
of considering, in these arrangements, the possibility of 
granting extensive credits, through a suitable payments 
system, in order to facilitate inter-Latin American trade 
and to prevent restrictive measures from being taken 
owing to payment difficulties. 
VIL The inter-Latin American financing agency and the 
common market 
The Working Group took note with satisfaction of 
the statements made by the observer sent by the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council to the effect 
that, at the meetings being held at Washington with a 
view to the establishment of a Latin American financing 
agency, special interest is being taken in the credits and 
investments intended for setting up industries for the 
common market. The Group also considers it pertinent 
at this stage to point out the desirability of introducing a 
system of short-and medium-term credits in order to 
encourage exports from the industries of the Latin 
American countries, and it would welcome a study of 
this aspect of the problem. 
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THE PROBLEM OF THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINA 
INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, Argentina's production of 
goods and services, measured on the basis of the gross 
national product, increased at a less rapid rate than the 
population. Because of this disparity, average per capita 
availabilities of goods and services now stand at a slightly 
lower level than ten years ago. 
The stagnation of the Argentine economy coincided 
with a period of almost unprecedented economic expan-
sion throughout the whole world. Over the same decade, 
the annual increments registered in the per capita product 
in the United States and in Latin America, excluding 
Argentina, were 2.2 per cent and 3.0 per cent respectively. 
The cause of Argentina's failure to develop, therefore, 
must not be sought beyond its frontiers or in purely 
adventitious circumstances. Something of more vital im-
portance lies behind the ills besetting its economy, the 
discovery of which was the main objective of the Secre-
tariat study on the economic development of Argentina.^ 
At the root of Argentina's problem is a structural 
disequilibrium. In the case of certain commodities or 
groups of commodities existing demand exceeds the 
capacity to supply it, and the imbalance is too great to 
be remedied by the simple expedient of modifying 
relative prices. This point is important enough to call 
for a brief explanation. 
It is common knowledge that with every change in 
the level of national income a change takes place in the 
composition of internal demand. As a rule, a higher 
income level is accompanied by a proportional contrac-
tion of demand for foodstuffs and agricultural com-
modities and a proportional expansion of demand for 
manufactured goods and services. In a country without 
foreign trade relations, at each income level the composi-
tion of production by types of goods must correspond to 
the composition of demand, except over short periods. 
On the other hand, where foreign trade exists, external 
demand for certain goods is superadded to domestic de-
mand, and if it increases rapidly, causes an alteration in 
the structure of domestic production which is not in keep-
ing with the change in the composition of internal de-
mand. In relation to this latter, production of export 
items expands quickly, while other lines develop slowly. 
The discrepancies are covered by exporting surpluses and 
importing goods of which there is a deficit. This is why 
it is characteristic of an economy whose development is 
channelled towards the external sector for the structure of 
internal demand to differ from that of domestic produc-
tion. The latter rather resembles what might be expected 
in a country with a lower income level but a closed 
economy. 
Consequently, a rapid expansion or a radical reduc-
tion of demand for exports necessitates a transformation 
of the structure of production. The changes entailed by 
an expansion of demand for exports are usually easy to 
effect, especially with the backing of capital and tech-
nique contributed by more developed countries. In con-
trast, the evolution of those imposed by a contraction 
in exports is slow and difficult. 
During the last 75 years, the Argentine economy has 
three times been confronted with the need to make 
relatively sweeping changes in the structure of its pro-
duction. The last quarter of the nineteenth century 
witnessed the opening of a phase of rapid externally-
directed development which ended in 1930 with the slump 
on the world market for primary commodities. A second 
phase then began, characterized by a contraction and 
stagnation of external demand and lasting until the 
Second World War, when it became clearly evident 
that once again the Argentine economy needed remodel-
ling on new lines. 
While on the two occasions mentioned Argentina suc-
ceeded in adapting itself to the changes in the factors 
conditioning its development, it proved unable to do so 
after the Second World War. The form currently as-
sumed by the disequilibrium referred to is familiar 
enough. Argentina's external resources are inadequate 
to import those goods that are essential for its economic 
growth, and barely suffice to meet the ever-increasing 
requirements of its industrial development in respect of 
raw materials and intermediate products. Moreover, the 
transport situation is unsatisfactory, the energy deficit 
is considerable and agricultural activities have declined 
to such an extent that per capita production today is 7.6 
per cent less than in the period 1930-55. 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of these structural 
maladjustments, the Argentine economy is potentially 
capable of developing a great deal more rapidly than 
in the past. If the necessary transformations are brought 
about, the gross internal product may increase by as 
much as 40 per cent by 1%2 and 77 per cent by 1967.® 
The analysis which follows will be largely concerned 
with describing the nature and significance of these 
changes. 
1 See the mimeographed text (Spanish only) of El desarrollo 
económico de la Argentina (E/CN.12/429 and Add. 1 to 4 ) . The 
printed edition will consist of three volumes. The first of these, 
containing Part One of the study, will already have gone to press 
by the time this article appears. 
2 1955 is taken as the base year. This general criterion was 
followed as being that adopted in the study El desarrollo econó-
mico de la Argentina, op. cit., on which work began in 1956. Since 
the present article is based on that report, it was considered best 
to keep the same base year. The adoption of a more recent year 
would have implied a radical revision of certain statistical series 
used here, and, above all, would not have altered the conclusions 
reached in these pages. 
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1. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE FIRST THREE DECADES 
OF THE CENTURY 
During the first 30 years of the present century, 
Argentina's gross domestic product expanded at the 
remarkably rapid anuual rate of 4.5 per cent. On the 
other hand, as a result of immigration, the annual rate 
of growth of the population was among the highest 
recorded in the world during that period —3.3 per cent; 
and as this rise in population absorbed a substantial 
share of the increase in the total gross product, the per 
capita product grew at the modest rate of 1.2 per cent 
yearly. The significant expansion of the total product in 
any case entailed a considerable investment effort, which 
in a country like Argentina, where there was no domestic 
industry manufacturing capital goods, could be achieved 
in only two ways: (a)through its export trade, which 
provided the financial means of importing the necessary 
capital goods; and (b) by virtue of foreign investment 
and loans. This was what did in fact take place. During 
those first three decades, Argentina earmarked 31.6 per 
cent of its gross domestic product for investment, one 
of the highest proportions ever registered in the whole 
•world over so long a period. Foreign investment and 
loans helped to finance this capital formation effort to 
the extent of 33 per cent. Argentina itself was able to 
defray the cost of the remainder, thanks to its export 
trade, which expanded at an averge annual rate of 4.5 per 
cent, and thus provided the necessary foreign exchange. 
It is a well-known fact that a major proportion of Ar-
gentina's exports consists and throughout the whole of the 
century has consisted of agricultural conmiodities, some 
of which undergo a certain amount of industrial proces-
sing. Consequently, the rapid development of this trade 
is an index of the intensity with which world demand 
for Argentina's agricultural commodities increased during 
the period in question. Furthermore, domestic demand 
for these goods also expanded, as a result of the high 
rate of population growth and the rise in per capita 
income. The ample availabilities of first-class land and 
the timely construction of a transport network to carry 
Argentina's agricultural production to domestic and 
foreign markets help to fill in the picture of the agricul-
tural sector's striking progress during the first thirty 
years of the twentieth century. 
The external demand referred to also had a dynamic 
effect on other activities. For example, it stimulated the 
growth of trade. In addition, thanks to the incentives 
provided by immigration and the improvement in per 
capita income, large urban centres came into existence, 
and this in turn promoted the development of certain 
consumer manufactures. Such industries, which in the 
first five years of the century had contributed 13.8 per 
cent of the domestic gross product, accounted for 17.7 
per cent in 1925-29. By virtue of this development, the 
proportion of domestic consumption which was satisfied 
with imports of non-durable finished manufactured goods 
fell from 12.4 per cent at the beginning of the century 
to 9.3 per cent in 1925-29. Nevertheless, the growth 
process which took place in the period under review was 
unquestionably typical of what is known as "externally-
directed development"; in other words, it was one of 
integration with the international market and adaptation 
of the production effort to world market demand. 
2 . T H E FIRST STRUCTURAL CRISIS 
The directing of the economy towards the world mar-
ket produced a discrepancy between the structures of 
domestic production and demand. At the time when the 
world depression began in 1929, Argentina's agricultural 
production was far greater than domestic demand for 
such commodities, while internal demand for capital 
goods, manufactured consumer goods and fuels notably 
exceeded domestic production of these items. The bal-
ances, of course, cancelled each other out through interna-
tional trade. 
The depression directly affected exports and foreign 
investment, which represented the driving force of the 
economy. The capacity to import, which in 1925-29 had 
averaged about 1 600 million dollars ^ per annum, drop-
ped in the following five-year period to 744 million, and 
the purchasing power of exports fell from 1 982 million 
dollars to 1 214 million. The net inflow of foreign capital 
decreased from 199 million to 120 million dollars. 
The decline in the capacity to import was the charac-
teristic feature of the second phase of Argentina's devel-
opment, since the levels registered before the crisis were 
not regained except for a short period between 1937 
and 1939. As the population continued to increase, 
although at a much more moderate rate than before, the 
per capita capacity to import declined still more steeply. 
As a result, an abrupt contraction was registered in 
aggregate domestic demand. If market forces had then 
been allowed free play and no attempt whatever had been 
made to offset their effects, internal income would have 
diminished until demand for imports fell into line with 
foreign exchange availabilities; and, in consequence, 
demand would have undergone a structural transforma-
tion, contracting most sharply in respect of capital goods, 
durable consumer goods and other manufactures, a major 
proportion of which Argentina was at that time obtaining 
through the medium of its foreign trade. In the case of 
all those goods which were imported in sizable quanti-
ties, a balance between demand and availabilities would 
have been achieved, but where exportable commodities 
were concerned, the gap between internal demand and 
supply capacity would have widened. 
The price paid for the adoption of a policy of this 
kind —which has in fact been pursued by some Latin 
American countries in similar circumstances— would 
have been economic stagnation, a deterioration in the 
standard of living of the whole population and possibly 
a long period of unemployment which would have af-
fected a considerable proportion of the labour force. 
Argentina chose a different path. It attempted to 
keep internal demand at the highest level possible in the 
circumstances, but in doing so maintained a structure of 
demand such that with respect to many items demand 
exceeded domestic production capacity and foreign ex-
change availabilities. It then devoted attention to the 
development of those lines of production in which the dis-
equilibrium was most marked, or, in other words, to 
import substitution. At the same time, it supplemented 
this policy by applying selective controls to the demand 
® With 1950 purchasing power. It should be noted that, unless 
otherwise indicated, all monetary values, both in Argentine pesos 
and in dollars, are invariably expressed in terms of their purchasing 
power in that year. 
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for imports, raising tariffs, devaluating the exchange rate 
more for some goods than for others, imposing quanti-
tative restrictions and, in short, resorting to all the 
procedures recommendable in such cases. 
The task of guiding Argentina's productive resources 
into new channels, although in itself by no means easy, 
was facilitated by several • circumstances. In the first 
place, a substantial proportion of available foreign ex-
change was being used for imports of non-durable or 
semi-durable consumer goods which could be produced 
in Argentina at reasonable cost. The relative volume of 
imports of this kind, which in 1925-29 had represented 
9.3 per cent of total consumption of goods and services, 
dropped to only 2.4 per cent in 1940-44. Their progres-
sive replacement by domestic production gradually left 
at Argentina's disposal the margin of foreign exchange 
required for those imports of capital goods, raw materials 
and fuels which the economy needed for its normal opera-
tion and for the expansion of its production capacity. 
In the second place, as very large amounts had been 
invested in basic social capital in the preceding period, 
especially in the transport sector, it was possible to 
expand production of other goods without further in-
vestment in those fields. Lastly, the rate of domestic 
saving was relatively high, and, although it declined 
during the 'thirties, permitted the development of non-
agricultural activities on the basis of a reduction of 
investment in agriculture, trade and transport and trans-
fer of the corresponding saving to the manufacturing 
sector. 
As the outcome of the policy adopted, the gross 
domestic product remained at fairly high levels even 
in the worst years of the depression, and actually in-
creased during those which followed. However, since its 
growth failed to match that of the population, only 
in 1945 did the per capita product regain the level 
registered in 1929. 
These developments are not surprising in view of 
what happened with respect to demand for agricultural 
commodities. Before the crisis, the agricultural sector 
represented one third of Argentina's economic activity, 
and about half its production was sold abroad. When 
external demand for agricultural commodities ceased to 
grow, only the expansion of domestic demand was left 
to provide incentives for the development of the sector in 
question. This demand increased to some extent as a 
result of the rise in population, but the stimulus thus 
afforded could not be great and was of course inadequate 
to replace the dynamic influence previously exerted by 
the demand of importer countries. Domestic consump-
tion of agricultural commodities in fact increased by 58 
per cent between 1925-29 and 1940-44.^ Since foreign 
demand, as reflected in exports, declined by 33.6 per 
cent, the 34-per-cent increment in agricultural produc-
tion was more than sufficient to satisfy both the greater 
internal and the reduced external demand. It may thus 
be asserted that the demand situation from the time of 
the world depression to the end of the Second World 
War was not such as to allow the expansion of the 
per capita product in a sector which at the beginning of 
^ This figure is based on an estimate of effective as distinct 
from apparent consumption, which increased to a much greater 
extent and reflected the destruction of surpluses during the war. 
the period had contributed one third of Argentina's total 
product. 
Obviously, in view of the limits set to the growth of 
so important a sector, it was materially impossible for 
the total per capita product to increase to a significant 
extent. To cite an example, for the total per capita 
product to have risen by 2 per cent annually at a time 
when agricultural production was not developing, non-
agricultural activities would have had to increase 2.3 
times in the short space of 16 years, 4 of which fell 
within the period of the war when the supply of capital 
goods was severely restricted. Again, since services, 
especially trade, were quite well developed at the begin-
ning of the period, the redirection of the economy 
necessitated by the world depression was clearly too 
sweeping to leave room for what might be considered a 
satisfactory increase in the per capita product. The 
maintenance of the pre-depresson situation was the most 
that could be expected. 
3. T H E SECOND STRUCTURAL CRISIS 
The year 1945 may be said to have witnessed the 
initiation of a third phase in the economic life of Argen-
tina during the present century. The year referred to 
was chosen mainly for analytical purposes, as, apart 
from the end of the Second World War, no event or 
group of events which constituted an unmistakable mile-
stone was registered in this as in the preceding phase. 
At the end of the war, Argentina's position was very 
different from its situation at the beginning of the world 
depression. Its population was almost 40 per cent larger, 
its total gross product had also risen by 40 per cent, 
and its industrial production was 65 per cent higher. 
Again, in consequence of the expansion of internal activ-
ity, the amount of foreign exchange required to keep 
the economy operating normally was much greater, a 
fact which in turn reflected import requirements in 
respect of raw materials, fuels and capital goods to 
replace equipment which was wearing out. At the same 
time, the relationship of exports to the aggregate product 
of the economy declined from 24 to 13 per cent, leaving 
Argentina with a very small foreign exchange balance to 
finance the imports of capital goods which it needed 
to achieve a significant increment in the per capita pro-
duct, as distinct from those required to maintain the level 
of activity. Argentina had come to be in the position of 
a large enterprise which has working capital at its dis-
posal but lacks resources to finance its expansion. 
The foregoing circumstances were combined with at 
least four other factors. In the first place, so far as 
finished consumer goods were concerned, the import 
substitution process which had taken place during the 
preceding period made it almost impossible for addi-
tional foreign exchange to be released by this means. 
Secondly, idle capacity no longer existed in the transport 
sector as it did in the early 'thirties; on the contrary, so 
long a time had elapsed without adequate replacements 
being effected that it was becoming essential to earmark 
large sums for capital formation in this sector. Thirdly, 
by the beginning of the 'twenties agriculture in the pam-
pas had exhausted the possibilities of expansion through 
the incorporation of new land. While this limitation 
15 
had been of little importance during 1933-44, because 
of the slow growth of demand, it must be borne in mind 
that a fresh impetus was given to such demand as from 
1945 and supply difficulties became clearly apparent. 
For Argentina's agricultural sector to regain its previous 
vigour, its production methods would have had to be 
altered and its typical organization patterns remodelled. 
Lastly, the very development of industry and motorized 
transport caused a marked increase in demand for fuels, 
especially petroleum. Anxiety to keep down petroleum 
prices had a two-fold effect. On the one hand, it accelerat-
ed the growth of demand; on the other, it reduced those 
financial availabilities which would have enabled domes-
tic production to expand at a much more rapid rate. 
As things were, it was on the balance of payments that 
the pressure of demand was exerted. 
In these circumstances, Argentina found itself faced 
with the inescapable necessity of steering a new course, 
of redirecting its production efforts. If the growth of 
production was to outstrip that of the population, Argen-
tina could no longer confine import substitution to 
finished consumer goods, since this process had almost 
reached its zenith and could not produce more foreign 
exchange than was indispensable for maintaining the 
existing level of economic activity. 
Two alternative ways of effecting the necessary trans-
formation were open to Argentina, and, furthermore, 
were not mutually incompatible. One was the expansion 
of exports; the other, import substitution in the field of 
intermediate products —especially fuels— and of capital 
goods themselves. 
Immediately after the Second World War, as distinct 
from in the early 'thirties, Argentina was very favourably 
placed for steering this new course. Indeed, from 1946 
onwards, a notable improvement was registered in the 
terms of trade and this, in combination with the consid-
erable foreign exchange reserves accumulated during 
the war, afforded plenty of scope for the new substitu-
tion efforts needed to expedite development. But advan-
tage was not taken of the opportunity. Available resources 
were utilized to import goods which would have ranked 
very low on a satisfactory list of priorities and to nation-
alize foreign investments producing a far lower economic 
yield than others might have offered, had they been 
effected. This largely accounts for the inadequacy of 
capital formation in transport, energy —especially pe-
troleum— and industries manufacturing capital goods, 
which in turn is perhaps the cause of 3ie most serious 
bottleneck in the Argentine economy. 
The defective distribution of investment also pro-
duced an adverse effect on the distribution of manpower 
among the various types of employment, and on the 
productivity of the labour force. An exceptionally high 
proportion of the increment in the active population was 
diverted from the sectors concerned with the production 
and transport of goods to others not directly productive. 
Moreover, within the production and transport sectors 
themselves, very serious defects were observable in the 
distribution of the manpower increment. The labour 
shortage affecting agricultural production was not ac-
companied by a corresponding transfer of active popula-
tion to industry. On the contrary, in the last decade 
industry employed relatively little additional manpower. 
Construction and rail transport were foremost among the 
sectors which absorbed unduly large proportions of 
the labour force, with a correlative decline in produc-
tivity. 
Thus there was a notable discrepancy in the trends 
followed by productivity in the Argentine economy. 
While in industry it steadily and persistently improved, 
it deteriorated in other branches of the production and 
transport of goods, as well as in those sectors towards 
which an abnormally high proportion of the manpower 
increment was diverted. All this neutralized the bene-
ficial consequences of the rise in industrial productivity, 
and in recent years has been partly responsible for the 
stagnation of the average per capita product throughout 
the economy. 
As regards the expansion of exports, too, Argentina 
lost a favourable opportunity. After the war, world 
markets for Argentina's export commodities underwent 
a striking expansion, in which, however, Argentina was 
unable to avail itself of its share; on the contrary, its 
relative position as a world supplier deteriorated (see 
table 1). Several factors brought about this situation. 
In the first place, there was little to attract investors 
towards agriculture, owing to the policy of redistributing 
income in favour of the urban population through the 
maintenance of low relative prices for agricultural com-
modities and direct consumer subsidies, and to the resul-
ting need for other measures —such as the freezing of 
rents— aimed at preventing the monetary costs of agricul-
tural production from rising. These same measures led 
to an unduly large increase in consumption of foodstuffs 
and, therefore, to the reduction of exportable surpluses. 
Secondly, Argentina paid no heed to the necessity of 
reforming agricultural production methods and did little 
to further the research and extension efforts which were 
essential requisites for an expansion of production in 
this important sector. Thirdly, the agricultural subsidies 
policy pursued by the United States led to the accumula-
tion of large surpluses which were unloaded on the world 
markets first through the Marshall Plan and later by 
means of the surplus disposal programmes.® 
To the reduction of exportable surpluses was added, 
from 1950 onwards, the loss of those earnings derived 
in previous years from terms-of-trade movements, which 
bore the main brunt of the effects of the United States 
surplus disposal policy. However, the gross product con-
tinued to increase and with it the amount of foreign 
exchange required for the maintenance of the level of 
economic activity. Thus the margin of foreign exchange 
available for the expansion of Argentina's productive 
capital gradually disappeared, and exports barely suf-
ficed to finance imports of intermediate products, fuels 
and capital goods required for replacement purposes. 
Given Argentina's state of economic stagnation, ef-
forts to redistribute income in favour of the urban areas, 
on the one hand, and to maintain the level of investment 
on the other, were, because of their incompatibility, 
almost inevitably bound to lead to an inflationary pro-
B Although this was undoubtedly a basic factor, its influence 
is often over-estimated. Even if the United States had not put 
the policy in question into effect, Argentina would not have been 
able to take full advantage of the world market situation for lack 
of sufficient production. 
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Table 1 
SHARE OF ARGENTINA AND UNITED STATES IN WORLD EXPORTS OF SOME AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, 
I N S E L E C T E D Y E A R S 
•f^g^lj Argentina United States Rest of the world 
Period /Thousands (Thousands (Thousands ('Thousands 
of tons) of tons) fg^J" of tons) of tons) 
MAIZE 
1934-38 10.200 6 256.8 61.4 797.7 7.8 3 145.5 30.8 
1945^9 4 265 1 828.0 42.8 1 661.9 39.0 775.1 18.2 
1950-54 4 890 1 029.0 21.0 2 560.0 52.4 1 301.0 26.6 
195 5 4 800 362.3 7.5 2 752.6 57.3 1 685.1 35.2 
195 6 6 200 1065.1 17.2 2 976.4 48.0 2 158.5 34.8 
W H E A T a 
1934-38 17 300 3 340.5 19.3 1 259.4 7.3 12 700.1 73.4 
1945-49 23 790 2 079.6 8.7 11 203.5 47.1 10 506.9 44.2 
1950-54 25 450 2 186.3 8.6 8 982.7 35.3 14 281.0 56.1 
195 5 25 200 3 714.0 14.7 7 390.0 29.3 14 096.0 56.0 
195 6 31 800 2 568.0 8.1 12 669.0 39.8 16 563.0 52.1 
LINSEED b 
1934-38 2 282 1 541.5 67.6 1.2 0.1 739.3 32.3 
1945-49 799 243.5 30.5 42.8 5.4 512.7 64.1 
1950-54 1 335 580.2 43.5 253.9 19.0 500.9 37.5 
W O O L C 
1934-38 660 77.4 11.7 — 582.6 88.3 
1945-49 794 110.9 14.0 — 683.1 86.0 
1950-54 712 71.3 10.0 — 640.7 90.0 
M E A T D 
1934-38 1 180 » 468.6 39.7 — 711.4 60.3 
1945-49 1 134 396.4 35.0 — 737.6 65.0 
1950-54 939 176.0 18.7 — 763.0 81.3 
SOURCE: See Economic Survey of Latin America, 1957 (United Nations publication. Sales N o . : 58.II .C.1) , special study on " T r a d e in Agricultural Commodities in Latin 
America" , table X X I V . 
a Including exports o f wheat f lour, expressed in terms of wheat, 
b Including linseed o i l in terms of seed, 
c Clean base. 
d Beef, mutton, lamb and pork (fresh, chilled or frozen) , 
e Total sample. 
cess. As was already stated, the redistribution of income tainment of such targets would imply considerable and 
in the direction described curtailed exportable surpluses unflagging effort, without which it might be a fairly 
and hence the supply of capital goods. Measures designed long time before they were reached, 
to keep up investment levels by means of a generous Neither these objectives nor the estimates of the capital 
fiscal and monetary policy swelled the demand for im- investment and other requisites needed for their at-
ported capital goods and for foreign exchange in general. tainment should in any sense be looked upon as forecasts. 
Efforts to modify this situation might conceivably en- They should be taken simply as points of reference 
counter political obstacles. designed to facilitate an assessment of the necessary ef-
fort in quantitative terms and to provide a clear picture 
, ^ of the economic policy that should be pursued. 
4 . DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS 
Argentina can emerge from its state of economic CHANGES REQUIRED IN THE STRUCTURE OF 
stagnation if it adopts and steadily applies an economic PRODUCTION 
policy calculated to remove the factors responsible for 
the bottleneck mentioned above. It has enough natural In order to increase its per capita product with the 
resources to enable a considerable improvement on the intensity indicated, Argentina must substantially enlarge 
present standard of living to be achieved and a popula- the volume of investment, but in a rapidly developing 
tion capable of carrying out the effort involved in their environment it will not need to raise the investment coef-
mobilization. ficient registered in previous years. Consequently, the 
Study of Argentina's economic conditions and prob- growth of per capita consumption can keep parallel with 
lems has led to the conclusion that the domestic gross that of investment. Development can be expedited by 
product may be increased 40 per cent by 1962 and 77 means of a rechannelling of investment with a view to 
per cent by 1967 in relation to 1955. These growth the elimination of bottlenecks, for which purpose a strict 
targets represent a ceiling beyond which it would be order of priorities will have to be followed, 
extremely difficult to go, unless an appreciable improve- The establishment of investment priorities must be 
ment were to take place in the external factors condi- based on an analysis of the function of each of the 
tioning Argentina's development. Furthermore, the at- sectors of production in the over-all development process. 
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If the per capita product increases, demand for the dif-
ferent goods and services expands at varying speeds, 
which find their technical expression in the size of the 
elasticity coefficient of demand. Consequently, if sec-
toral disequilibria between supply and demand are to 
be avoided, a larger proportion of investment will have 
to be earmarked for those sectors where demand is 
expected to increase more rapidly. 
Again, with the growth of internal demand for each 
commodity or group of commodities demand for imports 
also expands, as part of that corresponding to finished 
goods is satisfied with purchases abroad, while at the 
same time domestic production needs imported goods, 
both intermediate and capital, in proportions varying in 
every individual case. The larger the proportional increase 
in demand for imported goods deriving from the incre-
ment in demand for the products of any sector, the more 
severe is the pressure on the balance of payments and 
the greater the economic development difficulties resul-
ting from the increment in question. To prevent such 
pressure the growth of domestic production will have to 
outstrip that of demand, and for this purpose investment 
in the sector concerned will have to be given an even 
higher priority than that suggested by demand elasticity, 
Lastly, in the establishment of investment priorities 
due account must be taken of the capital formation 
deficit which may previously have accumulated as a 
result of lack of foresight or mistaken economic policy. 
This deficit, the elasticity of demand and the pressure 
exerted on imports by the growth of the deficit are the 
three most important factors that have been taken into 
consideration in determining the directions in which in-
vestment resources should be channelled during the period 
under study. 
An analysis of the various sectors of production 
making up the Argentine economy enables them to be 
classified in four groups, in accordance with the criteria 
mentioned above. The most important of these groups 
—called here the "dynamic sectors group"— contributed 
23.4 per cent of the gross product in 1955, and it is for 
the goods produced by this group that demand will 
expand most rapidly. Such a development would entail 
a heavy increment in demand for imports unless the 
proposed substitution programme were carried out. The 
second group is formed by agricultural activities, which 
accounted for 17.3 per cent of the product. The third 
consists of the so-called vegetative growth sectors, which 
were responsible for 18.1 per cent of the product. Lastly, 
the fourth —"other sectors"— includes the Government, 
services and housing, which contributed 41.2 per cent. 
The most serious shortcomings as regards accumula-
ting capital and setting the course of economic policy 
were registered in the dynamic sectors group. It is on 
this group, therefore, that a major effort will have to be 
concentrated during the next ten years. The study on the 
Argentine economy and its development prospects is con-
cerned primarily with these and the agricultural sectors 
The dynamic sectors group comprises machinery, 
equipment, vehicles and metals; paper, board, and print-
ed matter; chemical products; cement and building 
materials; petroleum; electricity; communications and 
other services, and transport. The third group —to 
which the vegetative industries were assigned— is com-
posed of the remaining manufactures and mining activ-
ities. 
Demand for the products of the activities included 
in the first group tends to rise 1.7 per cent for every 
1-per-cent increment in the gross product. In addition, 
its import coefficient is very high (21.5 per cent in 
1955). This group of industries, which accounts for 
barely 13.4 per cent of the aggregate product of the 
economy, absorbs 71.9 per cent of imports (see table 2) . 
Thus it is the zone of the Argentine economy which is 
most vulnerable to external fluctuations and contingen-
cies and where the principal import substitutions will 
have to be achieved. 
From a comparison of the foreign exchange require-
ments noted in table 2 with Argentina's foreign exchange 
availabilities, which were estimated on the basis of an 
analysis of market prospects for exportable agricultural 
production and the surpluses that might exist, it can be 
seen that an essential prerequisite for the attainment of 
the postulated rate of development is a far-reaching sub-
stitution effort, the magnitude of which is implicit in the 
need to reduce unit import requirements in those sectors 
where they are highest. 
By virtue of detailed study of each of the most impor-
tant sectors of production, it has been possible to define 
the lines on which the structure of production observed 
in 1955 would have to be modified if the projected 
development levels were to be attained without the risk 
of a serious balance-of-payments disequilibrium. The 
corresponding data are given in table 3. 
It should be stressed here that the figures indicating 
targets for the gross value of production by sectors in 
default of the import substitutions recommended serve 
only illustrative purposes, their aim being to show the 
effect of the production efforts implied by import substi-
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS OF FINAL DEMAND AND IMPORT REQUIREMENTS 
Sector of the cconomy 
Imports 1955 a 
Global coefficient 
of elasticity of final 
demand in relation 
to product 
Percentage distri-
bution by industries 
of origin 
Coefficient oí elas-
ticity of potential 
demand in relation 




ports in relation to 
final demand 
Share in total 
gross product 
at {actor cost 
Dynamic sectors 











a Consumer goods, intermediate products by sector of origin, and machinery and production equipment by sector of destination, 
b Including construction. 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: PERCENTAGE INCREMENTS REQUIRED IN 
GROSS PRODUCTION BY SECTORS, WITH AND 
WITHOUT IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 







2. Deposits, quarries and mines . . 
3. Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 
4. Textiles, wearing apparel and other 
made-up textile goods, and 
leather 
5. Wood and building materials . . 
6. Paper and printed matter. . . . 
7. Chemicals and rubber 
8. Fuels, electricity and public health 
works 
9. Metals ! ! 
10. Vehicles and machinery 
11. Construction 
12. Services in general 
1962 1967 1962 1967 
30.3 53.0 35.1 56.7 
98.2 186.7 32.5 68.1 
28.4 48.5 28.1 477 
37.8 65.7 37.3 64.5 
53.2 113.8 42.7 86.4 
66.1 126.0 48.4 90.3 
62.5 130.3 46.7 84.3 
62.0 114.2 46.8 82.8 
92.5 176.1 47.2 87.0 
111.3 164.2 77.5 129.4 
24.0 74.3 24.0 74.3 
43.2 19 A 40.9 74.6 
tution and the sectors in which the substitution effort is 
relatively most essential. The figures referred to must 
on no account be interpreted as realistic objectives, since 
they signify so great a balance-of-payments deficit 
that they would not be feasible. On the other hand, the 
production targets to be reached if the suggested substi-
tutions are effected represent practical possibilities. 
It is worth while pausing to examine in some detail 
the changes which will be required in the structure of 
production. In the manufacturing industries as a whole 
—both those of a dynamic and those of a vegetative 
character— output must increase 107 per cent by 1967. 
Agricultural production, on the other hand, according 
to the projections prepared, would expand by only 53 
per cent. Consequently, a change would take place not 
only in the structure of Argentina's industry, through 
the development of activities characterized by greater 
technical complexity than existing vegetative industries, 
but also in the structure of the economy, since the 
relative importance of industry would increase and that 
of agricultural production would decline. The latter's 
share in the aggregate product was 17 per cent in 1955 
and would fall to 15 per cent in 1967, while that of 
industry would rise from 23 to 27 per cent over the 
same period. 
Changes such as these, in the direction of a higher 
degree of industrialization, are not the reflection of a 
special preference. They are due to the fact that domestic 
demand increases more intensively in the case of indus-
trial goods than in that of agricultural commodities, a 
disparity which is only partly offset by the expansion of 
agricultural exports. This happens both in Argentina 
and in other countries, when the per capita product 
follows an upward trend. The inequality of the growth 
rates of industrial and agricultural production will thus 
be accentuated, since not only will demand for industrial 
goods be more intensive, but an increasing proportion of 
it will have to be met by means of import substitution. 
This point is of great importance for an under-
standing of the orientation of economic policy, and is 
often discussed in Argentina. Given a specific increase 
in internal and external demand, the relationship between 
agricultural and industrial production is not arbitrary. 
The two are closely interdependent, as are all the sectors 
of the economy. Industrial production cannot develop 
independently of agriculture. To state the case in outline, 
given a particular rate of growth of exports, the aggregate 
product of the economy can increase at a higher rate 
only if domestic production is substituted for a certain 
quantity of imports of industrial goods as well as other 
items. Otherwise, both industrial production and the ag-
gregate product would necessarily decrease because of 
the external disequilibrium which would be registered. 
Thus, equilibrium between industrial and agricultural 
production does not imply that their growth trends must 
run parallel and that the evolution of demand should 
not be taken into account. It is a dynamic, changing 
equilibrium, which is constantly being readjusted to 
prevailing internal and external conditions. The reason 
why it is disturbed in Argentina is not that industry 
has greatly expanded, but that the import substitutions 
required to enable the dynamic sectors to effect their 
essential imports have not been achieved. Paradoxical 
as it may seem, agriculture can emerge from its present 
stagnation only if the expansion of industry is accelerated. 
The implication is that, if Argentina's industrial de-
velopment has slowed down perceptibly, this is not be-
cause it has been excessive (since it is still below the 
level that might have been attained and that is needful 
in the national interest), but because import substitution 
has been inadequate and exports have declined. Hence 
the significance of vigorous action in these two fields, 
as well as in that of petroleum. 
6. CHANGES REQUIRED IN THE CHANNELLING OF 
INVESTMENT 
On the basis of output targets, current capacity and 
replacement and equipment needs, the volume of gross 
fixed investment by sectors can be determined. The 
relevant figures are given in table 4. 
A comparison of the allocation of investment in the 
future with that registered in 1955 gives a fairly precise 
idea of the great effort required as regards redirecting 
the Argentine economy —an effort which will also be 
reflected in the distribution of employment of the active 
population. 
7 . FINANCING OF THE INVESTMENT PROGRAMME 
In 1955-57, domestic saving (excluding foreign invest-
ment) averaged 14 230 million pesos (at 1950 prices) 
yearly, or about 20.6 per cent of the gross product. 
The correct procedure would have been to calculate future 
savings possibilities on the basis of this coefficient, but 
in view of the variations it customarily displays, and 
to avoid financial over-optimism, it was felt preferable to 
base the estimates in question on a coefficient of 19.4 
per cent. 
If the rate of saving were maintained at the level 
contemplated, and the product were to increase by 40 
per cent between 1956 and 1962, the economy would 
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Table 4 
ARGENTINA: ESTIMATE OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT BY SECTORS, 1956-67 
(At 19S0 prices) 
1955 1956-62 a 1963-67 & 


















Agricultural sector . . . . 
Other sectors producing 
goods b 



















































Total 15427 100.0 16 889 100.0 25 779 100.0 
a Annual average for the period. 
b Including vegetative manufacturing industries, mining and conatruction. 
c Including the publ i c sector, trade, f inance, personal services and housing. 
generate domestic saving equivalent to 111 073 million 
pesos for the whole period, that is, 7 147 million less than 
the value of the investment postulated for those seven 
years. This sum would have to be financed with loans 
and net foreign capital investment. In terms of dollars, 
it would represent 1 060 million ® and would correspond 
to barely 1.3 per cent of the product and 12.2 per cent of 
total exports in the period. If export and import sub-
stitution targets were attained, foreign investment to this 
amount could be amortized without difficulty, provided 
that the time limits allowed were sufficiently ample. 
It was previously pointed out that for the economy 
to generate savings sufficiently large to finance a major 
proportion of investment in 1956-62, the product would 
have to increase by 40 per cent. For this purpose it 
would be essential for investment to be carefully distrib-
uted over the period, in conformity with a strict order 
of priority, such that the first to be affected would be 
the investments exerting the greatest influence on the 
whole economy and those for which the best prospects 
of external financing existed. Only in this way would it 
be possible to secure the expansion of the product and 
® Dollars with 1955 purchasing power. The repatriation of 
Argentine capital amounting to 216 million dollars is also assumed. 
Otherwise, net foreign investment would have to be raised to 
1,276 million dollars. 
the generation of a larger volume of national savings to 
finance heavier investment. The principal function of 
foreign capital is precisely that of contributing to this 
process of self-generation of savings. 
The measures proposed for the solution of the balance-
of-payments problem, in combination with a policy of 
austerity in the current expenditure of the public sector, 
would enable the rate of saving to be raised to 23.0 per 
cent of the product in 1963-67. If this rate of domestic 
saving were achieved, and the product increased to the 
extent projected, the volume of savings generated would 
suffice to finance practically all ^ross investment and, 
according to estimates, only 184 million dollars' worth of 
net foreign capital investment would be necessary in the 
5-year period referred to. 
A more specific idea of financing problems can be 
formed if they are studied in the light of a national 
saving and investment budget, as given in table 5. 
This table shows that in 1955 investment exceeded 
the savings generated by the public sector by the equiv-
alent of 2.3 per cent of the aggregate product. The 
difference was financed by dint of borrowing from the 
private sector through various financial instruments, 
such as the issue of bonds, credit from suppliers, etc. 
The increment in public saving postulated for 1956-62 
is considerable, although still insufficient to finance the 
Table 5 
ARGENTINA: NATIONAL SAVING AND INVESTMENT BUDGET, 1955, 1956-62, 1963-67 
(In percentages of the gross product) 
1955 1956-62 a 1963-67 & 
Investment Saving Investment Savingb Investment Saving b 
Private 16.5 18.5 13.7 11.8 13.3 13.0 
PuWicc 5.9 3 g 8 3 y 6 JQ.O 10.0 
Domestic _ 22.1 — 19.4 23.0 
Foreign _ g j _ i j 0.3 
Total 22^ 22^ 207 207 23J 23.? 
a Annual averages. 
b As net figures are given for foreign loans and investment, amortization of the external debt is not considered separately. 
c For 1956-62 and 1963.67, most Government investment in transport and energy up to 1955 is inc luded under the publ i c sector. In the future, however, such invest-
ment may be financed by the private sector. In that case, the saving and investment of the private sector wi l l increase and those of the publ ic sector will decrease. 
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sector's own investment.' Nor do estimates suggest that 
the private sector will generate savings in excess of its 
investment. In both cases, the differences would be 
balanced with external loans and investments. 
The 23-per-cent increase in domestic saving projected 
for 1962-67 does not seem unduly large in the light of 
Argentina's experience. It could be achieved in its en-
tirety if the tax rate were successfully maintained at the 
current level and if the Government's consumer expen-
diture were reduced to 14.2 per cent of the aggregate 
product. 
8 . PRODUCTION AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION TARGETS 
It has already been pointed out that import substitu-
tion policy would have to be implemented mainly in the 
dynamic sectors. The implication is that an increasing 
proportion of the capital goods and raw materials used 
by these sectors would have to be domestically-produced. 
To give a preliminary idea of the magnitude of the import 
substitution effort required and of its distribution among 
the various dynamic industries, table 6 was prepared, 
showing in very brief outline the results of wide research 
carried out in collaboration with Argentine experts and 
leading industrialists. 
Table 6 
ARGENTINA: IMPORT REQUIREMENTS, WITH AND 
WITHOUT IMPORT SUBSTITUTION, 
BETWEEN 1955 AND 1967 
(Millions of dollars) a 
Effective 
Sector of the economy 
(A) 
Dynamic sectors (excluding 
petroleum) 
Steel making 201 
Non-ferrous metals. . . 42 
Machinery, vehicles, 
equipment and other 
durable goods. . . . 303 
Chemical products. . . 79 




Sectors developing less in-
tensively 266 
Grand total 1 172 









































What would these import substitutions imply? Po-
tential demand for imports ® —excluding petroleum-
would expand by about 1197 million dollars between 
1955 and 1967 if the aggregate product of the economy 
were to increase as postulated. Since in the same space 
of time the value of industrial import substitution would 
'' See, however, table 5, note c. 
^ The demand that would be generated in default of the neces-
sary import substitution. 
Table 1 
ARGENTINA: PROJECTION OF EXPORTS 
(Millions oí dollars) a 
Í955 1962 1967 
Agricultural. 
Industrial . . . 
Total exports . 
Net services. . 
Total. . . . 
















reach about 721 million dollars, effective imports would 
increase by 476 million, an amount which, though smaller 
than the increment in demand, is still substantial. Con-
siderable importance attaches to this conclusion. If 
Argentina's means of external payment proved insuf-
ficient to cover these irreplaceable imports, the growth 
target for the aggregate product could not be attained, 
and would have to be lowered correlatively with the 
reduction in the resources available for purchases abroad. 
Hence the need to expand exports and cut down im-
ports of petroleum. According to estimates, agricultural 
exports might be increased by 714 million dollars and 
industrial exports by 122 million, giving a total of 842 
million, which includes a small increment in net exports 
of services (see table 7 ) . As regards petroleum, it is 
calculated that imports could be reduced by 103 million 
dollars between 1955 and 1967 if the production projec-
tions were fulfilled. 
Thus, the expansion of agricultural and industrial 
exports and the contraction of petroleum imports would 
be sufficient to cover the increase in imports as well as 
the additional financial payments entailed by the servic-
ing of new foreign investment. The relevant estimates 
are shown in table 8. Those for 1962 are added with a 
view to shedding more light on the problem. 
The analysis of these figures affords an opportunity 
for once more laying stress on the character of the 
estimates or projections which they represent. Their 
sole purpose is to give some idea of the nature and 
magnitude of the subsidiary targets which would have to 
be attained in order to achieve the main objective —that 
of increasing the product. Forecasts as to import substi-
tution, the expansion of exports and the curtailment of 
imports are not attempted here. Attention is simply called 
to the fact that an essential requisite for the growth of 
Table 8 
ARGENTINA: ELIMINATION OF EXTERNAL BOTTLENECK 
IN THE ECONOMY 
(Increment in millions of dollars)^ 
Between Between 
1955 1962 
and 1962 and 1967 Total 
1. Inaease in demand for imports . . . 942 460 1402 
2. Import substitution 600 430 1030 
3. Increase in effective imports (1 — 2 ) . 342 30 372 
4. Increase in exports 552 280 832 
5. Difference available for financial ser-
vices and new reserves (4 — 3) . . 210 250 460 
a At 1955 prices. 
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the product is that these three subsidiary objectives be 
attained in combination and on the approximate scale 
suggested. The pattern in which they are combined is 
not arbitrary, nor the outcome of abstract juggling with 
numbers, but results from a thorough and careful analysis 
of practical possibilities. 
Thus, the present attempt to state the position in 
quantitative terms aims only at providing economic 
policy, and development programming in particular, with 
more specific and precise analytical instruments than 
can be derived from general statements, devoid of any 
attempt to assess approximate magnitudes, with respect 
to the basic variables of economic growth. 
It was mentioned above that in the dynamic sectors 
of the economy the import coefficient was very high, 
namely, 21.5 per cent. In the rest of the economy, which 
accounts for 75 per cent of the product, the corresponding 
coefficient is barely 2.8 per cent, the over-all figure 
being 7.5 per cent. At first sight it might seem surprising 
that the import problem should have come to play so 
decisive a role in the development of Argentina, since 
the relative significance indicated by this coefficient is 
so slight. But the imports involved are to a large extent 
essential ingredients of the economic process, so that, 
if they were not increased, the product could not expand 
either, except in so far as import substitutions were ef-
fected. Moreover, such resources are concentrated in the 
dynamic sectors, and it is there above all that the external 
vulnerability of the Argentine economy makes itself felt, 
just as it is precisely in the dynamic industries that the 
principal substitution process will have to take place. 
From another point of view, it should be pointed out 
that a change has taken place in the nature of Argentina's 
external vulnerability. In former times, when exports 
accounted for a very high proportion of the aggregate 
product, any variation in these exerted so marked an 
influence on aggregate demand that it would have been 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to counteract the 
effect of their fluctuations. Today the relative importance 
of exports has greatly decreased, and Argentina has the 
means of offsetting the fluctuations in question at its 
disposal. In this sense economic development has notably 
reduced Argentina's external vulnerability. But from 
another standpoint, that same development has increased 
its vulnerability on the import side. Argentina has always 
depended upon imports of capital goods and of raw 
materials and intermediate products; but it also used to 
have to purchase consumer goods abroad. In earlier 
times, curtailment of the latter imports enabled it tc 
continue financing those other external purchases of es-
sential goods —especially raw materials and intermediate 
products— which could not be deferred. This reducible 
margin has finally disappeared. Argentina can no longer 
draw upon it in order to expand essential imports, and 
the problem thus assumes a different form. 
In fact, so long as the rapid restriction of imports 
of consumer goods was possible, Argentina could do 
without a farsighted import substitution policy, since the 
immediate effects of such restrictive action gave it time 
to achieve the necessary substitutions. Now the disap-
pearance of the reducible margin compels it to look 
ahead, especially as the industries that need to be estab-
lished take a much longer time to set up, on account of 
their very complexity, than current consumer industries. 
(This is exemplified by a comparison between steel 
making and petrochemicals on the one hand, and the 
textile industries on the other.) 
There is another aspect of import substitution policy 
which cannot be disregarded here. When it is carried 
out within certain reasonable bounds imposed by econom-
ic considerations, import substitution is an indispensable 
requisite for economic growth. In developinp countries 
where primary production is predominant, the growth of 
the aggregate product generally tends to outstrip that 
of exports, and demand for imports to expand more 
than the product. The resultant trend towards disequili-
brium can be counteracted only by a slackening of the 
rate of increase of the product —impossible to contem-
plate as a desirable end— or by means of import substi-
tution. 
Fundamentally, this phenomenon is due to the fact, 
to which attention has so often been drawn in ECLA 
reports, that as the per capita product rises, once it has 
passed a very low level, demand for industrial goods 
follows a much more intensive upward trend than demand 
for primary commodities. 
Domestic production to replace industrial imports 
generally costs more than the similar goods which were 
formerly imported. However, this difference in cost is 
the price which a country must pay for increasing its 
product on a much larger scale. What is involved, in 
other words, is a loss of product in certain sectors which 
is self-compensated in that it generates a much larger 
increment in the product of other sectors. 
This does not mean, however, that import substitution 
of any kind is advisable. On the contrary, a strictly 
selective criterion must be adopted, giving priority to 
all those substitutions which fulfil the following two 
primary requisites: (a) the least difference in cost as 
between the domestic and the imported article; and (b) 
the greatest saving of foreign exchange. This criterion 
has been applied to the possible substitutions suggested 
here, although always provisionally, until the study \if 
specific projects enables more definite conclusions to bi; 
reached. 
It has just been stated that import substitution repre-
sents a loss of product over against an increment which 
is much greater. In reality, this loss would affect a 
relatively small import coefficient. As already shown, 
in 1955 the coefficient was 7.5 per cent, and by 1967 
the necessary substitutions would bring it down to 5.6 
per cent. The incidence of the loss would therefore be 
borne by barely 5.6 per cent of the aggregate product. 
However, the problem should not be dismissed lightly 
on this account. It is important, and in fact extremely so, 
since the extra costs are superimposed on those which 
have long accompanied the gradual development of the 
substitution process ever since the initial stage of indus-
trialization. Argentina needs to increase its productivity 
intensively, and has ample possibilities of doing so. In 
this connexion it would not be enough to increase per 
capita investment, improve technique and utilize man-
power more efficiently. Action would also have to be 
taken with respect to the import coefficient 
The coefficient of 5.6 per cent projected for 1967 
represents an extremely low proportion —lower, for 
22 
example, than that of 19 per cent registered in the coun-
tries of Western Europe in 1956. Such a coefficient had 
already been attained by the United States in the period 
preceding the world depression (1920-24). But at that 
time it had 110 million inhabitants (4 ^ times more 
than it is assumed that Argentina will have in 1967), 
which meant that there was a market of considerable 
size for any article in respect of which substitution was 
effected, and permitted a high degree of specialization 
and division of labour on a truly continental scale. If in 
addition the immense variety and importance of the 
natural resources of the United States are borne in mind, 
it will be understood that, although the size of the import 
coefficients in the two countries is similar, Argentina's 
situation is very different indeed from that of the United 
States during the period under consideration. 
What is more, in so far as future prospects can be 
described at present, Argentina will have to pursue a 
more far-reaching substitution policy with respect to 
imports from the large industrial centres after 1967, and 
will always be handicapped by the lack of certain natural 
resources and by specialization difficulties of the same 
kind as are experienced by other Latin American coun-
tries. All this is of vast importance for the problem of 
inter-Latin American trade, and accounts for Argentina's 
interest in the discussion of regional market possibilities. 
9. THE BASIC ROLE OF EXPORTS IN THE ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND THE INTRODUCTION 
OF IMPROVED AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUES 
The expansion of the export trade is just as vitally 
necessary as import substitution for the vigorous develop-
ment of industry and, consequently, for the rapid growth 
of the per capita product. Unfortunately, the world 
market for agricultural commodities is no longer what 
it was in former times, when it absorbed all that Argen-
tina could export. Its absorption capacity is now limtied, 
and competition from the United States is an additional 
factor in the case of certain very important items. Never-
theless, some Latin American countries have managed to 
increase their share in the world market, whereas that 
of Argentina has declined. Such is the consequence of 
the sharp downward movement in its export trade. 
It is common knowledge that the price policy for-
merly adopted discouraged agricultural production for ex-
Jort, while domestic consumption continued to increase; 
lence the regrettable situation just described. But the 
trouble cuts deeper. Argentina stiU needs to make a 
great effort to bring its agricultural production into line 
with the demands of its own development and the new 
conditions prevailing on the world market. As regards 
technical progress, it has lagged behind other comparable 
countries, and in the pampas, which are the source of 
most of its agricultural exports, average yields have not 
improved in the last three decades, except during the 
5-year period 1940-44. 
This fact is all the more serious if it is taken into 
account that the whole of the productive land in the 
pampas is already in use and that production can no 
longer be rapidly expanded, as in earlier periods, by 
extending the frontier of agriculture to include new land. 
Hence the imperative need to increase yields. By 1967 
the average yield of grain and oil seeds should be at 
least 17 per cent larger than in 1953-57, so that by this 
means, in conjunction with the enlargement of the area 
farmed, higher production levels may be attained. 
The same applies to stock farming. Beef production 
might rise from the present approximate figure of 50 
kilogrammes per hectare used for stock farming in the 
pampas to about 77 kilogrammes by 1967. It is con-
sidered that the average yield of stock farming land 
might progressively increase until by 1967 it had risen 
58 per cent above the 1953-57 average. 
To this end, a programme is needed consisting in 
technical action based on systematic research and progres-
sing from simple measures of which the effect would be 
immediate to others which would take a longer time 
to yield results. All these would of course have to be 
subordinated to clearly-defined economic ends. 
Without a vigorous programme for the introduction 
of improved techniques, crop production would develop 
only at the expense of stock farming, as has been hap-
pening in recent years, and the substantial produc-
tion increments which Argentina requires could not be 
achieved. 
If the postulated targets were attained, agricultural 
production and exports might register the increments 
shown in table 9. 
Table 9 
A R G E N T I N A : I N C R E M E N T R E Q U I R E D I N A G R I C U L T U R A L 
P R O D U C T I O N A N D E X P O R T S B E T W E E N 1 9 5 5 A N D 1 9 6 7 
Percentage increment in 
relation to 1950-54 a 
1962 1967 
Agricultural production . . 
In the pampas 









1 2 5 
a The period 1950-54 has been chosen to prevent the comparison from being 
affected by the exceptional yields registered in 1955. 
But the matter does not end with the application of 
technical measures to increase production and exports. 
There are institutional aspects of the question whose 
importance cannot be overlooked. To the consequences 
of a traditional land tenure system have been added 
those of the freezing of rents. Of the farms in the 
pampas, 53 per cent are in the hands of rent-paying 
tenants and sharecroppers, who work 54 per cent of their 
productive land. With the highly laudable aim of protec-
ting such farmers against the effects of the unfavourable 
price movement, rents were frozen in 1944 and eviction 
was prohibited. Measures of this kind are quite inade-
quate to replace really fundamental reforms in the land 
tenure system. Unquestionably, those adopted served 
their direct purpose, but at the same time they put a 
stop to the system of rotation of crop and stock farming, 
to the definite detriment of yields per hectare. 
How far is the traditional land tenure system compat-
ible with the energetic introduction of more advanced 
techniques? There can be no doubt that tenants and 
sharecroppers might very well put into practice the 
simple and immediately effective measures postulated 
for the next few years. But their interest might flag as 
techniques improved and such practices were adopted 
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as soil conservation, rotation of crops, application of 
fertilizers, expansion of the area under permanent arti-
ficial pastures, etc. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the impos-
sibility of bringing new land under cultivation creates 
other needs. From the economic point of view, so long 
as there was still available land in the pampas the exis-
tence of inefficiently cultivated areas was not of decisive 
importance. But now that the basic problem is to increase 
yields, it implies a waste of production capacity which 
weakens the power of the economy to expand. It is not 
only that there are large tracts unsatisfactorily farmed. 
Another problem existing in Argentina is that of frag-
mentation of the land, which has led to a multiplicity 
of holdings of anti-economic size. In fact, it is estimated 
that nearly two-thirds of the farms situated in the pampas 
in 1957 were smaller than the area considered to be an 
economic unit, according to the relevant concept estab-
lished by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Rent 
Control Boards (Cámaras de arrendamiento), i.e., a farm 
large enough to provide the livelihood and absorb the 
labour of a standard family. In Argentina as a whole, 
farms of under 10 hectares represent one-fifth of total 
farms, consist on an average of 4 hectares each and 
occupy 0.24 per cent of the total productive land. At a 
more general level, all this has unfavourable effects on 
yields and impedes technical progress. 
Lastly, in face of the sweeping technological and 
social reforms required in Argentina's rural sector if it 
is to make an effective contribution to the development 
of exports and of the economy as a whole, due considera-
tion must be given to the historical implications of the 
current land tenure system. In the last analysis, the 
technical progress achieved in production and transport 
has raised the value of the land. This is the permanent 
and conclusive fact. What is purely circumstantial is the 
temporary improvement in the position of the tenant or 
sharecropper. Moreover, prospects of an increase in 
the product per hectare, whether through technique or 
prices, have frequently tended to be reflected in advance 
in a revaluation of die land which has made it more 
difficult for the tenant or sharecropper to establish 
himself, as the value thus acquired by the land is exag-
gerated in relation to its current yield, especially if the 
revaluation phenomenon is accentuated by the lands be-
coming a refuge against inflation, as is happening at 
the present time. 
This repercussion of technical progress on the value 
of the land is another of the reasons why the introduc-
tion of improved farm techniques must inevitably be 
linked to the industrialization process. One of the dynam-
ic functions of this latter is to absorb, in conditions 
of high productivity, the manpower released from agri-
cultural employment by the introduction of more ad-
vanced techiiiques. If it were not for industrialization, 
the existence of this redundant manpower would prevent 
the increase achieved in the per capita product by virtue 
of new techniques from being transferred in adequate 
measure to the effective wages of rural workers, and 
the result would be that the trend towards revaluation 
of the land could develop entirely unhindered. 
Again, the improvement of agricultural techniques 
calls for more widespread use of capital goods and inter-
mediate products of industrial origin, which, if they 
were not supplied by domestic production, would have 
to be imported. Where there is a serious foreign ex-
change shortage it will be very difficult to decide in 
favour of the latter procedure, and this throws into 
still clearer relief the truth of the assertion that indus-
trialization is a necessary complement of the introduction 
of more advanced farm techniques and the improvement 
of agricultural productivity. 
Thorough discussion of this very complex problem is 
outside the scope of the present article, but in briefly 
touching upon the topic of improved agricultural tech-
niques it was necessary at least to call attention to its 
close connexion with the time-honoured problem of the 
land tenure system. 
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S O M E O B S E R V A T I O N S O N T H E I N D U S T R I A L D E V E L O P M E N T O F P E R U ^ 
The main object of the study on the industrial de-
velopment of Peru, which was undertaken in reponse to 
a request addressed to the ECLA Secretariat by the 
Peruvian Government, was to present an examination 
of the relevant problems and prospects. Its purpose 
was, in effect, to provide the background material and 
analysis which might help to answer the following three 
questions: 
(a) How intensively and at what rate woidd Peruvian 
industry have to develop in the future in order to make 
a positive contribution to the growth of the economy 
as a whole and to a gradual improvement in the level 
of per capita income? 
(b) T^at simultaneous changes would have to be 
made in the composition of industrial production and 
in the structure of the productive capacity of the manu-
facturing sector? 
(c) By what means and incentives could this growth 
and these changes be achieved? 
The purpose of the study having been stated in such 
terms, it is clear that it could not be confined to strictly 
industrial matters, isolated from the prospects and prob-
lems of all other economic activities. On the contrary, 
an appraisal of the industrialization process must, if it 
is to be sound, be based on an appreciation of the 
present conditions of the Peruvian economy as a whole, 
the characteristics of its growth and its development pos-
sibilities. Hence Part One of the study is devoted to a 
comprehensive survey intended to provide a general 
background for an examination of the special problems 
of industrial development, although, clearly, it does not 
claim to be a thorough or particularly detailed analysis. 
1. THE PRESENT STAGE OF PERU'S DEVELOPMENT 
The first task was to systematize the main data needed 
to portray the present stage of development of the Peru-
vian economy. 
According to the relevant estimates, the average level 
of per capita income amounted to some 187 dollars in 
1955, which is probably equivalent to not more than two-
thirds of the present average per capita income in Latin 
America as a whole. 
During that same year, about 60 per cent of the 
population was living in the rural areas and the same 
percentage of the total labour force was engaged in 
agricultural activities, which contributed 30 per cent to-
* The text of this article is based on a lecture delivered by 
Mr. Pedro Vuskovic, an economist in the Industrial Development 
Division of ECLA, at the Institute of Economic Studies, Lima, 
in which he summarized and explained the main ideas of Part 
One of the study The Industrial Development of Peru (E/CN.12/ 
493), Volume VI in the series Analyses and Projections of Eco-
nomic Development, which is being published by the Secretariat. 
The latter considers that, in addition to giving a comprehensive 
picture of the research undertaken, the following pages help 
towards a better understanding of Peruvian industrial and devel-
opment problems. 
wards the national income. This fact already shows the 
relatively low level of productivity in the farming sector. 
By contrast, there was one sector of high productivity 
—the extractive industry— which, however, generated 
only 7 per cent of the national income and employed 
less than 2 per cent of the total active population. 
Among the manufacturing activities, the income generated 
by industry proper, which is still relatively new, added 
to the income derived from cottage and small-scale in-
dustry, represented 17 per cent of the total national 
income. Finally, there were services of various kinds 
and at different stages of development. The most im-
portant of these was trade, with a share of the total 
income higher even than that of registered industry. 
The picture would not be complete unless some indica-
tions were given, besides these over-all figures, of the 
marked contrasts which exist in the various parts of 
the economy. Two different economies —that of the 
coastal belt and that of the sierra— exist side by side. 
They are linked together only to a very small extent, 
and the differences in their per capita income are in the 
ratio of one to three. A modern export agriculture is 
offset by a subsistence agriculture which is very back-
ward technologically, ^vhile an efficient and concentrated 
industry is counterbalanced by scattered artisan activ-
ities in which four times as many persons are employed, 
and so on. 
The relative importance of the external sector was 
rather high, witness the fact that the import coefficient 
(relationship between the value of imports and the gross 
national product) reached the figure of 18 per cent, 
while exports in 1955 amounted to some 5 100 million 
soles, an average of about 30 dollars per person. In-
cidentally, this latter figure does not compare very fa-
vourably with that registered in recent years in other 
Latin American countries.^ To some extent it dispels the 
relatively widespread belief that Peru enjoys a fairly 
favourable foreign trade position. Nor can it be dis-
counted as the possible source of potential disequilibria 
in the balance of payments, which have not assumed as 
severe a form as might have been expected because of 
expansion, the favourable effect of the terms of trade 
and the level and pattern of income distribution. 
In short, it may be concluded that in 1955 Peru dis-
played the typical features of an under-developed econ-
omy in which, moreover, the averages and per capita 
mean values could not be interpreted directly because of 
the marked contrasts noted in the various parts of the 
economy. 
On the other hand, Peru continued to have rich 
natural resources, a relatively high investment coefficient 
and a righ rate of economic growth. 
1 It is barely higher than that of Bolivia (29 dollars) and 
much lower than that of Argentina (49 dollars), Chile (70 dol-
lars) and Colombia (46 dollars). 
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2 . GROWTH DURING THE PERIOD 1 9 4 5 - 5 5 
The rate of growth during this period may be illus-
trated more clearly by a brief reference to the increase 
in tlie gross product from 1945 onwards. Following a 
moderate rise during 1945-50 and a more rapid one 
between 1950 and 1955, the gross product expanded 
throughout the whole decade at an annual average cu-
mulative rate of 2.9 per cent per capita, representing a 
total increase of 63 per cent. This rate of growth 
compares very favourably with that registered in most 
Latin American countries over the same period and its 
continuance would not only bring about a gradual rise in 
the living level of the population but would also enable 
Peru to go on improving its relative position in Latin 
America as regards national income. 
While the gross product was increasing, an urbaniza-
tion process of some magnitude was taking place. The 
relevant estimates indicate that, while the total population 
increment was 34 per cent, that in the rural areas was 
23 per cent and that in the urban centres 52 per cent. 
At the end of the period, the urban population thus 
represented 40 per cent of the total. 
Yet the significant economic growth registered during 
the decade under review was not accompanied by equally 
intensive structural changes. The agricultural sector ex-
panded its output in real terms by 47 per cent (what 
is even more striking, agricultural production for export 
increased by 59 per cent, while that for domestic con-
sumption rose by only 35 per cent) and its relative 
share in the total national income fell from 33.5 to 30.2 
per cent. The manufacturing industry almost doubled 
its volume of production but its relative share of the 
national income rose only slightly (from 15 to 17 per 
cent). On the other hand, the extractive industries 
maintained almost unchanged their share of the national 
product following a decline in their quantum of produc-
tion at the beginning of the period and a very rapid 
rise in the subsequent years. Finally, there was an in-
crease in the share of some services —building and 
transport for example— and a contraction in others 
(including the public sector). 
From the point of view of goods and services available 
for consumption and investment, the expansion of the 
gross product was accompanied by other advantages, in 
particular the favourable trend in the terms of trade 
and an increasing net influx of foreign capital. The 
terms of trade were in fact positive every year after 1945 
until 1955. The influence of the foreign capital inflow 
may be more clearly appreciated if it is remembered 
that there was a rapid change from a surplus of exports 
to one of imports. Consequently, while in 1945 available 
goods and services came to 1 000 million soles less than 
the gross product, in 1955 they exceeded it by more 
than 350 million soles. This undoubtedly facilitated 
investment and at the same time made a rapid rise in 
consumption possible. 
There was also another favourable factor. In order 
to achieve the increase in the gross product which has 
just been described, it was unnecessary to expend an 
investment effort of similar intensity. This is because, in 
the final analysis, the amount of the gross product ob-
tainable depends largely on two determinants: (a) the 
total stock of capital which it has been possible to ac-
cumulate; and (b) the extent to which it may be utilized, 
a concept known as the "product-capital ratio". Ac-
cording to one estimate, the stock of capital in Peru 
in 1955 was approximately 80 000 million soles. If this 
sum is compared with the gross product obtained in 
that year, a product-capital ratio of 0.40 would result. 
Such a ratio is not only high when compared with that 
of the other Latin American countries but is also far 
greater than that registered at the beginning of the 
decade. (The ratio improved steadily from 0.34 in 1945 
to 0.39 in 1951, a level at which it remained relatively 
stationary thereafter.) As a result, the pressure on do-
mestic investment was undoubtedly relieved, while at 
the same time there was a substantial contribution from 
foreign investment. During 1951-55, the latter represent-
ed 20 per cent of aggregate investment so that foreign 
capital constituted 15 per cent of Peru's total stock 
of capital. 
The rise in the import coefficient from 13 per cent 
in 1945 to 18 per cent in 1955 shows that the external 
sector played a very dynamic role. This factor might 
be construed as highly favourable, were it not for other 
factors which suggest that it should be regarded with 
some circumspection. Account must be taken first of 
the form in which the additional imports were financed 
and, secondly, of the changes which occurred in their 
structure. Actually, the growth of imports was not ac-
companied by even a comparable expansion of exports. 
While the former went up (in real terms) by 120 per 
cent, the rise in the latter was of only 40 per cent. But 
the factors which explain this divergence —the improve-
ment in the terms of trade and the influx of foreign 
capital— cannot be considered as permanent and will 
therefore probably not play the same part in the future. 
As regards the structure of imports (analysed at 1955 
constant prices), the improvement which might have 
been expected after such a marked expansion was not 
in fact achieved. On the contrary, the share of consumer 
goods rose from 20.7 per cent in 1945 to 26 per cent 
in 1951 and 24 per cent in 1955, while the share of 
capital goods fell from 49.7 to 44.1 per cent. 
These trends reveal a very high elasticity of demand 
for imported consumer goods. Over the period 1945-55 
it amounted to almost 2.0. To maintain such a high 
import elasticity for a long period would be very dif-
ficult. It would mean in practice that each increment 
of one per cent in the national income would have to be 
accompanied by a rise of more than two per cent in 
imports and corresponding increases in the capacity 
to import. 
The comments and figures mentioned above provide 
a clearer illustration of the magnitude of the industrial 
growth achieved during this period. Although in absolute 
terms the expansion of manufacturing output was very 
marked, the rise in the import coefficient, the increased 
share in imports represented by consumer goods (in stiff 
competition with domestic production) and the larger 
proportion of building materials (also partially produced 
in Peru) in imports of capital goods all show that indus-
trial development was perhaps not intensive enough and 
that, to a certain degree, domestic industry did not seize 
all the opportunities of expansion offered by the increase 
in domestic demand. 
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In short, the Peruvian economy expanded very con-
siderably between 1945 and 1955 to judge from the 
annual rate of increase of the gross product and per 
capita consumption (2.9 per cent and 3 per cent respec-
tively). However, this expansion %vas the result not 
only of internal efforts out also of the concurrence of 
certain favourable factors, including a relatively moderate 
rise in population, an increase in available goods and 
services relatively higher than that of the gross product 
(thus facilitating a more rapid expansion of consump-
tion), an improvement in the terms of trade, a marked 
rise in the product-capital ratio and a higher import 
coefficient. 
It is now pertinent to consider whether the concurrence 
of such factors will be equally favourable in the future 
or, otherwise, what must be done to maintain a similar 
rate of economic growth in the years to come. 
i 
3. SOME HYPOTHESES REGARDING FUTURE ECONOMIC 
PROSPECTS 
The future prospects of some of the factors which 
have just been mentioned will now be briefly reviewed. 
Between 1940 and 1955, the population increased at 
an annual average cumulative rate which fluctuated be-
tween 19 and 19.9 per mil. Towards the end of the period, 
it was already apparent that it was tending to grow vegeta-
tively as a result of a drop in the death rate (brought 
about mainly by the improvement in health conditions) 
and a more detailed examination of the age structure, an 
average rate of growth of about 24 per mil may be 
estimated for the period 1955-60 and of about 25.6 per 
mil for the rieriod 1960-65. Over the decade as a whole, 
the total population should thus increase by about 2.5 
million and should amount to almost 11.5 million in 1965. 
As an initial consequence, total consumption would have 
to expand by 75 per cent in a decade instead of only 65 
per cent as registered in the previous decade. However, 
these estimates lead to the more significant conclusion 
that between 1955 and 1965 the active population will 
increase by almost one million. This is probably one of 
the key factors which will exert the greatest influence 
on the future development of the Peruvian economy. One 
million persons will have to be given the opportunity of 
productive employment in the various branches of eco-
nomic activity and provided with the necessary capital 
resources. 
There is little to be said about the second factor —the 
terms of trade— the future of which is of course much 
more uncertain. From 1955 up to the present, they have 
followed an unfavourable trend. Any hypothesis which 
assumes that they will recover and remain at a level 
similar to that of 1955 might therefore be considered 
somewhat optimistic, especially if it is remembered that 
they depend not only on export prices but also on those 
of imports. This will also have important consequences 
for future development, as compared with the previous 
period, because it means in practice that the increments 
in consumption will require proportionately greater ef-
forts. 
Finally, reference has already been made to the 
moderate improvement in the product-capital ratio be-
tween 1945 and 1955 and also to the fact that its present 
level is relatively high. Its future evolution depends 
on opposing factors —on the one side, the additional 
expansion requirements of activities characterized by a 
higher capital intensity and, on the other, the possibilities 
of achieving a more intensive utilization of the present 
stock of capital. At all events, the hypothesis put for-
ward in the report that the product-capital ratio will 
remain at a level similar to that of 1955 does not seem 
pessimistic. 
Under the conditions described, it seems unlikely 
that Peru can maintain a similar tempo and pattern of 
development as that achieved in the previous decade, 
particularly in the external sector. A significant poten-
tial deficit in the balance of payments as well as a 
heavy demand for foreign capital and imports are there-
fore to be expected. Foreign capital needs may be more 
clearly appreciated with the help of some illustrative 
figures resulting from a series of calculations in which 
allowance is made for the limitations already mentioned. 
It may be concluded that, in order to increase total con-
sumption from 26 200 million soles in 1955 to 45 000 
million soles in 1965 (an annual per capita average 
rate of 3 per cent), with a simultaneous rise in the gross 
product from 32 000 to 54 600 million soles (a per capita 
growth of 2.9 per cent per year), a surplus of available 
goods and services valued at some 1 780 million soles in 
excess of the gross product would be required. This sum 
could only be obtained if there were a net inflow of 
foreign capital. Discounting the high import elasticity 
registered in the decade 1945-55 decade (2.0) and as-
suming the more moderate figure of 1.57 of the period 
1948-55, the demand for imports in 1965 would still 
amount to some 14 000 million soles at 1955 constant 
prices (as compared with only 5 700 million soles in 
1955). Would it be reasonable to expect that both the 
foreign capital and import requirements can be met? 
According to information available, the total foreign 
capital invested in Peru amounted to some 590 million 
dollars in 1955. Gross investment in that year totalled 
about 71 million dollars and remittances abroad unde» 
various heads —amortization, profits, interest— wert 
almost 59 million. The net inflow was thus only 12.2 
million. If future prospects are assessed on the basis of 
the estimate made in certain circles that total foreign 
capital will probably amount to about 1 000 million dol-
lars in 1965 and if the probable changes in the rates of 
amortization, reinvestment and interest are rather careful-
ly analysed, it may be concluded that a gross influx of 
new capital amounting to 90 000 million dollars will be 
accompanied by a net outflow of foreign capital amount-
ing to about 28 million dollars. A total capital of 1 200 
million dollars and a gross investment volume greater 
than 100 million dollars a year would be needed to 
establish a balance between total receipts and the total 
outflow of foreign capital. However, only in exceptional 
circumstances would it seem possible to secure a net 
inflow of 1 780 million soles as required. 
A study of the potenial demand for imports leads to 
an equally negative conclusion according to the detailed 
projections presented in the report on agricultural and 
mining exports. As regards the former, it is assumed as 
an initial working hypothesis that the cultivated area 
could be increased by between 400 000 and 500 000 
27 
hectares, a considerable expansion over the present total 
of 2.5 million hectares. In view of the rise in population 
and its higher income level, it is estimated that the in-
crease in the production of those goods in which Peru 
is now self-sufficient might require 360 000 hectares and 
the replacement of those imports which are at present 
most important (also allowing for heavier future demand) 
-would require some 195 000 hectares. There would thus 
remain 140 000 hectares available for the increase in 
export crops, which would mean in the aggregate an 
expansion in production of 40 per cent over the present 
volume of export items. In the case of the extractive 
industries, the relevant estimates are based on the prin-
cipal plans of the enterprises concerned. It is assumed, 
for example, that in 1965 exports of copper will amount 
to 210 000 tons, of lead 151000, of zinc 286 000, of 
iron ore almost 7 million tons, etc. This implies that 
the present levels of such exports would rise by 148 per 
cent in real terms. 
In short, the volume of total exports might double 
between 1955 and 1965, reaching in the latter year some 
10 000 million soles.® But this would still be insufficient 
to meet the potential demand for imports which, it will 
be remembered, were estimated at about 14 000 million 
soles. 
In the light of these considerations, it seems highly 
unlikely that the same rate and pattern of growth as in 
the previous period can be maintained. Hence, the most 
probable hypothesis put forward in the study assumes 
briefly (a) that, as a starting point, the aim is to main-
tain the rate of increase of the gross per capita product 
(2.9 per cent per year); (b) that an increase of the 
same intensity will be registered in available goods and 
services since additional favourable factors are not likely 
to arise; and (c) that, as a result, the expansion in 
consumption will have to be somewhat less than the rise 
in the gross product (2.2 per cent per year per capita). 
In their turn, these hypotheses imply at least two require-
ments: (i) that the investment coefficient can be raised 
from 19.2 to 23.7 per cent; and (ii) that the income 
elasticity of demand for imports can be reduced from 
2.0 or 1.57 to only 1.2 while additional changes must 
be made in their structure. 
Both requirements appear feasible. The investment 
coefficient had already reached, although in isolated 
years, figures very close to those indicated. To maintain 
them consistently at this relatively high level would 
undoubtedly require a strenuous effort, but it does not 
appear beyond Peru's possibilities. As regards the reduc-
tion in the income elasticity of demand for imports, even 
in these circumstances, a somewhat more rapid increase in 
imports than in the gross product is assumed. In this 
respect the problem in Peru is likely to be much less 
serious than in the other Latin American countries where 
the anticipated capacity to import remains far below any 
reasonable rate of increase in per capita income. 
4 . THE CONTRIBUTION REQUIRED OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Such then, in very broad outline, is the background 
for calculating industrial development needs. At least 
two factors emerge which are of decisive importance 
as regards intensifying the industrialization process: the 
role of industry in the absorption of manpower and 
its contribution to import substitution. 
The first factor wiU undoubtedly acquire considerable 
significance. The increase in the labour force during 
the next decade will be extremely large not only in 
absolute terms —one million active persons— but also 
in relative terms, since it will represent an increment of 
27 per cent over the present level of employment. This 
fact in itself might constitute a serious problem which 
may well be aggravated by the tendency, already ob-
servable in various economic sectors, to economize man-
power so far as possible.® This tendency is also to be 
expected in sectors which must continually strive to 
improve their competitive position in the world market, 
or in those branches of domestic industry which are 
facing stiffer competition from imports. But it may 
well be asked whether, in all these cases, the relative 
manpower and capital resources available in Peru are 
ideally distributed. 
This aspect may be illustrated by quoting some of 
the more significant statistics. The additional agricultural 
production necessary to meet the growth of domestic 
demand, to replace many of the present imports and to 
increase exports, may well represent an increase of 46.2 
per cent over existing levels. In view of the present 
low level of farm productivity, population pressure in 
certain zones and the inevitable adoption of certain 
modern techniques, it must be admitted that some im-
provement in output is bound to occur. Assuming that 
it represents on the average 20 per cent during the ten 
years, agriculture would be in a position to absorb 
490 000 persons, which would still leave 500 000 persons 
to find employment in non-agricultural activities. If in-
dustry increased its share of such activities to a very 
moderate extent (merely from 40.5 to 42 per cent), it 
would have to absorb 230 000 persons. Of these not less 
than 100 000 would probably have to be engaged in indus-
try proper, which in 1955 employed a total of just over 
120 000 persons. 
Its task would be no less arduous as regards import 
substitution needs. As will be recalled, an initial ap-
proximation suggested that total substitution needs might 
amount to some 4 000 million soles by 1965. Assuming 
that Peru itself can meet all its agricultural requirements 
—except for a deficit in wheat, and with a very low 
level of fruit imports— and bearing present petroleum 
prospects in mind, it may be concluded that more than 
three-quarters of these total substitution requirements 
would have to be met by manufacturing production. 
Considering the secondary needs which would arise from 
this substitution, it may be estimated that the industrial 
expansion required for this purpose alone would represent 
an output value of some 4 400 million soles, or 30 per 
cent of the total value of manufacturing production 
in 1955. 
In short, in view of the need to increase employment 
and to effect import substitution and bearing in mind 
the pressure of expanding domestic demand and the need 
2 At constant purchasing power equal to that of 1955. 
® For example, expansion plans in the mining industry provide 
for considerable increases in output which in many cases will be 
accompanied by only a very small rise in employment. 
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to maintain the necessary balance between the growth of 
industry and that of the other economic sectors, it may 
be concluded that the volume of industrial production 
would have to increase by 118 per cent between 1955 
and 1965. For this purpose the present stock of capital 
in this sector would have to be doubled and not less 
than a quarter of Peru's total gross investment would 
have to be channelled into industry. Only thus could 
industry play a positive role in the task of maintaining 
the tempo of economic development. At the same time, the 
relative position of industry proper (or registered in-
dustry) would be strengthened, the average productivity 
of this sector would be increased by about 58 per cent, 
and its share in the national income as a whole would 
rise to 21.3 per cent. 
This then is the tentative reply which the report 
makes to the first of the questions posed at the outset. 
5. CHANGES NECESSARY IN THE PATTERN OF 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
A brief reference may now be made to the second 
of these questions concerning the changes necessary in 
the pattern of industrial production and in the structure 
of industrial productive capacity that would have to 
accompany this economic growth. 
All the branches of manufacturing production ob-
viously could not be developed with the same intensity. 
Development itself makes certain changes necessary, be-
cause the various kinds of manufactured products have 
different demand elasticities. Indeed, the improvement 
in income levels is inevitably accompanied by a tendency 
on the part of consumers to modify their consumption 
pattern, the consumption of certain goods expanding more 
quickly than that of others. Suffice it to mention by 
way of illustration that, according to the estimates used 
in the study, the average elasticity for manufactured 
goods as a whole would be somewhat greater than unity, 
while it would be only 0.94 for processed foodstuffs, 
compared with 2.07 for paper products, 2.8 for chemicals, 
3.0 for goods produced by the metal transforming in-
dustries, etc. Furthermore, present import substitution 
possibilities are also different in the various manufac-
turing branches, a fact which may be particularly im-
portant because of the considerable overall substitution 
needs. 
A cursory glance at the present structure of Peruvian 
industry reveals that it is concentrated around three 
industrial branches: processed foodstuffs, beverages and 
textiles. These absorb more than half of total industrial 
employment and represent almost 60 per cent of the 
value of production, while the joint output of the chem-
ical and metal transforming industries constitutes less 
than 10 per cent of the total. From another angle, more 
than two-thirds of production is of consumer goods, while 
capital goods represent less than 5 per cent. This is 
actually a normal stage in the industrialization process at 
which efforts are made to cover first the lines of produc-
tion which are usually technically less complex and 
which call for a small capital outlay. However, in the 
course of very rapid industrial development, such as 
occurred in former periods, there are no very marked 
changes aimed at producing increased diversification. 
For example, between 1948 and 1955 the share of con-
sumer goods in the total dropped merely from 60 to 58.5 
per cent and there were no such changes in the structure 
of productive capacity. The three branches mentioned 
represented, in 1955, some 63 per cent of the book value 
of assets available and accounted for 60 per cent of the 
total purchases of machinery and equipment in that year. 
Another important consideration concerns the share 
of domestic supply covered by the various branches of 
Peruvian industry. In 1955, imports of manufactured 
goods ^ represented a quarter of total requirements for 
such goods. Although imports were registered for prac-
tically all manufacturing branches, two were of particular 
importance: chemicals and products of the metal trans-
forming and metallurgical industries. They represented 
69 per cent of the total imports of manufactured goods. 
The share of imports was also quite appreciable in the 
supply of goods from the pulp and paper industries 
(50 per cent), timber (30 per cent), rubber (25 per 
cent) and non-metallic minerals (22 per cent). On the 
other hand, it was relatively small in the case of proces-
sed foodstuffs, beverages, textiles, footwear, and wearing 
apparel and other made-up items, but even these amount-
ed to 804 million soles, i.e. they represented about 15 
per cent of Peru's total capacity to import. Generally 
speaking, no notable improvements were recorded in this 
respect. On the contrary, between 1948 and 1955, total 
availabilities of manufactured goods in Peru rose by 71 
per cent as a result of an increase of 90 per cent in 
imports and only 67 per cent in domestic production. 
If these two factors are considered jointly in the light 
of the hypothetical projections presented in the study, 
the trend and magnitude of the changes which might 
take place between 1955 and 1965 will become apparent. 
The relevant estimates show, for example, that, although 
all the branches increased their volume of production in 
varying proportions, the relative importance of the food 
industries would decline from 36.4 to 29.2 per cent and 
that of textiles from 11.3 to 10.8. By contrast, there 
would be an increase in that of the chemical industries 
(from 3.4 to 4.3 per cent), the metal transforming 
industries (from 4.6 to 5.8) and the basic metal industries 
(from 7.3 to 14.2), etc. 
6 . T H E INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Increased domestic demand, import substitution re-
quirements and the need to absorb manpower make it 
essential to achieve a certain tempo of industrial expan-
sion and to effect a series of changes in the production 
patterns by industrial branches. This involves the enlarge-
ment and diversification of productive capacity and 
the consequent financing and effective channelling of 
investment. Can Peruvian industry carry through this 
over-all expansion and these changes? This leads to the 
third question which raises an undeniably difficult prob-
lem involving internal aspects of the enterprises them-
selves and other aspects bearing on tax policy, credit, 
protection, etc., which finally constitute what has been 
termed in the study the "institutional framework" within 
* Expressed in c.i.f. values, which implies that they were to 
some extent undervalued. 
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which industry evolves. No attempt has been made to 
examine the question in detail, much less to reach final 
conclusions. Some of the existing facts and certain in-
formation that could form the subject of special research 
are briefly analysed. 
Once the expansion needs of production have been 
established, the investment effort required will depend 
to a large extent on the manner in which the present 
stock of capital is used, i.e. on the product-capital ratio 
achieved in industry. The practical analysis of this spe-
cific aspect is not at all easy because there are hardly 
any reliable statistics on the actual amount of capital 
invested in this sector. All that is available is partial 
information about the book value of assets, which is of 
little use in view of the fact that it relates to investments 
accumulated in different periods and depreciated ac-
cording to bookkeeping rather than realistic criteria, etc. 
However, an attempt at indirect measurement led to the 
conclusion that total fixed capital —depreciated at re-
placement cost— employed in industry in 1955 was prob-
ably about 13 000 million soles. This would mean a 
fairly favourable product-capital ratio: 0.41 as compared 
with only 0.33 in 1945. In other words, the phenomenon 
noted for the economy as a whole, whereby a prior im-
provement of the product-capital ratio subsequendy re-
lieved the pressure on investment, was repeated and in 
a more marked degree. However, the favourable level of 
1955 should not be construed as indicating that capital 
already invested was being utilized with any great in-
tensity —on the contrary, there was still plenty of room 
for improvement in that respect—, but should be at-
tributed rather to the large share of cottage and small 
industries (with very limited capital resources) and to 
the predominance of industrial branches of less capital 
intensity. In the future, the increased relative impor-
tance which industry proper will undoubtedly continue 
to acquire and the more marked role of industrial 
branches of higher capital intensity will tend to lower 
the product-capital ratio. The only remedy would be to 
ensure a better utilization of the present stock of capital, 
a task which depends mainly on what can be done within 
the enterprises themselves. 
Even if the product-capital ratio is maintained, the 
main problem will be the incentives which can be offered 
for the enlargement and diversification of investments. 
As a result two basic questions: (a) methods of finan-
cing and (b) industrial protection, will assume greater 
importance. 
Adequate consideration of the first aspect would 
require a detailed analysis of the possibilities of enlist-
ing resources both within and outside the enterprises. 
If, for this purpose, some of the developments during 
the period 1947-55 are examined, it may be observed, 
from a very broad though variable sample of enterprises, 
that their total assets rose from 1 500 to 9 000 million 
soles. Almost 40 per cent of this increment was the 
result of capital gains, a resource which cannot be con-
sidered as altogether external to the enterprises because 
it is derived to a large extent from the issue of bonus 
shares, i.e. a form of reinvestment of profits. A sixth 
of this expansion was financed with such typically 
internal resources as increases in reserves. A small 
proportion was financed with temporary resources and 
almost 40 per cent with typically external resources. 
In short, the information available is such that no very 
firm conclusions may be drawn. In other words, this 
is one of the further problems which merits more detailed 
inquiry. In the meantime, the analysis confines itself 
to a very cursory examination of some of the principal 
ways of mobilizing resources for industrial investment. 
One of the sources which might acquire considerable 
importance not onlv for the enlargement but also for 
the diversification of industrial investments is the capital 
market. At the moment, most enterprises are legally 
constituted as limited companies. Nevertheless, there is 
no control of such companies nor are there any bodies 
with sufficient powers to supplement the somewhat 
restricted activities of the stock exchange. Furthermore, 
under the existinsr system, most securities are not quoted 
at all on the exchange, where apparently only a very 
small proportion of total transactions take place. Thus, 
for example, while in 1956 the total new capital regis-
tered was 776 million soles and capital gains amounted 
to 247 million, the total movement of securities of the 
stock exchange was valued at only 14.8 million. 
The ploughing back of profits will undoubtedly play 
an important part in the future expansion of industrial 
productive capacity. During the period 1947-55, the total 
net profits of registered industrial enterprises amounted 
to some 2 500 million soles. Of this sum less than 25 
per cent was capitalized, a proportion which would 
probably be much lower if allowance were made for 
the large number of minor establishments not included 
in the statistics. Of course, the scale on which profits 
are reinvested depends on many factors which are outside 
the immediate scope of the study. Suffice it to mention 
briefly only two of them here. In the first place, tax 
policy does not appear to offer very powerful incentives 
for reinvestment because it does not differentiate for 
the purpose of taxation between distributed and undis-
tributed profits. Even more important is the tax policy 
followed with regard to the constitution of depreciation 
reserves. Calculations are based on the cost price instead 
of the replacement cost of assets. Since insufficient 
reserves would thus be formed, they are supplemented 
with additional reserves, which thus become liable to 
tax as though they were actual profits. 
However great the investment effort made with in-
ternal funds, the necessary expansion of industrial pro-
ductive capacity could probably not be embarked upon 
without adequate provision of credit resources. On 31 
December 1955, total bank credit granted to industry 
amounted to 1154 million soles or less than 10 per cent 
of the assets of the manufacturing enterprises. About 
95 per cent of this credit came from commercial banks 
which used for this purpose roughly a quarter of their 
lending capacity. This represented a slight improvement 
in the share of industry as compared with the years 
immediately before. The situation was different in the 
case of credit from development banks. Of the total 
credit granted by them (898 million soles), less than 
10 per cent went to the industrial sector, as compared 
with more than 40 per cent in 1945. These changes in 
the relative magnitude of the credit sources available 
to industry have both a qualitative and quantitative 
significance because of the different interest rates and 
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above all the differences in the terms of amortization 
which are applied in each case. 
Finally, there are other sources of financing whose 
relative importance has been somewhat restricted in the 
past. For example, in 1955 total public investment 
amounted to 1 764 million soles of which only 70 million 
could be considered as directly related to industrial 
development. Foreign investment in manufacturing, on 
the other hand, has increased considerably —from 14.9 
million dollars in 1951 to 26.8 million in 1955—, but 
its volume is still slight as compared with that of total 
industrial investment or with the share which foreign 
capital represents in other economic activities. 
In addition to these factors, which principally affect 
the various financial aspects of industrial expansion, 
there remain a whole series of incentives which may be 
offered through protective and development measures. 
Although there is no direct participation by the public 
sector in industrial activities, the Government can of 
course exert a powerful influence in their development 
not only by providing the basic social capital —transport, 
energy, etc.— essential for industrial growth, but also 
by providing numerous incentives many of which are 
included in the General Industry Act (Ley General de 
Industria) which is now being given favourable consid-
eration. 
One particularly important aspect is the protection 
of domestic industry against competition from imports. 
Since 1949, when direct import controls were scrapped, 
the protection machinery has been mainly confined to the 
customs tariff. This, however, is framed for fiscal pur-
poses rather than for the deliberate purpose of protection 
or with a view to industrial development needs. In 1955, 
total customs duties represented 11 per cent of the value 
of imports, a relatively low proportion compared with 
that of other Latin American countries. A more detailed 
comparison with the tax systems in force in Colombia, 
Chile and Venezuela shows, moreover, that in Peru cus-
toms duties are relatively lower for consumer goods 
and intermediate goods and very similar in the case of 
capital goods. Sometimes, the tax is heavier on goods 
produced by very complex industrial processes while it 
is relatively lighter on other goods which could be 
replaced very soon by domestic production. However, 
this is a very difficult problem to assess in general terms 
because of ¿he conflicting elements which must be taken 
into account. For example, the low level of protection 
may have discouraged the establishment of new import-
substitution industries, while at the same time competi-
tion with imports has made domestic firms more con-
cerned with productive efficiency than is normally ap-
parent in other Latin American countries. Perhaps the 
most important problem here is how to achieve enough 
flexibility to meet varying future conditions and to ensure 
that Peru's industrial development goes ahead at the 
required speed. 
In short, the study of the economic aspects of Peruvian 
industry carried out by the Secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America is intended to provide a 
picture which will help in the formulation of an industrial 
policy designed to enable industry to play a positive 
rather than a negative role in the arduous task of main-
taining —in conditions which are now less favourable— 
a satisfactory rate of growth of the Peruvian economy as 
a whole. 
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COFFEE IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PRODUCERS' PROBLEM 
by Onno Van Teutem * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The reappearance of an imbalance between world 
production and consumption of coffee has, during the 
last year, focused much attention on the Latin American 
coffee industry. A number of conferences were held 
between the main producing countries, at times including 
non-Latin American producers, and some major con-
sumer countries. In October 1957, seven of the principal 
Latin American coffee producing countries (Brazil, Co-
lombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and 
Nicaragua) concluded the so-called "Mexico agreement" 
to regulate their exports for one year through the reten-
tion of part of the crops. Further deliberations led to the 
establishment, in early 1958, of the International Coffee 
Organization, with its seat in Brazil, for purposes of 
stimulating world trade and consumption of coffee and 
of improving cofffee production conditions. 
In June 1958, an International Coffee Study Group 
was established in Washington for the discussion of ad-
ditional economic measures. The Latin American coffee-
producing countries within this group reached an agree-
ment to retain a proportion of their 1958/59 crops, in 
order to ensure the orderly marketing of coffee in the 
period October 1958-September 1959. These countries 
agreed to retain 5 per cent of all exportable production, 
up to a volume of 300 000 bags of 60 kg, and 10 per 
cent of further exportable quantities, but the retention 
share of Colombia was fixed at 15 per cent and that 
of Brazil at 40 per cent of the exportable crop. 
The current crop retention agreement is an emergency 
measure. Exportable world production of coffee has in-
creased sharply in the previous two crop years, from an 
estimated 34.4 million bags in 1956/57 to 44.4 miUion 
bags in 1957/58, and to about 51 million bags in the 
current 1958/59 season.^ While world production thus 
increased 29 per cent and 15 per cent in successive years, 
world consumption continued its normal annual increase 
of about 2 per cent.^ As a result, a considerable ac-
cumulation of stocks took place, especially in Brazil, the 
uncontrolled sale of which might have led to serious 
drops in world prices, for coffee consumption is notably 
inelastic with respect to changes in price.® 
• Economist attached to the FAO Regional Office of Latin 
America and member of the Joint ECLA/FAO Coffee Survey team 
in El Salvador and Colombia. This article expresses the personal 
views of the author and not necessarily those of the ECLA Secre-
tariat. 
1 United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture 
Circular, Coffee, 13 October 1958; this estimate was later revised 
to about 52 million bags. 
2 See, FAO The Latin. American Coffee Industry, November 
1958, document LARO 58/18, presented to the Fifth Regional 
Conference in Latin America, San José, Costa Rica, November 
1958). 
® The price elasticity of the demand for coffee depends on 
But although chaos in the world coffee market has 
been avoided by the retention agreement, these marketing 
measures do not directly affect the level of annual pro-
duction or of consumption. Nor do they strengthen the 
competitive position of Latin American coffee producers 
at a time when increased production in other parts of the 
world threatens this region's traditional export markets. 
Figure I 
EXPORTABLE PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
OF COFFEE 
(Millions of bags) 
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SOUBCB: United States Department o f Agriculture and Panamerican Coffee Bureau. 
many variables, the main ones of which appear to be the level 
of income per head of population and the price level of coffee 
itself. In a recent study, FAO estimates average price elasticity at 
about 0.2 (Committee on Commodity Problems, document CCP 
56/6, April 1956, Appendix II) . On a purely hypothetical basis, 
this coefficient could be used in connexion with recent data on 
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It is therefore apparent that consideration should 
now be given to additional measures which would permit 
the re-establishment of a more fundamental equilibrium 
in the coffee market, by making more far-reaching 
changes in agricultural production in the coffee zone 
than is possible through export regulation alone. 
In producing countries, any effective measures would 
have to take into special consideration the intricate prob-
lem of production structure. Production conditions are, 
on the whole, not so well known as those of international 
trade and consumption, especially in the case of tropical 
export crops, such as coffee. In recent years, however, 
the ECLA/FAO surveys of coffee production in various 
important Latin American producer countries have shed 
additional light on the farm problem. The findings of 
the surveys in two countries, Colombia and El Salvador, 
have recently been published^ and an additional study 
is being prepared in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
coffee trade and prices. For instance, the difference between 
actual world imports in 1957 and the world exportable crop in 
1958/59, some 13.5 million bags, would have been absorbed by 
an uncontrolled market only at prices between 10 and 15 cents a 
pound in New York, if average price elasticity were to remain at 
0.2 over such a wide range of prices. The great number of im-
ponderables in the coffee market however do not permit definite 
estimates under present conditions. 
4 Coffee in Latin Ameiica, Productivity Problems and Out-
Another way of solving the coffee problem might be 
sought on the consumption side, for instance through 
campaigns stimulating consumption and through other 
promotional activities. Among the serious existing prob-
lems are the tendency in the United States to make 
greater use of soluble coffees and to prepare weaker 
brews, both of which affect the level of imports. Fur-
thermore, many European countries still levy import 
duties or consumption taxes on coffee. To some extent 
it may therefore prove possible to reduce the current gap 
between consumption and production (see figure I) by 
increasing consumption. But it is unlikely that such an 
improvement would reduce the need for the more funda-
mental adjustments in the production structure discussed 
below. 
The present article does not aim at evaluating the 
stabilization measures that have been so far adopted 
with respect to coffee, nor does it deal with consumption 
aspects. Its objectives are rather, firstly, to explain some 
relevant facts about the producers' situation, as tliey 
have been revealed through the productivity surveys, 
and, secondly, to indicate possible alternative solutions 
to the coffee surplus problem at the farm level. 
look: I. Colombia and El Salvador (E/CN.12/490), United Nations 
Publication, Sales No. 58 II.G.4. 
II. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF LATIN AMERICA'S COFFEE PROBLEM 
In the past, coffee production has traditionally re-
acted slowly and belatedly to a new market situation. 
These lags have been responsible for the recurrence of 
periodic cyclical fluctuations in the development of the 
industry. The present difficulties are also largely caused 
by increases in production reflecting the resumption of 
the cyclical movement in the postwar period. 
Thus, although coffee production increased rather 
suddenly in the last two crop years, the problems of the 
world coffee industry in general, and of the Latin Ameri-
can industry in particular, lie deeper than in an incipient 
imbalance between production and consumption. The 
real causes are of a long-term nature. They are the 
outcome of developments that started in the 1930's, or 
even before, and that have been aggravated recently, 
especially in the decade, 1949-58, when coffee prices 
were favourable. They may be grouped under three 
headings: (1) the excessive new coffee plantings in 
major Latin American producing areas; (2) the increased 
competition of non-Latin American zones, notably those 
of the African continent; and (3) the persistently low 
technological level and productivity of coffee cultivation 
in Latin America, and the slowness with which improved 
cultivation methods are introduced on a commercial 
scale. 
1. EXCESSIVE PLANTINGS M LATIN AMERICA 
In recent years, new coffee plantings have been estab-
lished in many parts of the world, at rates in excess 
of those needed to supply prospective world coffee re-
quirements. Latin America itself has been responsible 
for most of these plantings. 
The most important factor determining the volume 
of new coffee plantings in a given period is, logically, 
its relative profitability as compared with that of com-
peting uses of land and capital. In the case of coffee, 
this is determined mainly by the level of world prices. 
In the 1930's, coffee prices were extremely low as 
a result of the world-wide depression, combined with 
excessive production. In the principal coffee producing 
country, Brazil, large stocks accumulated, and much of 
this unexportable surplus was disposed of by burning. 
Furthermore, a large-scale abandonment of old coffee 
plantings took place, and new planting was virtually 
suspended. Indications are that the situation was dif-
ferent in other Latin American coffee producing coun-
tries and that few plantings or none were actually aban-
doned. Nevertheless only very limited new investments 
took place in the coffee sector. 
The loss of a large part of the world coffee market 
in the war years only accentuated these tendencies. 
Huge stocks were held in producing countries and there 
was no incentive to undertake new plantings. Similarly, 
the first part of the post-war period brought few changes 
in this picture, and production was, especially in Brazil, 
considerably less than before the war. The increased 
world consumption of coffee was met by depleting pre-
viously accumulated stocks, and coffee prices only rose 
moderately until these stocks became exhausted in the 
course of 1949. 
At that time, however, a sudden shift took place in 
the world coffee market. Prices of Brazilian grades rose 
in less than a year, from about 30 cents per pound in 
New York, to more than 50 cents. While sharp fluctua-
tions took place in subsequent years, prices remained 
above this level until the second quarter of 1958. 
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The natural result of this powerful price stimulus, 
which was immediately felt by producers, was a sharp 
increase in new plantings. No accurate figures are availa-
ble on the total numbers of trees planted in each area. 
But it is common knowledge that the most spectacular 
increases took place in the Northern Parana area of 
Brazil, where climatic conditions were considered mar-
ginal for coffee growing because of the periodic oc-
currence of frosts, but where the quality of the soils 
and the topography are especially favourable. In the 
course of the present decade, coffee cultivation spread 
to large parts of the virgin lands of Northern Parana, 
between the borders of Sao Paulo State and Paraguay. 
In many cases excellent planting material was used and 
this caused yields in good years to be exceptionally 
high. Thus, despite great fluctuations due to frosts, 
average returns per hectare appear to be well above 
marginal levels. 
Although the Parana plantings had grown greatly 
in the early 1950's and approached full maturity when 
some four years old, their full impact was not really 
felt until the 1958 harvest. Twice, in 1953 and again 
in 1955, frosts occurred which killed the young plants 
and damaged older coffee trees, so that production was 
greatly reduced for at least the two subsequent crops in 
each case. 
However, after each frost the damaged plantings 
were immediately replaced. The net effect was therefore 
that the maturity date of the young plantings was post-
poned by several years, and that the average age of all 
plantings declined accordingly. A large proportion of 
the trees is estimated to be currently between three and 
seven years old. 
As a result, it was not until 1958 that many of the 
Parana plantings produced their first full crop, and 
production on these plantings will tend to increase for 
several years.® On the other hand, new planting has 
fallen off from the peak levels of the early 1950's, and 
it can be estimated that in the State of Parana, maximum 
production may be reached in about five years' time, 
® The ECLA/FAO surveys have shown that, in Colombia and 
El Salvador, maximum yields are reached when the trees are 
between 10 and 12 years of age and that gradual declines then 
take place unless compensating measures are taken. Preliminary 
data available for Brazil seem to confirm this pattern, at least in 
the case of the existing trees. New varieties are available which 
mature earlier and reach maximum yields more quickly (see E/CN. 
12/490, op. cit., p. 81). 
barring new frosts. Since Parana's production, in the 
current crop year, represented about one third of total 
production in Latin America, these changes in production 
will profoundly affect the coffee industry of the entire 
region. 
Although the establishment of new plantings in other 
parts of Latin America has been much less spectacular, 
some planting has taken place in nearly all countries. 
Consequently, production has increased considerably in 
the present decade. In 1958/59, the exportable coffee 
outputs of Mexico, Central America and Colombia were 
respectively 23, 31 and 15 per cent greater than the 
averages of 1950/51-1954/55. These figures compare 
with a 77 per cent increase in total Brazilian exportable 
production over this period,® 
While some expansion in capacity was no doubt 
justified, on the basis of the post-war rises in demand, 
it is apparent that capacity has increased excessively, 
laying the basis for a period of over-production which 
seems as yet not to have reached its greatest intensity. 
2 . COMPETITION BY OTHER REGIONS 
The expansion in coffee cultivation has not remained 
limited to Latin America alone. In fact, for the first 
time in the history of coffee, another continent, Africa, 
is emerging as a major competitor in the world market. 
The steep increases in African coffee production that 
have occurred since the 1930's, and the prospects for 
still further expansion of coffee growing on that con-
tinent, have posed serious additional problems for Latin 
America, superimposed on the region's own difficulties. 
Table 1 reviews the course of world coffee produc-
tion by major production areas since the pre-war period. 
It can be seen that virtually the entire increase in world 
production with respect to 1934-38 has occurred in the 
most recent period. The greatest relative gains are 
shown by Africa, which currently produces about four 
times as much coffee for export as before the war. In 
Brazil, on the other hand, production only recently ex-
ceeded the pre-war level. The increases in the produc-
tion of other Latin American countries, however, have 
also been considerable. 
Brazil's pre-war share of 61 per cent fell to less than 
half of the world total in the 1950's, excepting the crop 
0 United States Department of Agriculture, op. cit. 
Table 1 
COFFEE: WORLD EXPORTABLE PRODUCTION BY MAJOR REGIONS 
1950/51- ,OCR/CO ~ 193-5/i^ 1950/51- 1958/ 
1939/40 1954/55 1939/40 1954/55 1959 
(Million bags) (Per cent) 
Latin America 32.0 26.1 41.0 88 80 79 
Brazil 22.0 14.7 26.5 61 45 51 
Other countries 10.0 11.4 14.5 28 35 28 
Africa 2.4 5.7 9.1 7 18 17 
Rest of world 1.8 0.8 2.0 5 2 4 
Total 3<5.2 32.6 52.1 100 100 100 
SODHCES: 1935 /36-1939 /40 : Pan American Coltee Bureau, Cof/ee Statistics. Nos. 14 and 15; 1950/51-1951/55 : United Stales Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agri-
culture Circular, 13 October 1958; 1958/59: latest estimate of the United States Department of Agriculture. 
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year 1958/59. In contrast, Africa's share more than 
doubled over the same period, reaching 17 per cent of 
the world total in the current year. Increases in the 
share of the other Latin American producing areas were 
insufficient to offset fully the long-term proportional 
decline in Brazil, and Latin America's share in world 
coffee production fell from 88 per cent before the war 
to 79 per cent in 1958/59. 
Several factors account for the rather spectacular 
rises in African coffee production. The most important 
is perhaps the fact that Brazil's unilateral action to 
support world market prices in the 1930's functioned 
as an umbrella, under which production in other areas 
could increase profitably. In the pre-war period, it seems 
that both Africa and other Latin American countries 
benefited from this price umbrella by increasing their 
share in the market. The present retention agreement 
has modified the situation to the extent that all Latin 
American countries now participate in defending world 
coffee prices, though Brazil still shoulders the major 
burden. But it has not so far been possible to extend 
the coverage of the retention agreement to African pro-
ducers, and it appears that the present situation again 
favours Africa in relation to Latin America. 
African coffee production would probably not have 
risen as much, merely as a result of this factor. Actually, 
the Governments of many African territories have ac-
tively promoted the expansion of coffee cultivation by 
a variety of measures. Notable progress has been made, 
especially in the Belgian Congo and in British East 
Africa, in overcoming technical production difficulties. 
In these and other areas, modern experimental stations 
are in operation and effective agricultural extension 
services have been established on a scale not common in 
Latin America. Price support systems are also func-
tioning in several areas, and African coffee is given 
preferential treatment by European importing countries 
with which they have special relationships. In France, 
for instance, a 20 per cent ad valorem duty is applied 
to coffee from "foreign areas", and the European com-
mon market will also favour coffees from the associated 
territories over those of Latin America.'' 
As is well known, a special factor favouring the use 
of African coffees has been the recent shift in the con-
sumption pattern of the United States, and some other 
smaller importing countries, towards an increased use 
of soluble coffees. Whereas in 1949 only two per cent 
of United States coffee imports were destined to be used 
in the manufacture of solubles, this percentage increased 
to 20 in 1957. In 1958 this tendency seems to have 
continued. A large proportion of the coffee used in this 
process is of the Robusta type, which constitutes 80 per 
cent of African coffee production.® 
Finally, the prevalence of wage levels below those 
of Latin America has also helped the expansion in 
African coffee cultivation. This factor, and the higher 
yields of Robusta varieties, have made African plantings 
profitable, despite the fact that world market prices for 
African Robusta coffees have been considerably below 
the average prices obtained by Latin American coffees, 
which are exclusively of the Arahica type. 
The increased competition by non-Latin American 
producing regions has therefore become an important 
and permanent feature of the world coffee market. In 
the difficult period ahead, this competition is almost 
certain to become still stronger. The Latin American 
coffee industry as a whole will therefore have to make 
every effort in its power to strengthen its competitive 
position. 
3. LEVELS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE LATIN AMERICAN 
COFFEE INDUSTRY 
One of the aspects to which little attention has been 
paid so far in either international or national debates 
on the coffee situation has been that of the relative ef-
ficiency with which coffee is produced. Yet low produc-
tivity is a major cause of the present difficulties of the 
Latin American industry, and any serious attempt to 
solve them must necessarily deal at length with the 
intricate coffee productivity structure. 
Partly as a result of this lack of attention to produc-
tivity problems, insufficient data have been available 
for most Governments in Latin America to reach firm 
conclusions on these problems or to determine the rela-
tive importance of each. The ECLA/FAO Coffee Sur-
veys, referred to above, have been the first to investigate 
productivity on a national scale through extensive and 
representative field investigation. The following discus-
sion is therefore based mainly on the observations made 
in these surveys.® 
One of the principal conclusions of the studies made 
in El Salvador and in Colombia is that, on a large 
proportion of coffee farms, primitive production meth-
Table 2 
COFFEE: FREQUENCIES OF MAIN C U L T I V A T I N G PRAC-
TICES 7 N COLOMBIA AND EL SALVADOR 
(Percentage of the total productive coffee area) 
Colombia El Salvador 
1955/56 1954/55 
Weeding . . . . 97 99 
Pruning . . . . 27 49 
Fertilization . . . . 13 34 
Soil conservation . . . . 15 11 
Pest and disease control . . . . . . 22 52 
SOURCE: Coffee in Latin America, Productivity problems and prospects : I. Co' 
FAO, Commodity Series No. 29, Agricultural Products and 
the European Common Market, 1957. 
8 FAO, The Latin American Coffee Industry, document of the 
Fifth Regional Conference for Latin America, November 1958. 
lombia and El Salvador (E /CN.12 /490 ) , United Nations Publication (Sales 
No. S8.1I.G.4). 
ods prevail. Only very few cultivating operations are 
undertaken, and, consequently, average returns per hec-
tare or per man-hour are very low. This is illustrated 
by the following table which shows the frequency with 
which the principal practices are applied in the two 
countries. 
Even in El Salvador, which is generally considered 
to have the most advanced methods, two-thirds of the 
area did not receive any fertilizers in 1954/55; on 
9 For obvious reasons it is not possible to discuss here all the 
aspects of these surveys. The reader is referred to the oublication: 
Coffee in Latin America, cited in footnote 4, for detailed produc-
tivity analysis of coffee cultivation. 
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nearly 90 per cent no attention was paid to soil conserva-
tion, despite the predominance of hilly land; and about 
half of the plantings were not pruned or protected from 
diseases and pests, which are very common when coffee 
is grown under shade (as it is in both these countries). 
In Colombia, even less intensive production methods 
were found, as shown by the survey covering the year 
1955/56. Modern production methods in that country 
are only rarely applied to coffee growing, and it may 
be estimated that well over half of all coffee plantings 
receive no care at all, except for a small amount of 
weeding. This applies particularly to the new coffee 
farms recently established in outlying areas, such as the 
departments of Boyaca, Huila and Magdalena where 
average yields per hectare are low.^ ® 
Furthermore, a tendency has become apparent to cul-
tivate coffee on a very small scale and under primitive 
conditions. In Colombia 36 per cent, and in El Salvador 
50 per cent, of all coffee farms had under one hectare 
of productive planting' each." It is extremely difficult 
to apply efficient techniques on such farms, and many 
of them yielded reasonable returns only because of the 
favourable coffee prices prevailing in the last ten years. 
Another indication of the structural difficulties facing 
the industry is the fact that a large proportion of exist-
ing coffee trees are old and in need of replacement. 
As yields per tree tend to decline gradually from their 
maximum, which in the case of these two countries 
tends to be in the age group 10-12 years, average pro-
duction costs per unit increase to the point where the 
maintenance of the old planting finally becomes unec-
onomic. 
In El Salvador and Colombia, it was found that 63 
and 61 per cent respectively of all existing plantings 
were older than 15 years, in the years the surveys were 
held. A significant portion of these older plantings may 
be considered to produce uneconomically, especially since 
a general decline in farm coffee prices has now set in, 
which tends to advance the economic obsolescence of 
older plantings. 
Data available for other Latin American countries 
generally point to the existence of similar or even more 
critical problems. In Brazil, for instance, many of the 
coffee plantings in the State of Sao Paulo are known 
to be in poor condition due to excessive age, insufficient 
10 Source: ECLA/FAO Coffee Survey in Colombia. 
" E/CN.12/490, op. cit., page 30 and page 109. These small 
farms were responsible for 5 and 4 per cent of total output re-
spectively. 
care and the predominance of low-yielding tree varieties. 
At late-1958 price and wage levels, it was estimated that 
per hectare yields of at least 500-600 kg would be re-
quired to make cultivation economically feasible. In-
dications are that some 500 million trees out of a total 
of 1 400 million, or about 36 per cent, at present fall 
short of this minimum standard. 
Apart from these technical factors affecting major 
producing areas, where coffee production is otherwise 
well suited, the existence of coffee cultivation in ecolo-
gically marginal areas constitutes a further problem. 
In each country zones are to be found where coffee is 
being grown at excessively high or low altitudes or on 
very steep terrains or inadequate soils. In Colombia, for 
instance, nearly 10 per cent of the coffee plantings were 
found at altitudes of less than 1 000 metres above sea-
level, a height which in that country is considered a 
minimum for efficient production. 
In certain parts of Latin America, general economic 
factors which have no connexion with the coffee produc-
tion pattern as such have also had serious repercussions 
on production costs. The most significant example is 
found in Venezuela, where rural wages have shown a 
sudden and strong rise following developments in the 
petroleum industry and the rapid urbanization which 
has occurred there. The magnitude of the wage increases 
was such that coffee-growers were unable to match them 
with technological improvements, and the industry is 
currently in a state of decline. Though such an extreme 
situation does not exist in other Latin American coun-
tries, the Venezuelan example merits attention, for similar 
development elsewhere could be accompanied by compa-
rable effects on the sensitive coffee sector. 
Paradoxicallv. the past 10 years of favourable coffee 
prices seem to have accentuated, rather than lessened, 
the problems of low productivity. In this period, farm-
ers have not been under great pressure to concentrate 
on measures to lower production costs, or to introduce 
new techniques. Furthermore, the tendency of coffee 
cultivation to become excessively dispersed and the ap-
parent increase in the number of very small plantings 
have made it more difficult to acquaint coffee farmers 
with better production methods. 
The Latin American coffee industry is therefore 
faced today with an important structural problem of 
low productivity, caused by a variety of factors. This 
problem is likely to emerge more clearly now that 
competition has become stronger, and it requires early 
solution if the basis of the industry is to be safeguarded. 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE LONG-TERM PROBLEM AND SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the gravity of the situation, Latin America 
possesses the tools, resources and experience required 
to bring about structural adjustments. Yet these adjust-
ments are not likely to be effective unless the producer 
acquaints himself with the various types of solutions 
open to him, and unless the relative feasibility of various 
alternatives is studied at the national policy-making 
level as well. In current conditions, the weight of 
moderate, but effective. Government policies would do 
a great deal to relieve the prevailing uncertainty among 
farmers regarding the industry's future. Government 
policies, however, take into account the country's foreign 
exchange position, as well as the long- term coffee pro-
ductivity problem and the economic situation of the 
coffee-growing population. 
These solutions and some of the ways in which they 
may be applied may be grouped under the following two 
headings: 
1. Possibilities of improving the efficiency of coffee 
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production and reducing unit production costs 
through increases in yields; 
2. Shifts in the resource allocation of agriculture in 
coffee-producing zones which imply: 
(a) The elimination of excess production capacity 
through abandonment or clearing of mar-
ginal areas; 
(b) The substitution of alternative agricultural and 
livestock enterprises as a means of strength-
ening coffee farmers' incomes and of mak-
ing use of displaced resources. 
A sound coffee policy combines both these ap-
proaches. It is apparent that reductions in production 
capacity would benefit the Latin American industry most 
when combined with gains in average productivity and 
with a greater diversification of agricultural production 
in coffee zones. Yet policies designed for these purposes 
must be carefully balanced so as to prevent the increase 
in total coffee production which could result from the 
large-scale adoption of improved cultivating methods. 
From the point of view of the industry as a whole, it 
would seem best to establish a policy link between pro-
ductivity increases and capacity reductions on the basis 
of appropriate incentives. 
1. POSSIBILITIES OF RAISING PRODUCTIVITY IN 
COFFEE GROWING 
From the point of view of the individual coffee 
producer, the most acceptable solution to the coffee prob-
lem is one that enables him to maintain his total net 
income, even if coffee prices decline. One of the ways 
to achieve this is to improve his coffee cultivation 
system and to raise the productivity of the principal 
resources used in coffee growing: land, labour and 
capital.^-
One of the keys to an increase in the productivity 
of coffee growing is the improvement of coffee yields 
per hectare. The coffee surveys, undertaken by the 
ECLA/FAO Programme, have shown the close connexion 
between yields and labour productivity, as may be seen 
in table 3. Labour productivity on the highest yielding 
coffee plantings, for instance, was two-and-a-half times 
as high as that of the lowest yield group, which com-
prises nearly a fifth of all plantings. 
The magnitudes of these differences in productivity 
between important sections of existing coffee plantings, 
in a country of relatively homogeneous production meth-
ods, show that the productivity structure of coffee 
growing is more varied, and may well be more flexible, 
than is sometimes supposed. 
A considerable part of the productivity differences 
found in Colombia seems to be due to differences in 
natural production conditions rather than to those in 
technology, between various parts of the country. This 
12 Labour costs generally constitute over 70 per cent of all 
current operating costs in Latin American coffee growing. For 
purposes of simplification, the term "labour productivity" will 
henceforth be used to mean the total amount of coffee produced 
per unit of labour emoloyed in one crop year, disregarding the 
separate effects of land and capital. In all cases reference is 
made to the total volume of labour used, i.e. including substantial 
quantities of non-wage family labour. 
Table 1 
COLOMBIA: AVERAGE LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND PRO-
PORTION OF COFFEE PLANTINGS FOR VARIOUS 
YIELDS, 1955/56 
V M . ^ f T - ^ Proportion of JwM per hectare productivity f j ¡ 
(Kg of green coffee) ^ K , ^ 
Up to 250 0.33 19 
251 to 400 0.52 24 
401 to 550 0.49 16 
551 to 700 0.60 17 
701 to 850 0.65 11 
851 to 1 100 0.65 8 
more than 1 100 0.81 7 
Country total 0.66 100 
SOUBCE: ECLA/FAO Co f f ee Survey, unpublished figures. 
is explained by the fact that, in general, little cultivating 
attention is given to coffee trees, once planted, and that 
the production process largely consists of collecting the 
crops periodically. 
Under these conditions, which seem to prevail in 
many parts of Latin America, low yields therefore often 
correspond to unfavourable growing conditions. Policy-
making authorities may find, therefore, that improve-
ments can be obtained by discouraging coffee production 
in these zones and by concentrating output in the most 
suitable areas, more easily than by improving cultivation 
methods in the others. 
The greatest benefit per unit invested in extension 
services and similar technical programmes often occurs 
in high-yielding zones which already have better than 
average production systems, but where nevertheless there 
are still great possibilities of improving coffee cultiva-
tion. The problem is one of setting priorities for the 
use of the limited funds available, considering the na-
tional interest as a whole. 
The existence of a relationship between low yields 
and unfavourable natural growing conditions should, 
however, not obscure the existence of a second important 
relationship: between yields and the technology of pro-
duction. Although coffee cultivation is virtually based 
exclusively on human labour and little opportunity of 
using labour-saving equipment has so far presented itself 
(a factor which may raise labour productivity considera-
bly in other types of agriculture), it appears that there 
is nevertheless considerable scope for improving coffee 
productivity. The basis for such improvements seems 
to lie frequently in a more balanced and effective use of 
existing labour in the various cultivating operations, 
through a moderate intensification of these, aided by 
a wider use of improved tree varieties, fertilizers and 
other yield-raising items. 
A significant practical example of what is technically 
possible has been demonstrated by a long-term research 
programme in the State of Sao Paulo. Here, despite 
favourable natural conditions, low levels of technology 
have frequently caused producing areas to become unec-
onomic. Under the pressure of the preceding coffee 
surplus period of the 1930's, the Campinas Agronomic 
Institute has, over the last quarter century, carried 
out research on the integrated use of factors of produc-
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tion and of techriiques in coffee production, leading to 
the development of the "new system", adapted to SSo 
Paulo conditions. This system includes the use of high-
yielding trees, their closer spacing, intensive fertiliza-
tion, and soil and water conservation. These combined 
improvements have resulted in coffee yields per hectare 
four or five times as high as those obtained on the 
traditional plantings. Total unit production costs are 
also considerably reduced by those methods, although 
the large savings in the use of land and labour are partly 
offset by the increased fertilization costs. 
The Campinas production system has already been 
commercially adopted on many progressive Sao Paulo 
farms, without special economic incentives. At the pres-
ent time, however, the more general introduction of the 
"new system" might well be helped by a moderate pro-
gramme of financial assistance. Such a programme 
would serve to stimulate the adjustment process already 
started, acquainting farmers with profitable production 
opportunities. 
In most other Latin American countries no such 
research has been done, and definite recommendations 
cannot yet be made on the priorities for various technical 
improvements in each area. The productivity surveys 
in Colombia and El Salvador have thrown new light on 
this problem and may provide some guidance, but they 
are not substitutes for integrated research and experiment 
programmes specifically designed to provide a long-
term solution to the productivity problems of the areas 
concerned. 
There is a great need to determine the improvements 
in yields and in labour productivity which can be ex-
pected from various practical alternatives already availa-
ble to farmers, under present conditions. It is not sure, 
for instance, whether any additional cultivating labour 
would best be invested in replantings, more pruning, or 
in more and better weeding; and greater attention could 
well be paid to such basic practical problems. On the 
other hand it is also necessary to undertake long-term 
projects such as those designed to evaluate the signifi-
cance of shading coffee trees, versus production without 
shade, as in Brazil. The present difficulties of the coffee 
industry show the urgency of increasing efforts to co-
ordinate existing technical programmes in the region 
so as to find integrated solutions. 
One concrete example of the improvement of yields 
which may result from the application of more advanced 
techniques under commercial production conditions, is 
provided by the study of fertilizer responses made in 
connexion with the ECLA/FAO Coffee Survey in Co-
lombia.^^ For this purpose, a number of farms were 
selected in the major production department of Caldas, 
where fairly homogeneous growing conditions prevail. 
After allowing for the effect of differences in the use 
of labour and in altitude, the relationship between coffee 
yields and the level of fertilization was isolated. The 
resulting data are shown in table 4. 
The increases in yields on these farms were low with 
small fertilizer applications. They then increased, reach-
ing a maximum of between 201-300 and 301-400 kgs. 
of fertilizer per hectare, and subsequently fell rapidly. 
This is a normal pattern, showing increasing marginal 
Coffee in Latin America, op. cit., pages 60-62. 
Table 1 
COFFEE: NETa RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FERTILIZATION 
AND YIELDS ON COMMERCIAL FARMS IN 
CALDAS, COLOMBIA 
(Kilogiammes per hectare) 
Coffee yield 
Fertilizer input b 
Totai Margina] _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ 
1-100 730 20 
101-200 800 70 
201-300 890 90 
301^00 1 235 345 
401-500 1 320 85 
501-600 1 360 40 
601-700 1 380 20 
701-750 1 390 10 
SOURCE: Coffee in Latin America, op. cit. 
a Allowing for di f ferences in labour use and in altitude. 
b Includes mineral fertilizer and organic materials, the latter in terms of the 
former ( on a value basis ) . 
returns with very low fertilizer application and dimin-
ishing marginal returns at higher levels. The practice of 
fertilization is clearly one of the important factors affect-
ing coffee productivity. But conditions vary and it would 
be necessary to evalute the costs and returns of fertiliza-
tion in each region and compare them with those of 
alternative cultivation improvements before it would be 
possible to find the level of optimum use of fertilizers. 
Among the policy tools applicable for purposes of 
raising coffee productivity, the fuller use of production 
credit deserves special mention. In most areas, coffee 
production credit for all purposes is at present provided 
by purely commercial sources, which do not always take 
fully into account the particular problems of the coffee 
industry. It is the general experience in agricultural 
programmes that one of the most effective ways to in-
fluence techniques is through the use of different interest 
rates for various types of production credit and through 
a technical inspection of the use made of the loans. 
Since many coffee farmers currently depend on credit, 
and since credit institutions are widely available in most 
coffee-producing areas, the use of supervised credit could 
have a considerable effect, notably on small farms 
which have so far made litde use of improved methods. 
The flow of credit represents currently one of the 
the few effective links between coffee producers and the 
rest of the economy. No major additional overhead 
, costs or technical innovations would be required for its 
expansion in most production areas, since existing fi-
nancial institutions could be employed for this purpose, 
and these could be assisted by the extension services. 
2 . SHIFTS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION ON COFFEE FARMS 
Increases in efficiency by themselves cannot provide 
a solution and are only one phase of the whole problem 
of structural change. In fact, unless the proper policy 
is followed, an increase in productivity might well result 
in an even greater total output. It is, therefore, neces-
sary to consider improvements in productivity simul-
taneously with the reduction of production, and to look 
for measures that can promote both these seemingly 
contradictory objectives. 
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The only way in which the rise in production cajj 
be checked is by taking part of the producing area 
out of production. But farmers are unhkely to take 
existing coffee plantings out of production, unless they 
can use the land, labour and other resources so freed 
for alternative enterprises, which provide them with 
equal or higher incomes. 
(a) The reduction in productive capacity 
The concept of "excess production" with reference 
to coffee is not easy to define. Unlike other com-
modities, it does not depend only on the level of prices. 
Productive capacity itself is constantly changing as a 
result of the entry into production of young coffee 
plantings, the development of the yield cycle in adult 
plantings, and the replacement or abandonment of the 
very oldest plantings. It would therefore be exceedingly 
difficult to maintain a balance between production and 
consumption, even if long-term equilibrium prices were 
somehow prevailing in the world market. 
Under existing demand conditions, prices could hard-
ly be stabilized at the levels prevailing in July 1958, 
when the current crop year began, without some decline 
in output. This is shown by the fact that even the 
withdrawal of about 12 million bags by Latin America, 
or 29 per cent of the region's 1958/59 exportable pro-
duction, has been insufficient to stabilize world prices.'^ ^ 
Between July and December 1958, Santos grades fell 
from about 47 to 41 cents per pound in New York. 
The magnitude of the problem of over-capacity is 
even greater when the maturation of additional plant-
ings, and probable further increases in production in 
the coming years, are taken into consideration. For a 
period of several years it seems likely that, judging by 
present trends and unless special measures are taken, 
the surplus in Latin America will be at least one third 
of total output.!® 
There is little prospect that producers would, on 
their own initiative, undertake to reduce their coffee 
production by such a large amount. Previous experience 
has shown that, even in periods of very low coffee 
prices, such as the 1930's, the abandonment of cof-
fee plantings or their replacement by other crops was 
a very slow process, and that in many areas no such 
reduction in capacity took place at all. At the relatively 
high farm prices which are currently being paid for 
coffee, and which reflect the fact that the world market 
is being supported by the retention of a proportion of 
available supplies, little incentive would therefore seem 
to exist to reduce coffee production. The reason for the 
reluctance of coffee farmers to eliminate even their least 
productive plantings in response to changes in the world 
market is not only the difficulty of finding alternative 
sources of cash income but also the fact that producers 
consider these plantings a valuable investment, the loss 
of which would have to be compensated in some way. 
Furthermore, the elimination of plantings itself and the 
preparation of the land for alternative agricultural and 
ivestock enterprises would require a new investment 
which would have to be made at a time when current 
farm incomes were on the decline.^® 
These considerations suggest a number of possibili-
ties for Government coffee policies. Special financial 
assistance to overcome each of the obstacles mentioned 
might well result in the quick adaptation of coffee grow-
ing to the new market conditions and in a shortening 
of the period of excess production. Unfortunately no 
precedents in this field are available in Latin America, 
and a careful appraisal is therefore required to estab-
lish the effectiveness and applicability of various mea-
sures, or their cost. 
Goverment funds used in the execution of coffee 
policies have so far been devoted mainly to acquiring, 
transporting and storing unexportable quantities of 
coffee and have not been used on a large scale for the 
specific purpose of stimulating structural production 
adjustments or of influencing cultivation methods. As a 
result large stocks have accumulated which not only 
burden the world market and provide a constant source 
of price uncertainty, but also represent a costly and 
unproductive investment, which Latin American coun-
tries can ill afford at the moment. 
In Brazil, for instance, the 1958/59 coffee pro-
gramme includes the purchase by the Brazilian Coffee 
Institute (Instituto Brasileiro do Café) of 40 per cent of 
the exportable crop, or more than 10 million bags, requir-
ing an investment of 12 700 million cruzeiros. If part of 
these resources were earmarked for the purpose of taking 
old plantings out of production (e.g. by loans to farmers 
who are willing to stop growing coffee), and of stimu-
lating new lines of agricultural production, more eco-
nomic results might be achieved. Lacking any previous 
experience of this kind, it is not easy to predict the 
impact of a strong Government policy of eliminating, 
for instance, low-yield plantings. But the amount spent 
in 1958/59 would be ample, for instance, to compensate 
Sao Paulo farmers for the capital represented by 500 
million of the lowest yielding trees, and thus to reduce 
productive capacity permanently by some 2.5 million 
bags." 
In some cases it might even be worth considering 
Vv'hether replanting should be encouraged. One advan-
tage of partial replacement of old and low-yield coffee 
plantings by high y productive new ones would be that 
productive capacity would in the first place actually fall. 
The maturing of the new plantings would take place only 
in three or four years' time, when market conditions 
may have improved somewhat, if other policies are 
effective. This alternative might also be acceptable to 
coffee farmers, for it would enable them to stay in their 
traditional business while diversifying their pattern of 
output,!^ and strengthening their competitive position 
United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul-
ture Circular, op. cit. 
IS A reduction of this magnitude would pose an enormous 
problem at the farm level. Since the lowest yielding plantings 
would presumably be the first ones to be taken out of production, 
a cut of one third in production might require the elimination 
of over half of all Latin American coffee plantings, affecting 
millions of people. 
16 The problem of alernative production possibilities in coffee-
growing areas will be dealt with separately below. 
These estimates assume the average value of low-yield coffee 
trees at about 20 cruzeiros each. 
18 Since average yields on new plantings would, in Sao Paulo, 
frequently be four or five times as high as those on the ones to 
be eliminated, this procedure might result in a reduction in the 
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Table 1 
PRICE INDICES OF COFFEE AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES IN BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA, 1948-58 
(1948 = 100) 
Brazil Colombia 




















4 + 5 
(6) 
1949 122 105 116 130 106 123 
1950 203 106 192 188 127 148 
1951 213 132 161 227 139 163 
1952 216 155 139 243 145 168 
1953 252 181 139 262 152 172 
1954 464 214 217 359 168 214 
1955 452 266 170 302 162 186 
1956 482 318 152 404 173 234 
1957 487 355 137 457 215 213 
1958a 533 378 141 468 240 195 
SOURCE: 1. United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; 2. Conjuntura Económica, Brazil ; 4 and 5. Revista del Banco de la República, Colombia 
a Preliminary, based on the first 8-10 months. 
in the world coffee market. On the other hand, unless 
the newly established productive capacity were consider-
ably smaller than the capacity eliminated, the burden 
of excess production would merely by shifted forward 
some years. 
The prospects for executing a plan to reduce total 
coffee production capacity by the elimination of marginal 
plantings seem to be more favourable now than they 
were in the 1930's. World demand for coffee is at a 
record level, and coffee production has only recently 
begun to exceed consumption requirements. At the same 
time the possibilities for diversification have improved 
notably as will be seen in the next section. Experience 
shows, however, that a reduction in total output is one 
of the most difficult objectives to achieve for any sector 
of agriculture, and that great effort will be required in 
the case of coffee to achieve satisfactory results. 
(b) The diversification of agriculture in coffee-pro-
ducing zones 
The way of solving the problem of over-production 
of coffee which is likely to receive most serious at-
tention is to shift resources, now employed in coffee 
growing, towards other agricultural and/or livestock ac-
tivities. Such a development would make total farm 
incomes less vulnerable to declines in coffee prices. 
In general, much improvement is possible along these 
lines. In comparison with previous periods of over-
production of coffee, such as that of the 1930's, the 
range of alternative possibilities open to coffee farmers 
has considerably deepened and widened. A rapid de-
velopment of the internal markets in coffee-producing 
countries has taken place, which has resulted in sharp 
increases in the demand for all food and agricultural 
commodities. Many of these could be produced in areas 
now mainly specialized in coffee growing. 
The high level of coffee prices of the postwar period, 
however, has so far largely prevented this increased 
demand for alternative products from being reflected 
in the production structure of coffee-growing areas. 
Though the rises in world coffee prices, which gathered 
momentum in 1949, were not fully passed on to producers 
(being partly absorbed by export taxes, exchange rate 
differentials, or other special levies) domestic coffee 
prices generally advanced until 1954 much more than 
the prices of other agricultural commodities (see table 5) . 
Moreover, Government measures prevented the full impact 
of the decline in coffee prices from being passed on 
to the producer in the period 1954 to 1957. 
The 1958 figures in the table do not yet fully reflect 
events in the second half of the year, when coffee prices 
(in local currencies) fell notably and prices of other 
agricultural commodities advanced sharply. At any rate 
it appears that the effect of recent price shifts has been 
to reverse the price gains of coffee relative to other 
agricultural commodities since the beginning of the post-
war coffee boom in 1949, and domestic price relation-
ships between coffee and other commodities have become 
much less favourable to coffee again. 
Table 6 
PRICE INDICES OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 
RELATIVE TO COFFEE IN BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA 
(Price relationship to coffee in July 1957 = 100) 
Colombia Brazil 
Commodity July December July December 
1958 1958 a 1958 1958 a 
115 159 163 211 
120 141 99 159 
139 179 131 285 
Meat 123 • 175 
Milk 135 179 
SOURCES: Wholesa le prices in Bogotá market: Boletín Mensual de Estadística; 
Average prices received hy farmers in the State of Sao P a u l o : Department of 
Agriculture, 
a Preliminary. 
planted coffee area of up to 80 per cent, freeing much of the land 
for other purposes. 
10 Prices in local currency rose more than New York prices, 
but allowance must also he made for general increases in local 
prices. Consequently relative prices of coffee did not rise by as 
much as would have been justified by changes in world prices. 
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Figure II 
BRAZIL: SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRICE INDICES" 




I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
A S O N D J 
1 9 5 7 
M A M J J A S 
1 9 5 8 
SOURCE: Department UF Agriculture. 
K Average prices received by farmers in SSo Paulo State. 
A major change in price relationships appears to 
have occurred in both Brazil and Colombia since the 
middle of 1957, when coffee prices started to recede 
(see table 6) . By the end of 1958, farm coffee prices 
had fallen nearly 30 per cent from their 1957 peak levels 
in the main producing areas, while prices of other 
agricultural commodities continued to rise steadily. Con-
sequently, in this 18-month period, the prices of staple 
foodstuffs in Brazil and Colombia, for instance, rose 
sharply relative to coffee prices. Shifts of this magnitude, 
which may well develop further over the next few years, 
are unlikely to leave the farming structure unaffected. 
Figures II and III further illustrate the recent price 
changes in some primary commodities that have taken 
place in the two main coffee-producing countries. The 
recent declines in farm coffee prices in domestic cur-
rencies reflect the tendency on the part of Governments 
to let producers shoulder an increasing proportion of 
the financial burden caused by over-production. 
Indications are that the new price situation is already 
changing coffee farming in certain areas. In north-
eastern Sao Paulo State, for instance, sizeable reductions 
in low-yielding coffee plantings seemed to be taking 
place in late 1958.^" Much of the land freed was being 
20 Observations based on a field trip made in November 1958. 
turned into pasture for dairy cows and in annual crops 
such as maize, but nearly always a certain proportion 
of it was replanted with coffee trees according to the 
"new system". These changes were effected without 
any special financial incentives other than the modified 
price relationships for coffee. Many farmers also seemed 
to be only awaiting further policy statements before 
changing to other crops. But in most parts of Latin 
America no such spontaneous production shifts have 
been reported so far, and diversification may prove 
more difficult. 
While the price structure has thus become more fa-
vourable to non-coffee products, a situation which can 
be expected to last, there are several important general 
obstacles to a rapid increase in the production of these 
commodities on coffee farms, for example marketing 
and transport difficulties. 
The great importance of coffee cultivation in Latin 
America is in no small degree due to the special hand-
ling advantages this commodity has over other agri-
cultural products. Once processed on the farms, the 
high unit value of coffee makes its transport economical 
over long distances, and coffee can be stored for long 
periods without any deterioration in quality. It is ap-
parent that, since efficient transport facilities are not 
Figure III 
COLOMBIA: SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRICE INDICES" 
Uuly 1957 = 100) 
SEMILOCARITHMIC SCALE 
MAIZE 
SOURCE: National Adminiatrative Department of Statistics, Boletín Mensual de 
Estadística^ Bogotá, 
a Wholesale prices in Bogota. 
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common in rural Latin America, many outlying coffee 
districts will not be able to supply on a competitive 
basis more bulky and/or more perishable agricultural 
commodities to the consuming centres. Transport costs 
would first have to be lowered and handling facilities 
improved. 
Moreover most coffee farmers have very little ex-
perience in the commercial production of agricultural 
commodities other than coffee, so that technical exten-
sion campaigns would have to be conducted to assist 
them. Since the existing technical services have also 
been concerned principally with coffee cultivation, a 
new emphasis would have to be laid on commodities 
other than coffee by all concerned. In many areas the 
prevailing attitude towards diversification possibilities 
has been formed in periods differing greatly from the 
one now beginning. Therefore there is a general need 
to reappraise the various opportunities offered and to 
establish study groups for this purpose."^ 
Finally, the relatively small size of coffee farms in 
many parts of Latin America may also slow down the 
replacement of coffee by other commodities. Since cof-
fee cultivation is based on a relatively intensive use 
of human labour, efficient production can take place on 
small planting units. This is less true for other crops. 
Consequently, labour requirements may be different for 
other types of farming. This implies that production 
switches on coffee farms must be studied from the point 
of view of labour, as well as from that of land. 
A wide range of other crops is encountered on the 
coffee farms of most countries. In many areas these 
are mainly produced to supply the food requirements 
of farm families or those of the immediate neighbour-
hood, but commercial production has in places gradually 
evolved out of this pattern. In nearly all cases, however, 
these crops are destined for domestic consumption in 
the coffee-producing countries themselves, not for export. 
In Colombia, for instance, the majority of coffee 
farms reported the production of one or more crops in 
addition to coffee.^^ Bananas and plantains were the 
most frequent other crops, followed at a considerable 
distance by sugar cane, root crops, maize, cacao and 
minor food crops. But in most cases the value of these 
secondary crops amounted to a relatively small propor-
tion of the total value produced on coffee farms, and 
production on a commercial scale was encountered only 
exceptionally. It was also found that the degree of 
specialization of coffee farms increased sharply as the 
average size of coffee plantings rose, further evidence 
of the subsistence nature of non-coffee crops on the 
smallest farms. 
In El Salvador, the relative importance of alternative 
crops in coffee areas is even smaller, as land in the 
higher ranges is almost exclusively planted to coffee. 
Partial data available for other producing areas indicate 
that conditions do not differ greatly from those in Colom-
bia or El Salvador, with the exception of parts of Brazil. 
In Brazil, diversification is most highly developed in 
the State of SSo Paulo. In the last 25 years, the total 
area in coffee plantings has declined notably and many 
In Colombia, the National Federation of Coffee Growers 
has recently established such a group. 
^ Coffee in Latin America, op. cit., chapter IV. 
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alternative crops have increased in commercial impor-
tance. Among these are cotton, sugar cane, rice, maize, 
beans and citrus fruits. More recently, in certain cases, 
it has been found that coffee farming may be profitably 
combined with the growing of eucalyptus trees, castor 
seed, sisal and even fruits such as grapes and figs. The 
dynamic economic development of this State has greatly 
stimulated the adoption of these new crop combinations. 
As the production of these new crops gradually 
improves, under the spur of local and national competi-
tion, the possibility of growing some of them for export 
has to be considered. At present, quantities of sugar, 
citrus fruit, and groundnuts are already exported by 
Sao Paulo, when the domestic market for such products 
is saturated. But regular large-scale exports of the com-
modities that might be produced on marginal coffee 
land would require the establishment of suitable market 
organizations, and so far the main impulse to their 
production has been provided by the growing domestic 
market. 
The possibilities of increasing the production of 
alternative crops, in partial substitution for marginal 
coffee plantings, are therefore different in the various 
coffee-producing countries, and in their sub-regions. But, 
in general, it seems that they have been underestimat-
ed in the past, and that much can be done to increase 
crop diversification, especially as coffee cultivation tends 
to become less profitable. 
Another possibility of diversification is the expansion 
of livestock farming on coffee farms. Such an expan-
sion is feasible in view of the rapid rise in the potential 
market for livestock products in Latin America, as a 
result of their high income-elasticity of demand. Per 
capita consumption of meat, milk and poultry products 
is generally low, notoriously so in the region's coffee 
producing areas. Increases in livestock production, in 
connexion with changes in the coffee-growing structure, 
would be useful for another reason: the need to obtain 
organic fertilizer. 
At present, coffee-livestock, combinations already oc-
cur fairly frequently. In Colombia, for instance, it was 
found that 15 per cent of all coffee farms reported 
livestock products as their principal source of income 
after coffee. Nearly one half of the value produced by 
all non-coffee activities on coffee farms could be at-
tributed to livestock, and the value represented by this 
production amounted to 10 per cent of the value of 
coffee. It is clear therefore that livestock production 
is feasible in coffee areas, even in periods when coffee 
prices have been generally favourable to producers.^^ 
In the case of Colombia, the explanation of the im-
portance of livestock farming in coffee areas seems to 
lie in the broken topography of the country, which often 
makes the cultivation of annual crops very difficult. 
Elsewhere in Latin America, the pattern may be dif-
ferent, but livestock production in combination with 
coffee is increasingly found in many areas where coffee 
growing is firmly established. 
At any rate, the expansion of livestock production 
would be a serious possibility for most Latin American 
coffee regions. The specific pattern of production in 
23 E/C.N.12/490, p. 28; the year of reference is 1955/56. 
each case would naturally depend on a farm's site, the 
market situation and the quality and quantity of the land 
available for this purpose. In relatively highly developed 
areas, the combination coffee-dairy, or coffee-poultry 
might be the most successful, whereas in more remote 
areas beef production would probably have better pros-
pects. In all cases, the manure produced could be used 
on the farm's coffee plantings. In certain parts of Sao 
Paulo, the high prices of fertilizing materials have even 
led to manure being the most highly valued product of 
the livestock held on coffee farms. 
In general, the expansion of livestock production 
would require more land and less labour than an in-
crease in non-coffee crops. This is especially the case 
with the raising of beef cattle. To some extent, this 
affects the Colombian situation, where the small coffee 
farm is typical. Nevertheless, it has been established 
that the average amount of agricultural and pastoral 
land per Colombian coffee farm was 20.1 hectares, as 
compared with only 3.3 hectares actually planted with 
coffee. Consequently, livestock production prospects 
there are not as unfavourable as is sometimes supposed. 
On the whole, prospects for increasing livestock out-
put in the coffee-producing regions of Latin America 
appear to be moderately favourable, especially if tech-
nical, financial and marketing guidance is given to farm-
ers and detailed local studies are made to establish the 
most profitable use of available resources. 
Although the specific measures to stimulate the re-
placement or abandonment of marginal coffee plantings 
would depend on local conditions in each area, one 
possibility is a combination of direct subsidies with the 
application of technically supervised credit. Cash sub-
sidies might be paid to farmers in compensation for 
eliminating productive coffee trees, and their payment 
would be contingent upon proof of such action. Tech-
nically supervised credit on the other hand could provide 
the basis for a readjustment in the production structure, 
both through stimulating non-coffee production on coffee 
farms, and through improvements in the productivity of 
the remaining coffee trees. 
It would therefore seem to be possible to achieve 
simultaneously a reduction of the area under coffee 
plantings and of total production, with an increase in 
the productivity of coffee growing and with greater 
diversification. 
IV. SUMMARY 
1. For the first time since the Second World War, the 
Latin American coffee industry is faced with a serious 
problem of over-production caused by the maturation of 
large plantings established in the past decade. This 
problem is aggravated by the rise of African coffee 
production. 
2. Although world coffee consumption is at a record 
level and may increase further, prospects are that the 
increased supplies cannot be absorbed by consumers at 
prices which producers would consider reasonable. 
3. Coffee market prospects will therefore depend very 
largely on whether policies are adopted in producer 
countries to bringing about adjustments in the structure 
of production. National and international measures so 
far adopted have helped to achieve a temporary stab-
ilization in the world market, but the question is now 
whether measures are needed at the farm level, directed 
at the roots of the problem, and, if so, what measures 
would be effective. 
4. The elimination of excess productive capacity is one 
possibility deserving special attention under present con-
ditions. Since a fall in coffee prices alone would hardly 
bring about the necessary reduction in the area planted. 
Government pohcies might aim specifically at obtaining 
this through financial assistance to farmers. If output 
declined in the least productive, and the worst situated, 
coffee areas this would increase the competitive strength 
of the industry. 
5. The shift from coffee production would be greatly 
encouraged if profitable alternative uses could be found 
for the resources freed. Although coffee farms are tra-
ditionally highly specialized, the growth of domestic 
markets has opened new opportunities of increasing the 
output of alternative crop and livestock production in 
coffee zones. Recent changes in farm price relationships 
tend to favour this development. 
6. The principal long-term problem of coffee cultivation 
in Latin America remains its low average productivity 
of labour and land. Available technical improvements 
could raise productivity significantly, even though coffee 
cultivation may remain dependent on an intensive use 
of human labour. Greater efficiency would aid Latin 
American producers to meet increased world competition. 
7. In most producing areas insufficient evidence is avail-
able on which to base integrated programmes for the 
improvement of the coffee industry, dealing with prob-
lems of excess capacity, low productivity, and diver-
sification opportunities simultaneously. One of the first 
requirements in this connexion would be a co-ordination 
and strengthening of the many existing technical services 
and the establishment of national study groups con-
sidering the problem as a whole. 
8. The financial resources required for the implement-
ation of an effective farm programme for the Latin 
American coffee industry would be found, for example, 
by using part of the funds currently invested in inventory 
accumulation. One of the financial tools which could be 
used to influence farmers is technically supervised credit 
(to encourage the adoption of the recommendations for-
mulated for each area). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past ten years, a considerable amount of 
statistical data for the Latin American region has been 
tabulated by ECLA. Some of the series have been shown 
in the annual Economic Survey or in the studies present-
ed at various conferences. Many of the series, however, 
have been used only as background material upon which 
ECLA's economists have based their analyses and as a 
result have not been available to the public. It has thus 
not been possible for the reader to obtain consecutive 
series. 
While in the past, the resources at ECLA's disposal 
did not permit the systematic publication of the data, 
the Economic Bulletin and the Economic Survey will 
henceforth contain statistical supplements showing an-
nual and quarterly series bagic to ECLA's work. The 
first set of such tables appeared in the most recent issue 
of the Economic Bulletin —Volume III, No. 2— when 
basic data relating to population, national income, capital 
formation, finance, balance-of-payments, prices and trade 
were published. The present issue brings up-to-date the 
quarterly series published in that Bulletin. In addition, 
it contains new series relating to mining and industrial 
production and the destination of leading products ex-
ported from the region. Trade index numbers calculated 
to the base 1955 (which has now been adopted for 
ECLA's current studies) are also shown. Series relating 
to agricultural production have not yet been published 
as certain incomparabilities in national data (notably 
the statistical treatment given to harvests which over-
lap the calendar year) have yet to be eliminated. Work 
is however proceeding on this problem and it is hoped 
to present these series at an early date. 
It is emphasised that tables given represent merely 
the data adopted or elaborated by ECLA for internal 
use. In no event are they to be considered as a substitute 
for statistics published officially by the country con-
cerned or by the U.N. Statistical Office. It should also 
be noted that data for the most recent periods shown in 
the tables are to be considered as provisional, and in cer-




LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC INDICATORS (QUARTERLY) 
Series Unit . 
1956 1957 1958 
I 11 in / V I 11 111 rv 1 11 Ill 
Production 
1. Mining 1955 = 100 108 108 113 115 124 127 124 120 116 114 119 
2. Manufacturing 1955 = 100 99 107 109 104 103 109 114 111 106 113 116 
International trades. 
3. Total imports: values 
Millions of 
dollars 1 893 1946 1956 2 133 2 272 2 320 2 381 2 528 2 044 2174 2129* 
4. Total exports: values Tf 2 145 2 130 2 076 2 177 2 281 2 165 2 092 2 112 2011 2 023 1 972 * 
5. Trade balance: values >r + 252 + 184 + 120 + 44 + 9 — 155 — 289 — 416 — 33 — 151 — • 157* 
6. Imports from United States . . . . 882 906 884 1 096 1037 1 124 1 110 1 195 1041 1 017 972 
7. Exports to United States 1007 905 908 820 1030 900 881 957 933 908 818 
Imports from Western Europe c . . . 448 482 460 560 544 548 584 677 573 552 547 c 
9. Exports to Western Europe c . . . . „ . 589 614 618 656 743 761 698 628 621 622 586 c 
10. Total exports: quantum 1955 = 100 inn , 115 108 108 112 108 108 110* 
11. Total exports: unit value 1955 = 100 no ^ 99 100 97 94 93 94 89 * 
Prices and finances 
12. Exports of foodstuffs and raw materi-
als: price index 
(a) Total • . . . . • . . 1955 = 100 100 100 101 101 104 102 98 97 95 93 91 
(b) Total excluding petroleum . . 1955 = 100 100 100 100 100 104 101 97 95 92 90 87 
13. Gold and foreign exchange holdings e. 
Millions of 
dollars 3 550 3 525 3 525 3 680 3 700 3 995 3 865 3 805 . . . ... 
SOURCES AND METHODS; See Explanatory Notes, 
a The data are indicated at f . o .b . values except 
period. 
for total imports (item 3 ) . b Two months only . c Excluding Finland, Spain and Yugoslavia. d Including an estimate for Belgium based on a two-month period. e End of 
Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: GOLD RESERVES a 
(Millions of dollars} 
1957 1958 
March ^ e ^ ^ March fune 
Argentina i g T 181 166 126 126 125 
Bolivia 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Brazil . , 324 324 324 324 324 325 325 
Colombia 57 58 58 62 65 67 70 
Chile 46 43 40 40 40 40 40 
Ecuador 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Peru 35 35 35 28 20 20 20 
Uruguay 183 183 183 180 180 180 180 
Venezuela 669 669 719 719 719 720 720 
Sub-totalb ] 530 1517 1 549 1 502 1 497 1 500 
Costa Rica 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Cuba 136 136 136 136 136 136 135 
EI Salvador 32 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Guatemala 27 27 27 27 7J 
Honduras — — — , , , , 
Mexico 166 165 182 180 158 153 147 
Nicaragua 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 
Panama — — — — ~7 
Dominican Republic 11 H H H H " ^ 
Sub-totalb m 372 391 38S 368 360 3j4 
Grand total: Latin America b I 900 I 890 1 940 1 890 1 865 1 860 ^ ^ 
I I I I I — 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, October 1958 and February 1959. 
a At end of specified month, , r T - * • • i> 




L A T I N A M E R I C A : F O R E I G N E X C H A N G E R E S E R V E S a 






















Grand total: Latin America 
SOURCE: International Financial Statistics, op. cit. 
a At end of specified month, 
b August. 









































































































































Table 16 (Continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS W I T H T H E UNITED STATES (QUARTERLY) 
(Millions of doJ/ars) 
1957 J 958 
item — 
I II III IV I II III 
A. Goods and services 
Total balancea _ 231 _ 486 _ 445 - 463 262 274 • 316 
Goods: balance — 6 — 22? — 227 — 241 — 92 — 89 — 97 
Exports to the United States. • -t-1062 4- 945 4- 926 4- 996 4- 967 4- 950 4- 892 
Imports from the United States — 1 068 — 1 170 — 1 153 — I 237 4-1059 — 1 039 — 989 
Services: balance — 225 — 261 — 218 — 222 - — 170 — 185 — 219 
Imports from the United States — 473 — 504 — 488 — 482 — 417 — 434 — 468 
Including: investment income. — 251 — 271 — 243 — 250 • — 206 — 211 — 226 
Exports to the United States. + 248 + 243 4- 270 4- 260 4" 247 4- 249 4- 249 
B. Movement of private United States 
capital and others (total) . . . -1- 241 -f 595 4- 306 4- 315 4- 141 4- 243 4- 40 
Private United 
States capital + 232 4- 583 4- 295 4- 306 4- 134 4- 234 4- 32 
Donations + 9 4- 12 4- 11 4-, 9 4- 7 4- 9 4- 8 
C. Credit or debit balance resulting 
from transactions in goods and 
services, donations and private 
United States capital (A + B ) . + 10 4- 109 139 — 148 121 31 276 
D. Loans from United States Govern-
ment (excluding military aid), 
and others (total) + 45 4- 55 4- 73 4- 94 4- 94 + 75 4- 248 
Loans + 14 4- 24 4- 49 4- 59 4- 57 4- 39 4- 222 
Donations + 31 4- 31 4- 24 4- 35 4- 37 4- 36 4- 26 
E. Variations in foreign holdings of 
gold and assets abroad (total) . 17 354 8 4- 205 4- 84 4- 35 4- 223 
Long-term variations in assets. . . — 10 — 1 — + 7 4- 4 4- 66 4- 6 
Short-term variations in assets. . . , — 13 — 366 — 23 4- 151 4- 80 — 31 4- 20? 
Gold purchases and sales. . . . . - f 6 4- 13 4- 15 4- 47 — — 4- 12 
F. Errors, omissions and inter-regional 
dollar transfers 38 4- 190 4- 74 — 151 _ 57 79 19? 
SOURCE: Survey of current business,-June, September and December 1958. 
a Excluding military transferg. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME OF MINING PRODUCTION 
Gross output at 1955 international prices 
(1955 = 100) 
Weighting 
1955 1945 1948 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
1956 1957 
A. By product 
Coal 75 81 79 83 88 93 94 100 102 99» 
Crude petroleum . . . . . 69.9 44 63 71 80 84 83 89 100 113 125 
Iron ore . . 3.2 8 29 34 47 51 65 83 100 127 167 
Copper ore . . 11.6 105 98 87 91 94 86 86 100 114 112 
Lead ore 2.3 76 79 96 99 106 101 97 100 99 107 
Zinc ore 1.0 64 57 72 68 85 85 88 100 97 94 
Tin ore 1.4 152 132 112 118 114 124 102 100 96 99 
Silver 2.1 113 104 100 99 113 104 92 100 94 99* 
Gold 1.6 123 97 109 104 108 110 99 100 96 91* 
Sulphur 0.4 8 5 7 13 21 16 30 100 ISO" 200* 
Sodium nitrate , . . . . 1.8 90 119 104 109 93 92 102 100 75 84» 
Total 100.0 57 70 75 82 86 82 89 100 110 121* 
B. By country 
Argentina 2.5 79 80 81 85 91 95 97 100 101 111 
Bolivia . . 2.0 126 120 103 n o 107 111 96 100 100 104 
Brazil 66 72 75 80 88 93 89 100 102 124» 
Colombia . . 4.2 60 60 80 89 88 93 96 100 111 111 
Chfle 12.9 100 105 90 94 96 89 89 100 108 108» 
Mexico 12.Í 71 77 87 89 93 89 92 100 104 104 
Peru 4.3 62 51 66 74 79 84 96 100 109 120 
Venezuela , . 58.7 40 60 67 77 82 80 87 100 115 130 
SOUBCE: ECLA, based on country data given in table 6. (For metbodfi used. see Explanatory Notes. ) 
Table 6 
REFINING OF NON-FERROUS METALLIC ORES 
(Percentage of domestic ores smelted or refined in the country) 
Copper Lead Zinc Tin 
Country 1945- 1950- 1955- 1945- 1950- 1955- 1945- 1950- 1955- 1945- 1950- 1955-
47 52 57 47 52 57 47- 52 57 47 52 57 
Argentina a a 94 94 88 12 65 56 76 84 85 
Bolivia ^ — 
Chile 98 95 94 — — 
Mexico 88 89 83 98 90 95 27 25 22 99 66 50 
Peru 79 73 72 74 52 51 2 2 11 a a a 
Total 92 88 90 89 74 74 19 18 20 2 2 2 
So«BCES AND METHODS; Scc ExpUnatoiy Notes, 
a A l l refined ore is o f foreign origin. 
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Table 7 
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MINERALS 
Country 1945 1948 1950 J 9 5 1 1952 1953 1954 1 9 5 5 1956 1 9 5 7 
COAL (thousands of tons) 
3 18 2 6 4 0 112 82 9 3 133 1 5 2 2 0 6 
2 0 7 3 2 0 2 5 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 0 2 0 2 5 2 0 5 5 2 2 6 8 2 2 3 4 2 0 6 0 
7 3 0 8 8 2 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 5 9 6 6 1 230 1 500 1 8 0 0 1 9 0 0 
2 0 7 8 2 2 7 1 2 181 2 2 1 1 2 4 1 7 2 336 2 2 6 7 2 3 0 8 2 277 2 0 9 6 
9 1 5 1 0 5 7 9 1 2 1 119 1 3 1 7 1 4 3 2 1 3 1 4 1 3 4 2 1 4 0 8 1 421 
201 .189 ^ 1 9 7 186 2 2 5 281 . 2 5 8 115 129 140 
17 1 8 2 6 2 8 25 29 32 31 31 35 
6 017 6 4 6 0 6311 6 6 6 2 7 022 7 415 7 5 1 9 7 9 9 7 8131 
CRUDE PETROLEUM (thousands of tons) 
3 2 7 4 3 323 3 3 5 7 3 501 3 552 4 0 7 9 4 229 4 367 4 4 4 0 4 8 6 0 
50 6 0 80 6 8 6 7 7 8 221 351 4 1 7 4 6 6 
10 19 38 9 0 9 8 120 130 2 6 4 524 1 321 
3 1 5 7 3 291 4 7 1 1 5 3 1 1 5 351 5 4 5 4 5 530 5 4 9 3 6 1 0 4 6 3 3 6 
^ — 8 2 9 9 119 164 2 2 6 336 4 6 2 5 6 5 
3 4 5 3 3 8 3 4 7 357 3 7 5 391 4 1 5 4 6 6 4 5 1 4 2 1 
6 231 10 363 • 1 1 0 6 2 1 1 0 5 7 10 3 6 4 1 1 9 6 9 12 7 9 3 • 12 9 7 2 12 6 9 6 
1 8 2 7 1 8 7 2 2 0 5 1 2 139 2 2 5 9 2 126 2 2 8 0 2 3 0 2 •2 544 • 2 5 5 6 
4 7 3 0 4 71 6 7 2 79 9 7 5 91 0 0 7 9 6 571 9 4 2 2 9 101 1 8 6 1 1 5 1 6 8 131 521 148 3 8 0 
62193 88 947 Í01 004 113 634 119 449 117 0 0 5 1 2 6 186 1 4 1 5 4 0 •159 435 177 601 
IRON ORE (thousands of tons of meta! content) 
4 4 2 1 0 6 9 1 351 1 6 3 7 2 150 2 4 6 0 2 0 8 8 2 300 2 0 7 3 2 7 8 0 
1 7 3 1 6 8 1 1 7 7 1 1 9 6 1 1 4 2 6 1 7 2 3 1 365 9 4 0 1 6 6 3 1 6 7 8 
1 7 5 2 2 7 2 8 6 3 1 3 3 4 0 331 3 1 4 4 2 9 4 8 9 5 7 5 
— — — — _ 558 1 118 1 0 2 4 1 561 2 0 7 7 
— — 1 2 7 8 1 3 1 261 1 4 7 0 3 4 6 9 5 4 0 1 7 0 4 9 9 7 7 0 
790 2 9 7 7 3 408 4 7 2 4 5 1 7 7 6 542 8 3 5 4 10 094 12 8 3 5 16880 
COPPER ORE (thousands of tons of metal content) 
6 .1 6 . 6 4 . 7 4 . 8 4 . 7 4 . 5 3 .7 3 .5 4 . 4 3 .9 
8 .9 15 .4 21 .0 19 .6 17 .7 15 .5 1 5 . 4 1 7 . 7 - 14 .6 13 .9 
4 7 0 . 2 4 4 5 . 1 • 362 .9 3 8 0 . 7 4 0 8 . 6 3 6 2 . 2 363 .7 4 3 3 . 5 • 4 8 9 . 7 4 8 4 . 3 
6 1 . 7 59.1 6 1 , 7 6 7 . 4 58 .5 60 .1 54 .8 5 4 . 7 - 73 ;3 6 0 . 7 
31 .9 18.1 30 .3 32 .3 3 0 . 4 35 .4 37.7 4 3 . 4 4 6 . 2 58 .5 
5 7 8 . 8 5 4 4 . 3 480.6 504.8 519.9 477.7 475.3 552.8 6 2 8 . 2 6 2 1 . 3 
LEAD ORE (thousands ol tons oi metal content) 
18 .2 25 .5 2 4 . 9 29 .3 24 .9 19.0 2 1 . 4 2 6 . 8 29 .2 3 0 . 7 
9 . 5 2 5 . 6 31 .2 3 0 . 6 30 .0 2 3 . 8 18 .2 19.1 21 .6 26 .3 
0 .1 6 . 2 3 .4 7 .3 6 . 6 5.2 4 . 0 4 . 0 3.2 • 3 . 6 
2 0 5 . 3 1 9 3 . 3 238 .1 2 2 5 . 5 2 4 6 . 0 2 2 1 . 5 2 1 6 . 6 2 1 0 . 8 199 .6 214 .9 
53 .7 • 4 8 . 5 6 4 . 9 8 2 . 4 9 5 . 8 114 .6 110.1 118 .8 121 .1 131 .3 
2S6.8 299.1 362.5 375.1 403.3 384.1 3 7 0 . 3 3 7 9 . 5 374.7 4 0 6 . 8 
ZrNC ORE (thousands of tons of metal content) 
13.1 12 .2 1 2 . 7 15 .5 15 .4 16.1 18 .9 21 .2 23 .9 29 .4 
2 1 . 0 21 .1 19 .6 30 .5 35 .6 24 .0 2 0 : 4 21 .3 17.1 19 .7 
. 2 0 9 . 9 179 .0 2 2 3 . 5 180.1 2 2 7 . 4 2 2 6 . 5 2 2 3 . 7 2 6 9 . 4 248 .9 . 2 4 3 . 0 
. 6 1 . 2 58.8 87 .9 1 0 1 . 2 1 2 7 . 8 • 139.1 158 .6 166 .1 175.1 . 1 5 7 . 6 
3 0 5 . 2 : 271.1 3 4 3 . 7 3 2 7 3 ; 406.2 405.7 421.6 . 4 7 8 . 0 465.0 , 4 4 9 . 7 
TIN ORE (tons of meta/ content) 
1 101 • 2 8 4 261 2 4 1 2 6 5 156 9 7 8 6 85 1 8 4 
4 3 168 37 9 3 5 3 1 7 1 4 33 6 6 4 32 4 7 2 35 3 8 4 2 8 2 8 7 2 8 369 2 7 2 7 3 2 8 2 4 2 
1 7 7 1 8 5 4 4 7 3 7 2 4 1 9 4 8 3 3 5 5 6 1 5 508 ' 4 8 1 
44 446 3 8 4 0 4 32 422 3 4 2 7 7 33 1 5 6 3 6 0 2 3 2 9 7 3 9 2 9 0 7 0 2 7 8 6 6 2 8 907 
SILVER (tons) 
2 2 3 2 1 2 2 3 5 2 4 0 340 2 2 3 1 5 5 100 52 4 2 
2 0 8 2 3 5 2 0 4 2 2 3 2 2 0 190 1 5 7 184 2 3 5 167 
5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
2 5 27 2 9 3 7 4 4 4 7 4 6 53 57 "•is 
1 1 0 9 7 1 3 6 1 2 5 1 1 2 c 173 c 107 c c — c 
1 9 0 0 1 7 8 9 1 528 1 3 6 2 1 566 1 4 6 4 1 241 1 4 9 2 1 340 1467 
4 0 4 2 8 9 4 3 6 541 597 611 535 714 700 7 8 7 
2 8 7 5 2 6 5 2 2 5 5 2 2 5 3 2 2 8 8 3 2 642 2 3 4 5 2 547 2 3 8 7 
Argentina. 
Brazil . . 
Colombia. 
Chile a . 
Mexico. . 





Brazil . . 
Colombia. 
Chile . . 
Ecuador . 
Mexico. . 
Peru. . . 
Venezuela 
Total . 
Brazil . . 
Chile . . 
Mexico. . 










Bolivia c . 
Chile . . 
Mexico . 





Peru. . . 
Total . 
Argentina. 




Bolivia a . 
Colombia 
Chile. . . 
Honduras. 
Mexico. . 
Peru. . . 
Total . 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
Table 7 (Continued) 
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MINERALS 
Countiy mS mS 1950 1951 1952 1953 
GOLD (kilogrammes) 
Soliviad 183 208 240 99 335 713 
Brazil e 5 073 4 051 4 082 4 228 4 252 3 604 
Colombia 15 760 10 428 11 801 13 397 13 133 13 562 
Chile 5 610 5 105 5 984 5 439 5 229 4 065 
Ecuador 2 155 2 466 3 059 392 756 909 
El Salvador 354 646 916 767 800 620 
Honduras c 585 688 1 137 1 039 1 104 1 479 
Mexico 15 530 11 434 12 694 12 237 14 289 15 038 
Nicaragua c 6 419 6 850 7 157 7 792 7 921 8 058 
Peru 5 370 3 458 4 602 4 923 4 073 4 412 
Venezuela. 2 390 1 547 .1 072 89 149 849 
Total 59 429 46 881 52 744 50 402 52 041 53 309 
SULPHUR (thousands of tons) 
Argentina 11.5 8.4 7.8 7.7 18.6 19.0 
Bolivia» 0.6 2.7 4.4 7.8 5.6 2.5 
Chile 20.8 13.3 15.4 30.2 48.6 32.6 
Mexico 8.5 5.2 11.4 29.1 49.1 34.1 
Peru 1.2 1.0 0.1 2.3 5.1 5.0 
Total 42.6 30.6 39.1 77.1 127.0 93.2 
SODIUM NITRATE (thousands of tons) 
Chile 1 384 1 835 1 608 1 680 1 438 1 421 
SOURCES AMD METHODS: See Explanatory Notes, 
a Including lignite, 
b Estimate based on export trend, 
c Exports. 
d Exports plus purchases by the Central Bank and the Mining Bank, 
e Mined gold only, 
f Estimate based on first 10 months. 



































43 255 46416 
178.1 594.9 
1 574 1 540 1 159 






6 2 1 2 
4 786 
2 803 
21.3 18.7 18.9 17.3 
2.6 4.0 3.5 0.8 
39.7 50.9 
114.5 521.3 '94.6 1 068.7 
1 300 
T a b l e 8 
LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
Regional average of national series, using added value weights 
(Indices: 1955 - 100) 
Industrial group ISIC Groups 
Weight, 
ing 1948 1949 
1955 a 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Total manufacturing 
Including: 
Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco . 
Textiles 
Paper and paper products . . . 
Chemicals, petroleum a . . . . 
Non-metallic mineral products . 
Basic metals 
2 — 3 
A . ANNUAL 
100.0 73 74 79 83 83 85 93 100 , 105 109 
20 — 22 29.0 72 74 81 85 90 92 96 100 106 113 
23 12.8 84 86 86 86 83 85 95 100 103 98 
27 2.1 64 66 76 82 77 81 91 100 111 123 
31 — 32 16.4 64 68 76 78 77 77 88 100 111 118 
33 5.7 55 61 69 73 74 83 91 100 109 117 
34 4.8 62 68 78 81 82 84 92 100 107 113 
ISIC 
Groups 
1956 1957 1958 
Ill I II III IV I II III ÍV I II 
B . QUARTERLY 
Total manufacturing 2 — 3 99 107 109 104 103 109 114 111 106 113 
Including: 
Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco . . . . 20 — 22 98 106 113 106 107 111 116 115 109 117 
Textiles 23 96 105 108 103 94 100 103 95 86 97 
Paper and paper products 27 107 111 114 111 121 115 132 123 122 127 
Chemicals, petroleum a 31 — 32 108 108 112 115 110 117 124 120 120 125 
Non-metallic mineral products . . . . 33 104 112 112 110 111 116 119 121 108 117 
Basic metals 34 108 110 109 99 108 112 112 118 114 124 
SOURCE: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, January and November 1958. Data for 1958 were supplied by the United Nations Statistical O f f i c e , 
a Including coal products. 
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table 9 
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(Indices: J 955 = 100) 
Group 1948 1949 1950 ¡951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
ARGENTINA 
Foodstuffs 89 89 91 87 90 95 96 100 117 i n ' 
Eeverages. 76 80 85 88 84 82 85 100 96 94 
Tobacco 87 93 91 94 100 99 95 100 98 97 
Textiles 109 113 110 109 90 89 95 100 • 102 95 
Wearing apparel 122 118 106 100 89 93 84 100 97 90 
Wood and furniture 125 113 115 115 99 104 106 100 ' 99. 107 
Paper and paperboard . . . . ; 70 , 68 78 86 74 65 85 100 • i l l 114 
Printing and publishing . . . . . . . . 115 106 121 103 74 79 90 100' • 104 • 126 
Leather and leather products a 133 122 123 119 101 99 96 100 • 99 99 
Rubber products 70 62 . 58 82 85 70 86 100 97 102 
Chemical products. 80 80 88 91 82 81 88 100 102 111 
Petroleum refining 63 63 78 78 84 88 94- 100 103 . 125 
Cement, glass, china earthenware and pot-
tery 88 93 98 96 87 85 91 100 107 115 
Basic metal products - 78 84 90 93 69 69 87 100 98 103 
Metal products (excluding machinery), . . 79 71 76 83 72 66 , 80 100 90 108 
Vehicles and machinery 120 86 78 83 83 79 85 100 83 103 
Electrical machinery and appliances . . . . 53 54 62 69 78 • 75 79 100 98 110 
Ship building and repairing 76 64 60 80 103 95 92 100 57 50 
Miscellaneous 77 81 94 105 106 91 104 100 92 83 
General index 91 88 91 93 86 84 90 100 . 99 . 102 
BRAZIL 
Foodstuffs 64 68 75 82 87 94 89 • 100 
Beverages 57 58 69 82 89 92 94 100 
Tobacco 45 52 59 70 77 79 92 100 
Textiles 66 71 75 73 77 81 95 100 
Footwear 68 69 76 92 84 87 83 100 
Paper and paperboard 60 69 79 83 83 93 96 ICO 
Rubber and rubber products 50 62 70 80 86 97 9 7 100 '93 '98 
Pharmaceutical products 76 80 94 117 109 112 121 100 
Glass and china, earthenware and pottery. 51 58 66 79 82 97 95 100 
Cement 43 49 53 • 56 62 78 93 100 'Í26 Í23 
Iron and steel 43 51 66 72 70 85 98 100 114 121 
General index 60. 65 73 77 80 • • 87 95 100 ... 
CHILE 
Foodstuffs 75 76 78 ' 82 86 102 104 100 106 106 
Beverages • 67 70 70 70 82' 95 92 . 100 108 108 
Tobacco 94 90 92 86 93 96 98 100 100 85 
Textiles 82 83 82 81 87 94 . 9 8 100 90 92 
Footwear and wearing apparel 97 87 88 86 89 97 99 lOO 87 90 
Paper and paperboard 75 77 78 81 84 91 100 100 98 111 
Chemical products ; 91 9 2 93 104 107 101 . 104- • . 100 106 113 
Coal derivatives 99 102 102 97 95 102 101 100 100 98 
Cement and glass 93 88 90 98 108 102 102 100 91 81 
Iron and steel 30 39 25 ' 84 105 112 . 119 100 144 149 
67 70 70 82 9 1 98 103 • 100 • 107 106 
PERU 
Foodstuffs 65 71 75 76 80 90 94 . 100 , 101 
Beverages. . . ; . . . . . . • 43 45 53 64 86 103 95 100 99 
Tobacco . ; . . 74 87 93 90 90 98 104 100 103 
Textiles 75 • 80 71 79 81 81 101 100 106 
Footwear and wearing apparel 37 40 47 56 64 74 86 100 112 
Wood and furniture 32 32 53 83 83 84 89 100 104 
Paper and paperboard 39 45 39 64 55 76 102 100 130 
Printing and publishing .: . . . . . . 35 .61 52 68 65 69 85 100 113 
Leather 62 64 78 87 89 88 88" loo 117 
Rubber products 53 52 50 79 68 105 99 100 93 
Chemical products . . . . . . . . . . 4 4 59 52 67 74 75 87 100 124 
Petroleum refining SI 83 82 91 93 94 . ' 98 100 1Q5 Cement, glass and china, earthenware and 
pottery .67 65 64 66 64 75 90 100 95 
Basic metal products. . . . . . . . .. • 38 50 52 . 63 64 74 76 100 122 
Metal transforming industries . • 53 60 61 86 91 108 87 100 107 
General index 53 60 61 69 • 72 . 81 88 100 111 
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lable 9 (Continued) 
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(Indices: J 955 = 100) 
Group ms 1949 1950 mi 1952 1953 1 9 5 4 1955 1956 1957 
VENEZUELA 
3 7 4 1 4 6 4 9 5 8 6 8 8 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 
4 6 5 5 6 1 7 3 8 5 • • 8 7 9 2 1 0 0 • 1 0 4 1 1 0 
55 6 1 6 1 6 5 7 8 . - - 8 5 • 9 5 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 5 
4 0 3 9 3 8 5 4 6 5 7 6 9 3 - 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 2 7 
2 1 2 3 , 2 7 31 4 3 6 6 • • 8 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 3 
3 5 4 1 4 8 4 8 52 6 5 8 6 1 0 0 1 0 6 1 1 8 
9 6 9 2 8 4 9 8 101 9 6 9 2 1 0 0 1 0 9 1 2 8 
1 9 2 8 3 2 3 7 4 7 5 8 6 5 1 0 0 9 6 1 0 2 
6 4 6 4 6 7 6 4 7 1 7 7 8 7 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 1 2 
11 8 2 7 3 3 4 1 57 9 6 1 0 0 1 2 2 1 4 2 
3 9 3 9 4 0 4 4 5 9 8 0 9 1 1 0 0 H I 1 3 4 
3 0 3 8 3 8 4 1 6 5 7 5 8 9 1 0 0 9 1 . 9 0 
8 1 7 4 5 5 9 6 8 7 3 • 7 6 1 0 0 1 0 8 1 2 5 
19 2 6 3 8 4 5 59 • " 7 2 ' 8 9 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 3 
4 8 . 1 5 2 6 3 4 4 7 8 3 ioo 9 3 1 1 7 
1 6 2 ? . 2 6 3 0 4 6 • 6 4 ! 8 4 \ ioo , 1 1 8 . 1 4 6 
31 36 43 5 1 61 71 8 5 100 105 118 
GUATEMALA 
96 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 9 6 7 7 100 1 0 6 1 3 1 
9 3 9 3 9 8 9 9 1 0 4 1 0 2 1 0 7 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 8 
8 6 9 1 9 5 1 0 0 1 0 3 9 7 1 0 4 IOO • 1 0 7 1 0 6 
1 2 1 1 0 3 1 0 4 8 2 1 0 6 9 5 1 0 5 1 0 0 Ml 1 2 1 
8 8 8 6 8 7 7 6 8 6 9 1 8 8 1 0 0 1 0 6 1 3 7 
7 2 7 2 7 3 7 1 6 3 58 6 9 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 1 7 
1 1 2 1 0 3 1 1 1 1 1 9 115 • 1 0 9 • 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 7 1 0 7 
6 0 9 4 9 1 9 3 9 9 1 0 4 9 6 1 0 0 1 0 4 1 3 1 





Wearing apparel . . . 
Wood and furniture. . 
Paper and paperboard . 
Printing and publishing 
Skins and hides. . . . 
Rubber products . . . 
Chemical products . . 
Pharmaceutical products 
Petroleum refining . . 
Construction materials. 
Metallurgical industry . 
Misceüaneous 
General index b. . . 
Foodstuffs 
Beverages. . . . . , 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel . 
Wood. . . . . . 
Skins and hides. . 
Chemical industries . 
Tofai index c. 
SOURCES AND METHODS: See Explanatory Notes, 
a Including leather footwear. 
b Including electricity production and water supply. 
c Including the non-metallic minerals group and excluding electricity. 
Table 10 
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES 
(Thousands of tons) 
Country 1950 1951 1952 1 9 5 3 1954 1955 1956 1957 
C E M E N T 
Argentina I 5 6 8 1 5 4 3 I 5 3 9 1 6 5 9 I 7 0 7 1 8 6 9 2 0 2 9 2 3 4 0 
Brazil I 3 8 6 1 4 5 6 1 6 1 9 2 0 3 0 2 4 7 7 2 7 2 0 3 2 6 7 3 2 1 1 
Colombia 5 8 0 6 4 8 7 0 0 8 7 3 9 6 2 1 0 4 6 . 1 2 2 0 1 2 1 1 
Cuba 3 8 2 4 1 9 4 0 5 4 2 0 4 6 3 6 1 3 6 5 1 
Chile 5 1 3 6 9 8 8 1 8 7 6 2 7 7 5 8 0 4 • 7 7 1 111 
Ecuador 5 8 7 9 8 9 9 1 9 5 1 4 5 1 5 2 1 5 5 
Mexico 1 3 8 8 1 5 3 5 I 6 4 0 1 6 7 2 I 7 6 6 2 0 8 6 2 2 7 7 2 5 1 9 
Peru ; . . . . 3 2 9 3 6 0 3 7 1 4 4 9 4 8 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 7 
Dominican Republic 7 2 1 0 4 1 3 7 1 3 0 1 6 0 2 3 4 2 6 3 2 8 0 
Uruguay 3 0 0 2 9 3 2 8 7 2 9 4 2 9 5 2 9 2 3 4 8 4 2 4 
Venezuela 501 6 2 1 8 4 0 9 8 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 8 2 1 4 5 1 1 7 4 7 
Other countries 1 1 6 1 5 7 1 8 5 • 2 1 4 ' 2 4 0 . . 2 7 3 3 1 8 3 6 5 
Total 7 1 2 7 7 S 7 6 S 644 . 9 561 1 0 5 9 3 11 7 5 9 13.264 14177 
PIG IRON 
Argentina . 1 8 19 32 3 6 4 0 3 5 3 5 3 4 
Brazil 7 2 9 7 7 5 8 1 2 8 8 0 1 0 8 9 1 0 6 9 1 1 5 2 1 2 5 2 
Colombia — • • • ' 9 9 1 1 6 1 2 6 
Chile 1 1 0 2 4 0 2 7 0 • ' 2 8 6 3 0 5 2 5 6 3 6 7 3 8 2 
Mexico 2 2 7 2 5 4 3 0 4 2 4 2 • - 2 5 2 3 2 8 4 0 8 • • 4 2 9 
Total 1 0 8 4 1288 I 418 1 444 1686 1 787 2 078 2 223 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES 
(Thousands of tons) 
Country 1950 J95I 1952 1953 1954 1955 J956 1957 
STEEL INGOTS 
Argentina 130 132 126 174 186 218 202 222 
843 893 1 016 1 148 1 156 1 375 1299 
Colombia — — — — — 77 100 129 
Chile 56 172 243 313 321 290 381 388 
473 544 537 ,591 725 888 1050 
Uruguay — — — — — 13 10 
Total. . 1366 J 620 1806 2 040 2 246 2 466 2 959 3 098 
FINISHED STEEL 
Argentina. 268 302 301 286 538' • • 677 631 703 
Brazil. . . . . . . . . . . . 623 697 719 841 971 1030 1 142 973 
Colombia. . . . . . . . . . — — — 35 81 112 
Cuba. . . . . . . . . . . . — — • — — 15 15 
Chile 139 188 217 238 236 276 269 
Mexico. . . . . . . . 383 465 526 431 503 586 710 880 
Peru — — — — — — . — • 6 
Uruguay . ; 32 26 32 30 30 
Total. . 1635 1734* 1 775* 2 276 2 596 2 885 2 988 
SULPHURIC ACID 
Argentina 77.2 64.5 60.4 56.6 54.0 100.0 122.5 117.5 
Brazil. . . . . . . . 121.8 107.7 150.4 96.5 » • • 121.0 185.0 302.0 
Colombia 6.5 6.5 6.5 8.2 8.0 10.0 10.5 9.8 
Cuba 25.3 26.9 24.3 26.0 31.9 27.5 32.2' 32.2 
Chile . 13.0 16.0 17.5 17.5 20.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 
Mexico. 43.4 56.7 92.2 102.5 110.0 126.5 158.8 181.6 
Peru . 10.7 12.4 13.1 13.1 15.1 14.8 13.2 20.2 
Uruguay . 3.4 4.4 5.3 6.3 6.0 8.3 8.0 8.5 
Venezuela — — — — 5.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 
Total. . 301.3 295.1 369.7 326.7 451.1 579.2 720.8 
CAUSTIC SODA 
Argentina 8.7 a 11.1 12.2 28.0 31.0 32.0 
Brazil 15.0 15.0 15.0 23.0 30.0 41.0 
Colombia 0.2 7.0 10.0 12.0 17.0 15.2 
Chile 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.5 
Mexico 5.4 13.5 16.6 23.8 25.8 34.2 
Peru. 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Total 35.6 .51.3 58.S 92.1 109.0 127.3 
SODIUM CARBONATE 
Colombia. 6.6 11.0 14.3 14.2 16.9 
Chile 9.8 9.3 11.1 17.2 17.5 17.5 
2.0 — — 30.4 30.2 31.0 
Total 11.8 15.9 22.1 61.9 61.9 65.4 
WOOD-PULP 
Argentina. . 38 42 37 39 53 57 65 63 
Brazil 152 163 175 180 175 186 209 221 
Chile 15 16 17 15 19 18 . 20 34 
Mexico. 60 68 73 74 82 94 135 158 
Peru 5 7 8 10 12, 12 15 14 
Total. 270 296 310 ¡•IS 341 367 444 , 490 
NEWSPRINT 
Argentina. 2.8 3.0 0.6 7.6 22.1 21.6 17.2 12.0 
Brazil 37.9 41.1 43.2 41.5 30.6 - 37.2 39.4 49.0 
Chile 11.0 11.0 12.0 9.0 12.0 11.0 11.2 19.5 
Total 55.Í 55.8 58.1 €4.7 69.8 67.8 S0.5 
OTHER I PAPER 
Argentina 227.6 199.4 166.8 222.7 262.0 290.3 290.6 
Brazil ; . . 210.0 220.0 218.7 249.9 283.6 295.9 341.1 313.6 
Chile. 30.0 32.0 41.0 . 37.0 36.0 41.0 49.3 42.3 
Mexico 190.0 184.8 192.7 207.2 228.6 254.9 307.0 
Peru ! . . . . . . 22.3 21.5 23.9 26.9 28.5 34.6 34.3 
Venezuela. 8.6 8.9 9.3 10.4 12.3 14.9 18.9 
Tota! 700.5 674.3 679.6 786.8 868.3 985.1 1 006.7 
í a i j l e 11 
VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS- (QUARTERLY) 
(Millions of dollars) 
1956 1957 1958 
v^ounrry 
Ill IV I II III IV I II in 
( a ) EXPORTS F.O.B. 
Argentina 2Í2.2 268.4 279.6 243.4 215.2 236.6 242.8 254.3 223.8 
Bolivia 21.9 42.2 20.1 27.7 22.6 27.3 14.9 17.6 
Brazil 383.6 379.6 345.3 270.1 359.5 416.7 270.8 303.8 312.7 
Colombia 128.0 120.7 140.1 108.2 138.2 124.1 105.7 94.3 134.3 
Chile 132.2 152.8 125.9 118.5 104.3 110.6 103.0 66.4 
Ecuador 29.8 26.9 20.1 21.0 32.0 25.6 19.6 20.1 3 3. i 
Paraguay 8.5 8.5 6.2 8.6 10.3 7.8 5.2 9.1 10.2 
Peru 82.7 83.8 71.1 80.8 76.9 92.6 61.2 65.6 78.8 
Uruguay 33.3 65.4 57.3 29.4 24.9 16.7 44.6 28.7 • 27.2 
567.8 597.6 ; 614.2 588.8 566.0 567.9 560.5 567.4 
Total . . . 1 587.4 ] 716.1 1 663.3 J 521.9 1 572.7 1 624.0 1 435.7 J 420.4 J 466.4 
Costa Rica a . . . . . . . . . . 9.5 17.8 29.6 20.6 13.1 19.0 27.4 29.7 14.5 
Cuba a. . . ^ . . . 195.7 114.3 ^ 201.0 , • 288.6 224.1 130.9 199.8 234.3 200.0 
El Salvador . . 8.2 18.9 65.6 38.2 14.8 , 20.0 40.2 30.3 18.4 
Guatemala a ; . . . . 15.5 38.3 39.3 24.5 16.6 33.9 35,0 30.6 16.1 
Haiti . . . 6.0 7.6 10.9 8.0 . 6.4 9.0 6.0 
Honduras a 19.5 13.9 15.9 24.0 : 12.3 • 11.7 16,7 . 24.8 15.0 
Mexico a 193.6 209.8 183.2 151.5 . ^ 186.9 211.3 184.2 166.7 189.8 
Nicaragua 7.2 3.7 22.1 , 27.1 8.0 • 7.0 .24.0 . 21.9 8.7 
Panama a 7.6 5.4 7.6 8.9 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.9 6.8 
Dominican Republic. . . . . . . 26.2 30.8 42.8 51.3 29.2 . 36.5 . . 33.1 45.6 27.0 
Total 489.0 460.5 618.0 642.7 519.7 488.0 575.1 602.8 • 505.3 
Grand total: Latin America. . . 2 076.4 2 176.6 2 281.3 2 164.6 2 092.4 2 112.0 2 010.8 2 023.2 1 971.7 
( b ) IMPOSTS C.I.F. 
Argentina 268.9 284.3 305.6 333.5 328.7 342.6 288.7 312.7 316.5 
Bolivia . . . 24.2 28.2 12.9 25.0 23.9 • 30.3 15.7 18.6 15.4 
Brazil 315.8 369.6 313.0 389.7 400.3 •• • 385.8 205.8 372.4 401.1 
Colombia •. . . . 164.0 133.2 91.5 98.2 135.4 156.3 109.6 101.6 91.8 
Chile 86.4 89.6 106.9 105.9 • : 112.7 117.0 122.0 105.4 
Ecuador b 23.9 23.3 24.2 25.9 28.0 32.2 27.6 22.8 28.6 
7.0 5.9 5.9 8.6 10.0 7.2 10.3 11.3 8.7 
Peru : . . . 94.5 100.0 86.9 113.3 98.2 101.0 91.7 85.8 84.4 
Uruguay 54.1 54.6 58.4 60.0 56.3 • 51.7 22.9 24.0 31.4 
Venezuela be 297.5 354.1 • 562.0 436,2 479.5 . 575.1 • 426.8 388.9 371.7 
1442.8 1 574.3 1 589.3 1 673.0 . 1 799.2 J 32].] 1 443.5 I 463.3 
Costa Rica 22.5 24.9 21.9 27.4 25.9 27.6 24.4 27.0 24.2 
Cuba b 157.8 213.3 231.2 227.3 208.1 • 224.6 241.6 216.7 204.0 
El Salvador. . . . . . . . . . . . 26.2 28.6 30.0 28.8 28.2 28.0 27.4 26.8 27.6 
Guatemala b 40.4 33.4 39.8 39.4 38.9 35.0 39,7 40,1 37.3 
Haiti . . 10.8 12.1 LO.I 8.3 7.7 9.4 
17.1 19.4 18.8 20.2 19.4 20.6 17,2 18,8 19.4 
Mexico A 270.9 282.7 270.4 299.4 296.1 289.3 288,6 316,0 272.2 
20.2 16.1 16.5 18.6 25.6 20.1 15,8 17,5 24.5 
Panama e . . . 24.2 25.3 26.3 28.6 26.9 35.2 24,3 •23,2 24.5 
Dominican Republic b 29.8 34.8 32.5 32.4 31.6 39.5 35,4 35,7 32,0 
Total . . '. . . 619.9 690.6 697.5 730.4 708.4 729.3 723,4 * 730.4 * 675.7 
Grand total: Latin Ametida . . 1 956.2 2 m.4 2 271.8 2 319.7 2 381.4 2 528.5 2 044.5 ' 2 173.9* 2 129.0 
SOURCES AND METHODS: See Explanatory Notes. 
a Adjustments have been made in the case of goods originally valued at nominal or arbitrary prices. 
b F.o.b. values were adjusted so as to approximate to c . i . f . values, according to the percentages given in the. Explanatory Notes, 
c Including gold, 
d Including imports from free zones at the frontier, 
e Including imports from the Canal Zone. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
QUARTERLY EXPORT INDICES 
(1950 = 100) 
1 9 5 6 1957 1958 
Countiy 
Ill IV I n III IV I II III 
( a ) QUANTUM 
Argentina 9 1 1 0 9 1 1 5 1 0 0 9 2 9 8 1 0 6 1 0 2 9 1 . 
8 2 1 5 4 8 1 1 2 2 7 3 • 1 4 2 6 3 7 6 • . 
Brazil 1 0 9 1 0 7 9 7 7 7 1 0 3 1 1 9 7 9 • 9 3 • 9 8 
Colombia 1 0 8 1 0 2 1 0 8 8 2 1 2 1 1 1 8 1 0 6 9 4 1 6 2 
Chile 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 4 1 2 6 1 2 8 • • 8 6 
1 5 1 1 3 8 1 1 0 1 3 1 1 7 1 1 5 6 • • 1 0 9 • 1 1 4 2 Í 4 
Paraguay 8 3 8 9 59 8 8 1 0 8 8 8 59 • 9 9 • 1 0 9 
Peru 1 8 2 1 7 2 1 5 1 1 6 7 1 6 1 1 9 6 • • 1 5 2 - • 1 6 6 • 1 9 4 
Uruguay 6 4 1 2 0 1 0 4 4 7 4 5 3 5 • 1 0 0 6 4 • 6 3 
Venezuela • 170 182 1 9 4 198 187 179 1 7 8 174 179 
Toial 119 130 128 117 122 128 • 1 1 7 • l i s 122 • 
Costa Rica 5 2 90 1 5 4 1 1 5 7 6 1 1 0 1 5 5 • 1 7 9 8 6 
Cuba 1 3 1 72 1 1 9 1 6 5 1 4 6 • 8 3 1 2 9 1 5 4 1 3 0 * 
El Salvador 4 4 7 3 2 5 3 1 5 7 6 4 1 0 5 1 9 9 1 7 4 1 0 2 » 
5 6 1 3 1 1 4 2 9 5 6 3 1 4 1 1 4 6 • 1 3 3 7 0 * 
Haiti 6 7 7 0 9 8 7 5 6 3 8 9 5 8 . . . 
1 0 9 1 1 3 8 7 1 3 2 6 8 6 4 8 3 
1 5 3 1 6 3 1 1 8 9 4 1 5 8 1 7 3 1 5 0 1 3 7 1 6 5 
Nicaragua 7 3 3 7 2 3 6 3 2 8 9 3 8 7 2 6 0 2 4 4 8 8 
Panama 1 3 0 8 8 1 3 3 1 4 5 1 3 9 1 4 5 1 4 5 1 6 2 1 1 4 
Dominican Republic 1 3 2 1 3 2 160 178 108 138 124 177* 106* 
Total 1 2 5 1 0 9 129 136 1 3 3 120 139 1 4 8 * m* 
Grand total: Latin America , . . 121 1 2 5 129 122 124 126 123 m* 124* 
( b ) UNIT VALUE 
8 9 8 6 8 5 8 5 8 2 8 4 8 0 • • 8 7 8 6 
Bolivia 1 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 1 0 2 1 4 0 8 7 1 0 6 - • 1 0 5 
Brazil 1 0 5 1 0 6 ' 1 0 5 1 0 4 1 0 3 , 1 0 4 1 0 2 - 9 7 9 4 
1 1 9 1 2 0 1 3 1 1 3 4 1 1 5 1 0 6 1 0 1 1 0 2 8 4 
Chile. 1 6 8 1 6 3 1 4 5 1 3 6 1 2 9 1 2 3 1 1 4 1 0 9 
Ecuador 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 9 9 1 1 6 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 9 ' 9 5 
Paraguay 1 2 5 1 1 6 1 2 6 1 1 8 1 1 6 1 0 7 1 0 6 1 1 1 1 1 3 
9 8 1 0 5 1 0 2 1 0 4 1 0 3 1 0 2 8 7 8 6 8 8 
Uruguay 8 2 8 6 8 7 9 9 8 6 7 6 7 0 7 0 6 8 
Venezuela. . 1 0 9 1 0 7 1 0 6 1 0 7 1 0 8 1 0 9 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 9 
Total. 1 0 7 106 104 1 0 5 104 1 0 2 9 9 100 97 
Costa Rica a 1 3 6 1 4 7 1 4 3 1 3 3 1 2 8 1 2 9 1 3 2 1 2 4 1 2 5 * 
Cuba a 8 9 9 5 1 0 1 1 0 5 9 2 9 4 9 3 9 1 9 2 * 
El Salvador 1 0 8 1 3 1 1 5 2 1 4 2 1 3 5 1 1 1 1 1 8 . 1 0 2 . . 1 0 5 * 
Guatemala " 1 4 1 1 4 8 1 4 0 1 3 0 1 2 7 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 7 * 1 1 7 * 
Haiti 9 7 1 1 9 1 2 0 1 1 6 1 0 9 1 1 0 1 1 2 • . • 
Honduras» 1 2 8 1 1 9 1 3 0 1 3 0 1 3 0 1 3 0 1 4 2 
Mexico a 9 6 9 8 1 1 8 1 2 4 9 0 9 3 9 4 9 3 " ¿ 8 
Nicaragua 1 5 0 1 5 4 1 4 3 1 2 5 1 3 1 1 2 3 1 4 0 1 3 7 1 5 0 
Panama a 1 1 2 1 1 7 1 0 8 1 1 7 1 1 3 1 1 5 1 1 5 1 0 5 1 1 4 
Dominican Republic 9 2 , 1 0 8 1 2 4 1 3 3 1 2 5 1 2 2 1 2 3 • 1 1 9 * 1 1 8 * 
Total 96 105 118 116 9 7 1 0 0 1 0 2 101 * 9 6 * 
Grand total: Latin America . . . 1 0 4 106 1 0 8 1 0 8 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 * 9 6 * 
SOUBCES AND METHODS: See Economic Bulletin jor Latin America, vo l . IH, No. 2 {Santiago, Chile, October, 1958), Explanatory Notes, 
a Based on adjusted values (see table 11 ) . 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
Q U A R T E R L Y E X P O R T I N D I C E S 
(19S5 = 100) 
„ , 1956 
(Year) j j l 
( a ) QUANTUM 
Argentina 112 137 117 
Bolivia 106 86 128 
Brazil 109 98 78 
Colombia 92 87 66 
Chile 104 112 110 
Ecuador 103 96 110 
Paraguay 130 82 125 
Peru 112 99 113 
Uruguay 126 128 63 
Venezuela 115 133 135 
Total no 116 106 
Costa Rica 76 137 100 
Cuba 112 113 155 
El Salvador 103 224 143 
Guatemala 105 135 94 
Haiti 123 121 89 
Honduras H4 140 195 
Mexico 103 88 74 
Nicaragua 79 120 160 
Panama 85 101 113 
Dominican Republic 108 113 135 
Total 105 112 115 
Grand total: Latin America 109 115 108 
( B ) U N I T VALUE 
Argentina 91 88 90 
Bolivia 107 98 91 
Brazil 95 99 98 
Colombia 100 111 113 
Chile 110 95 90 
Ecuador 102 95 86 
Paraguay 80 86 78 
Peru 103 106 106 
Uruguay 91 97 101 
Venezuela 97 94 95 
Total 97 96 99 
Costa Rica HO 108 102 
Cuba 101 117 123 
El Salvador 103 110 100 
Guatemala H I HO 98 
Haiti 95 100 100 
Honduras 92 89 96 
Mexico 100 103 101 
Nicaragua 102 103 95 
Panama 98 88 93 
Dominican Republic 99 13? a 1 J 3 ' 
Total 101 110 . Ill 
Grand total: Latin America . . . . • • 98 99 100 
SOURCES AND METHODS: See Explanatory Notes and notes ' to tables 11 and 12. 















































































































































































































Q U A R T E R L Y EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIÉS 
A. Quantities in thousands of tons 
1 9 5 6 1957 195S 
Countiy 
I II III J V I II III rv I II 
TropicaJ-zone products 
BANANAS 
Brazil 2 8 . 6 3 9 . 8 59.1 6 0 . 5 57 .1 58.9 45 .2 57,3 66 .6 78 .6 
Colombia 56 .7 6 7 . 6 48 .1 4 3 . 5 6 0 . 6 55 .7 37 .5 37 ,4 57.1 54.1 
Costa Rica 7 4 . 7 5 3 . 4 50.0 54.3 8 0 . 6 79 .8 68 .8 81 ,1 81.3 82 .2 
Ecuador 143 .1 1 4 8 . 4 126 .8 160 .6 1 4 8 . 3 160.1 177.0 192 ,2 175 .4 156 .6 
Guatemala 2 9 . 7 4 1 . 1 • 33 .0 21 .0 • 30 .8 36.5 34 .7 2 7 . 8 39.2 38 .5 
5 7 . 4 1 2 5 . 5 118 .6 9 1 . 4 102 .8 124 .6 4 9 . 7 • 6 0 . 2 • 76 .3 • 155 .2 
Panama 7 3 . 0 7 1 . 7 6 6 . 7 : 3 6 . 4 6 9 . 7 74 .9 69 .1 7 5 . 8 • • 8 2 . 5 ; 76 .6 
Total. . . . . . . 4 6 3 . 2 5 4 7 . 5 502 .3 4 6 7 . 7 5 4 9 . 9 590.5 4 8 2 . 0 5 3 1 . 8 • 578.4 641.8 
SUGAR 
Brazil. . . . . . . . 14 .5 — — 4 .1 4 . 8 38.3 2 1 1 . 2 • 1 6 9 . 6 • 211 .1 113 .4 
Cuba 1 3 2 0 . 7 1 4 1 9 . 3 1 7 0 5 . 4 8 8 2 . 2 1 3 0 6 . 6 1 8 4 9 . 5 1 4 2 4 . 2 6 4 4 . 7 1 569.0 1 7 2 4 . 4 
Peru 1 0 9 . 6 7 3 . 7 118 .0 127 .0 1 3 6 . 4 112 .6 87.2- • • 160 .1 • 107 .4 • 9 9 . 4 
Dominican Republic . 1 7 4 . 1 , 2 0 8 . 5 164.1 147 .3 2 2 0 . 1 2 7 9 . 9 138 .3 85 .1 152.8 253.1 
Total 1 618.9 1701.5 J 9 8 7 . 5 J 160.6 1 6 6 7 . 9 2 280.3 1 860.9 1 059.5 2 040.3 2 190.3 
COFFEE 
Brazil. . . . . . . . 262.2 • 2 4 5 . 7 2 4 4 . 3 • 256 .1 2 3 7 . 2 156 .8 205 .6 2 5 9 . 5 144 .4 203 .6 
Colombia 86 .9 . 8 1 . 8 - 71 .5 6 3 . 9 6 9 . 3 51.1 86 .2 • 82 .8 70 .2 60 .4 
Costa Rica . . . . . 10 .4 5 .3 1.8 5.3 13 .1 , 7 . 5 2 .6 6 .2 ' 12.3 16.2 
Ecuador 2 .2 0 . 8 11 .4 10 .1 4 . 7 2 .4 13.0 ' 9 .1 3.5 2 .2 
El Salvador 3 5 . 7 14 .8 2 . 4 11 .7 4 0 . 9 23 .6 6 .3 12 .4 27 .2 21 .1 
Guatemala 2 4 . 2 1 1 . 8 4 . 6 • 2 1 . 9 2 1 . 3 10 .8 6 .6 23 .1 • 21 .8 18.0 
Haiti 12 .6 7 . 4 2 . 8 4 . 7 6 . 7 3.8 2.3 ' 6 .7 
Honduras 1.9 6 . 0 3 .0 0 . 9 2.1 6 .2 1.6 0 . 4 4 . 4 5.8 
Mexico 33.1 2 1 . 6 8 .2 11 .1 32 .0 , 2 8 . 6 , 6 .4 21 .8 22 .4 29 .5 
Nicaragua 6 . 5 6 . 6 2 . 4 1 .4 9 . 3 7 . 4 2.2 3.1 12.1 6 . 8 
Dominican Republic . 11 .7 , 5 .1 2 .3 7 .3 4 . 2 . 3.2 . 0 .5 13 .8 7 .8 8 .0 
Venezuela 7 . 7 6 . 4 4 . 4 4 . 9 9 . 6 7 .2 3.8 7 .5 13 .9 9 .2 
Total a 4 9 5 . 1 " . 4 1 3 . 3 359.1 3 9 9 . 3 ' 450.4 3 0 8 . 6 337 .1 446.4 
CACAO 
Brazil 2 9 . 0 • 1 0 . 4 , . 4 8 . 3 38 .1 2 2 . 9 8 .5 24 .6 53.7 18 .6 16.0 
Costa Rica 1.5 , 1 .7 0 . 6 2 . 4 . 1 .7 1 .9 1.4 2 . 4 1.8 2 .6 
Ecuador 3 .6 12 .1 7 . 8 5 .7 5 .4 10.5 6 .7 4 .1 6 .0 8.1 
Dominican Republic . 3.0 7 . 6 4 . 5 2 . 4 2 . 5 13.1 6 .0 • 2 .4 5.6 12.1 
Venezuela 4 . 2 7 .1 • 4 . 8 2 . 4 4 . 7 5.8 1.9 2 .6 5.4 5-7 
Total. . . . . . . 41.3 38.9 66.0 . Sl.O 372 39.2 40.6 65 .2 37.4 44.5 
COTTON 
Brazil 2 1 . 0 67.S 37.4 17.1 10 .0 2 6 . 4 2 1 . 6 8.1 17 .2 7 ,5 
El Salvador ; . . . . 6 .3 , 15 .3 5.9 . 2.1 . 7 .3 7 .8 3 .8 . 6 .3 . 9 .7 6.1 
Mexico . . . . . . . . 1 3 0 . 3 : ; 4 3 . 0 128 .0 . 1 2 0 . 5 34 .0 9 . 8 131.1 . 1 0 9 . 0 6 5 . 4 . 27 ,4 
Nicaragua . . . . . . 6 .1 2 8 . 0 2 . 2 0 . 1 8 . 8 21.1 2 . 9 . . 3.2- 10.3 16 ,6 
Paraguay 0 . 4 6 .1 2 .3 1 .5 0 .5 3.6 3.6 1.2 0.3 3.6 
Peru - 18 .3 • 2 8 . 7 • 33.3 2 8 . 6 12 .2 20 .0 28 .0 . 2 1 . 6 14.0 22 .9 
Total 182.4 • 188.6 209.1 169 .9 72.8 • 8 8 . 7 191.0 149.4 . 116 .9 84.1 
Temperate-zone products 
. M E A T 
Argentina 9 0 . 7 87.2 9 1 . 8 106 .1 . 9 9 . 3 ' ' 83 .8 87 .9 iolo 108 .7 9 9 . 8 
Uruguay. . 8 .0 2.9 . 12 .2 . 30 .0 2 0 . 2 17.3 .17.9, - . 4 . 7 8 .0 8 .8 
Total 9 8 . 7 90.1 104.0 136 .1 119.5 101.1 105.8 1 0 7 . 7 116 J 108,6 
WHEAT 
Argentina 7 1 9 . 9 5 8 0 . 2 589 .8 6 3 5 . 7 6 3 9 . 0 810 .0 607 .0 6 0 4 . 0 321 .2 572 .3 
Uruguay 1 2 2 . 4 1 3 0 . 6 76 .5 89 .3 8 1 . 9 2 5 . 8 2 0 . 4 7 .7 64 .0 9 9 . 2 
Total 8 4 2 . 3 710.8 6 6 6 . 3 725.0 720.9 8 3 5 . 8 6 2 7 . 4 611.7 385 .2 671.5 
MAIZE 
Argentina 5.3 2 1 7 . 4 4 8 1 , 8 3 6 0 . 7 14 .6 10.9 2 2 1 , 6 312 .0 150.0 377 .2 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
Table 14 (Continued) 
QUARTERLY EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 
B. Values in millions of dollars 
1956 1957 1958 
1 11 III Í V 1 11 m IV 1 11 
Tropical-zone products 
BANANAS 
Brazil 2.0 2 .9 3 . 7 3 .8 3.6 3 .7 2 .9 3.1 3.5 3.4 
Colombia 5.9 8 . 8 6 . 6 6 . 8 9 . 0 9 . 7 2 .2 2 .2 2 .3 2 .2 
Costa Rica 8 .4 5 .9 5.5 6 .0 8 .2 8.1 1.2 8 .7 8 .6 8 .6 
Ecuador 9 . 2 9 . 6 7 . 8 9 .9 8 .9 8 .3 8 .2 9 . 2 8 .9 7 .0 
Guatemala 3.6 4 . 9 3 .9 5.0 3.5 4 . 1 3 .9 3.1 4 .1 4 . 0 
Honduras 6 . 4 14 .0 13.1 10 .4 9 . 8 12 .2 5.2 6 .5 8 .0 14.5 
Panama 6 .6 6 . 6 5.3 3.9 5.8 6 . 3 5.9 6 .4 6 .9 6 . 4 
Total 42.1 5 2 . 7 45.9 45.8 48.8 52.4 35.5 3 9 . 2 42.3 46.1 
SUGAR 
Brazil l .J — 0.3 0 . 4 6 .1 2 5 . 7 13 .7 17 .1 10.1 
Cuba 138 .0 151 .0 156 .0 7 9 . 0 162 .0 2 3 5 . 0 173 .0 84 .0 158 .0 185 .0 
Peru 8.1 5.3 9 . 2 10 .2 12 .3 11 .5 9 .5 16 .3 9 . 5 8 . 4 
Dominican Republic . 13.0 15 .1 12 .7 . 12 .2 2 5 . 8 34 .0 14 .8 8 .5 13 .3 19 .4 
. Total 160.4 171.4 177.9 101.7 200.5 281.5 223.0 J 2 2 . 5 J98 .0 2 2 2 . 9 
COFFEE 
Brazil 2 5 0 . 9 2 4 9 . 8 2 6 0 . 7 2 6 8 . 2 2 4 0 . 4 153 .9 1 9 6 . 9 2 5 5 . 4 143 .9 190 .7 
Colombia 117 .9 111 .0 9 7 . 0 87 .1 1 0 3 . 4 85 .3 112 .7 9 0 . 0 80 .5 6 8 . 8 
Costa Rica . . . . . 15 .0 6 . 6 2 . 8 9 . 5 19 .6 10 .7 3.4 7 .0 15 .2 18.5 
Ecuador. 2.0 0 . 8 14 .7 11 .8 4 . 9 2 .3 14 .1 8 .4 3 .0 1.8 
El Salvador 4 7 . 5 2 1 . 0 3.0 1 6 . 6 58.1 30 .6 8 .0 13 .2 31.1 22 .9 
Guatemala. . . ; . . 33 .5 18 .0 7 .3 33.1 31 .3 15 .5 9 . 0 2 6 . 4 2 5 . 6 20 .2 
Haiti 13.3 7 .9 3 .0 5.6 7 .8 4 . 4 2 .5 6 .3 
Honduras 2 .2 6 . 9 3 .5 0 .9 2 .4 7 .3 1.9 0 . 4 4 . 4 5.5 
Mexico 4 5 . 1 30 .7 13 .2 16.1 4 2 . 3 35 .1 8 .0 2 3 . 4 23 .8 30 .0 
Nicaragua 8 .4 9 . 3 3.4 2 .0 12 .7 9 . 8 2 .6 3 .5 13 .6 7 . 6 
Dominican Republic . 13.8 6 . 2 2 .9 9 .9 5 .7 4 . 1 0 . 6 14 .7 7 .9 7 .3 
Venezuela 9 . 4 8 .3 6 .2 6 . 7 12.3 8 .9 1.7 8 .4 13 .9 9 . 2 
Total a 5 5 9 . 0 476.5 417.7 467.5 540.9 367.9 361.4 457.1 
CACAO 
Brazil 16 .8 5 .2 25 .2 2 0 . 0 11 .4 3 .8 15 .6 38 .9 15 .0 15 .0 
Costa Rica . . . . . 0 . 8 0 . 7 0 .3 1.1 0 . 7 0 . 8 0 .8 1 .6 1.5 2.1 
Ecuador 2.3 7 .3 4 . 6 3 .2 3.1 6 . 5 5.1 3 .7 5.5 7 . 5 
Dominican Republic . 1.7 3.6 2 . 4 1 .2 1.1 6 . 9 3.6 1.9 4 . 6 10 .5 
Venezuela 2 .6 4 . 1 3 .0 1 .4 2 . 8 3 .8 1.4 2 .0 4 . 5 5.1 
Total 24.2 2 0 . 9 55.5 26.9 19.1 21.8 26.5 48.1 31.1 40.2 
COTTON 
Brazil 1 3 . 8 4 2 . 7 21 .1 8 .3 6 .3 17 .9 14 .7 5.5 11 .8 4 . 3 
El Salvador 4 .0 9 . 4 3 .5 0 . 7 4 . 8 5 .0 2.1 3.6 6.1 4 . 0 
Mexico 8 5 . 7 28 .2 7 6 . 6 7 2 . 6 2 2 . 9 6 .3 7 8 . 6 65 .1 39.0 15 .7 
Nicaragua . . . . . . 4 . 9 17 .3 1.3 — 5.5 12 .7 2 .8 0 .8 6 .3 9 . 7 
Paraguay 0.1 3 .2 1 .5 0 . 8 0 .3 1.8 1.9 0 .5 0 .1 1.7 
Peru 13.6 2 0 . 5 2 6 . 2 2 5 . 4 1 0 . 4 15 .3 23 .1 1 9 . 2 10.0 16.5 
Total 122.1 121.3 130 .2 1 0 7 . 9 5 0 . 2 59.0 123.2 94.7 73.3 51.9 
Temperate-zone products 
MEAT 
3 2 . 4 2 9 . 0 32.1 35 .9 32 .5 2 9 . 5 29 .3 34 .4 35 .3 36 .0 
Uruguay 3.8 1 .5 6.1 10 .7 8 .5 7 . 4 9 . 4 2 .2 3.4 4 . 4 
Total 36.2 . 3 0 . 5 38.2 46.6 41.0 3 6 . 9 38.7 36.6 38.9 40.4 
W H E A T 
Argentina 4 2 . 3 37 .2 36 .4 39 .0 39 .2 4 6 . 8 35 .9 37 .0 19 .2 34.5 
Uruguay 8.0 7 - 2 4 . 5 5.3 4 . 8 1 .5 1.2 0 . 4 3 .5 5.2 
Total. . . . . . . 50.3 44.4 40.9 44.3 44.0 48.3 37.1 37.4 . 2 2 . 7 39.7 
MAIZE 
Argentina 0.2 14.3 2 8 . 7 20 .1 8 .0 6 . 0 12 .0 18 .6 8 .0 16.9 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
Table 14 (Continued) 
QUARTERLY EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 
A. Quantities in tliousands of tons 
Country 
19S6 1957 

















5 4 . 6 
32.8 
2.4 









2.2. . 1.7 
13.6 ; 8.7 
45 .2 48.4 7 9 . 5 . . 
QUEBRACHO 


















. 5-7 , 
.1..6 . 







31.8 26.6 23.7 35.2 26.7 34.4 27.2 33.5 30.2 .46.1 
12.4 12.3 6.1 5.9 ; 5.2 6.0 7.3 11.0 • • 6.7 4.1 
44.2 38.9 29.8 41.1 31.9 40.4 34.5 44.5 36.9 50.2 
W O O L . 
4 1 . 7 27 .7 - • 17.4- 22 .2 38 .5 28 .9 10.9 9 .5 • 24 .8 • 13.8 
27.1 • 16.3 4 .2 16.2 18 .0 4 . 8 1.9 3.1 23.3 8 .4 
68.8 44.0 ' 2 1 . 6 38 .4 ' • 5 6 . 5 33 .7 ' 12.8 • • 12.6 48.1 22 .2 
Argentina 6.1 • 20.5 15.1 19.3 24.2 17.1 51.3 . 48.1 67.5 42.6 
Uruguay 5.5 3.7 — 4.9 0.2 4.0 10.4 11.1 0.3 7.2 
Total 11.6 24.2 15.1 24.2 24.4 21.1 61.7 59.2 67.8 49.8 
Mining products 
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952 1 222 
13 • 44 
206 • • 207 
97 • 120 






32 5 7 4 3 4 . 9 7 5 ,37 286 
117.0 114.8 129.1 124.9 
11.9 11.8 15.5 • Í1.8 
11.4 10.7 18.8 14.7 
140.3 137.3 163.4 151.4 
33.2 35.8 51.1 . . 38.3 . 
29.3 21.9 40.9 . . . 39.4 
62.5 57.7 92.0 . . . 77.7 . 
46.7 55.5 61.1 40.9 
45.0 20.8 39.5 43.6 . 
91.7 76.3 100.6 84.5 
7.5 6.2 8.9 4.4 
910 1016 882 799 
41 48 32 18 
54 15 138 10 
115 . . 114 . , 86 135 

















37 106 34 887 33 3 0 3 32 649 30 661 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
Table 14 (Continued) 
QUARTERLY EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES 
B. Values in milJions of dollars 
~~~~ 1956 1957 
I II III W ' I II III 
HIDES 
Argentina 10.4 10.9 10.6 17.4 12.2 10.2 9.0 
Brazil 1.8 0.9 2.1 0.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 
Paraguay 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Uruguay 3.2 3.3 2.6 6.4 3.5 1.6 2.8 
Total 15.7 J5.6 16.0 24.6 17.2 13.1 13.1 
QUEBRACHO 
Argentina 7.3 6.0 5.3 7.7 5.7 7.1 5.6 
Paraguay 2.3 2.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 
Total 9.6 8.1 6.4 8.7 6.6 S.l 6.7 
W O O L Argentina 46.5 30.6 19.3 27.4 51.1 38.5 14.8 
Uruguay 35.9 21.8 5.8 24.6 27.5 8.1 3.1 
Total 82.4 52.4 25.1 52.0 78.6 46.6 1 7.9 
LINSEED OIL Argentina 1.8 6.3 4.9 6.0 6.4 4.0 11.6 
Uruguay 7.1 0.6 — 1.3 — 1.0 2.3 
Total 2.9 6.9 4.9 7.3 6.4 5.0 15.9 
Mining products 
NITRATE 
Chile 16.1 16.2 4.3 12.0 11.3 10.5 11.1 
IRON ORE 
Brazil 8.5 8.4 9.7 8.5 7.9 13.7 13.8 
Chile 2.1 3.2 3.2 4.0 3.2 4.8 5.4 
Peru 3.8 2.9 4.0 4.1 4.8 6.3 6.4 
Total 14.4 14.5 16.9 16.6 15.9 24.8 25.6 
C O P P E R 
Chile 55.7 49.4 170.0 113.0 88.8 74.0 67.6 
Mexico 22.7 21.5 16.5 12.9 10.2 9.4 8.1 
Peru 9.9 9.3 8.8 5.6 5.1 6.0 5.2 
Total S8.3 80.2 195.3 131.5 104.1 89.4 80.9 
LEAD 
Mexico 12.1 . 12.8 • 11.7 16.7 16.8 10.8 10.7 
Peru 7.9 8.0 7.3 8.1 7.2 7.4 5.1 
Total 20.0 20.8 19.0 24.8 24.0 18.2 15.8 
ZINC Mexico 9.8 9.4 10.8 13.3 11.9 8.8 9.9 
Peru . . . . . . . . 3.9 3.2 3.9 3.1 4.4 5.2 2.1 
Total 13.7 12.6 14.7 16.4 16.3 14.0 12.0 
T I N 
Bolivia 11.2 15.2 14.0 18.9 11.6 15.7 12.6 
. PETROLEUM B 
Colombia 16.5 16.9 - 17.8 18.7 18.9 16.9 19.8 
Ecuador 0.1 0.4 0.4 — 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Mexico 1.8 3.0 2.2 2.5 3.1 0.9 0.1 
Peru 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.1 
Venezuela 473.9 474.7 502.2 533.7 555.2 565.6 537.1 
Total 493.8 496.4 523.9 556.4 579.6 ' 585.7 559.5 
SOURCES AND METHODS: See Explanatory Notes. Totals refer exclusively to the countries speci f ied. • 
a Excluding Peru which appears in the annual tables (see Economic Bulletin for Latin America, V o l . I l l , No. 2 ) . 
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Table 1 5 (Continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES BY DESTINATION 
mo 1954 1955 1956 1957 1950 1954 
Destination 
1955 1956 1957 
Quantities in thousands of tons Vaiues in millions of dollars 
Latin America 
United States 
Western Europe . . . . 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom . . . 







331 334 417 415 . 349 33.9 25.6 31.4 31.1 39.4 
2 868 2 454 2 671 2 879 2 916 312.4 271.6 285.4 240.2 340.2 
2 194 1 695 1 375 1699 ! 2 169 • . 222.1 81.7 • • 100.3 194.6 . 265.1 
92 48 12 27 40 9.0 3.6 0.9 5.3 . 3.5 
344 108 226 133 221 38.9 8.6 16.8 16.5 27.4 ' 
1 300 626 484 822 1053 130.5 43.4 33.4 108.0 128.0 
147 21 210 671 524 13.1 88.7 16.2 37.5 66.1 
104 104 122 120 9 11.6 7.1 8.5 16.7 1.1 
— 9 480 217 365 — 0.8 40.3 28.4 48.6 
128 532 541 751 628 13.6 39.5 41.7 53.4 78.9 
5921 5 236 6 304 6 604 7 048 638.1 4S3.5 527.4 584.0 849.5 
Latin America . . . , 
United States. . . . 




France . . . . . 
Italy. 
Netherlands . . . 
Sweden 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 
Eastern Europe . . . 
World total . . . 
Latin America . . . 
United States 
Western Europe . . , 
Italy 
Netherlands . . . 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 





Latin America . . . 
United States. . . . 
Western Europe . . 
Belgium 
France. . . . 
Italy 
Netherlands . . . 
United fCingdom. . 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 
Sweden 
Eastern Europe . . . 
Japan 

































































































































1414.4 1 897.3 1 750.0 1 877.6 1 672.1 
12.3 16.3 17.8 16.4 17.9 7.8 19.7 13.4 9.6 11.2 
126.5 85.8 117.1 111.2 44.1 77.5 91.3 81.8 58.7 62.3 
60.4 • 84.1 . 41.7 48.0 47.6 . 36.1 13.8 32.7 27.2 30.9 
6.1 . 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.4 3.8 7.8 4.7 3.0 3.4 
10.2 8.9 7.2 18.3 16.8 7.1 9.4 5.4 10.0 10.4 
4.0 48.2 20.0 17.1 20.1 2.7 54.7 15.9 9.9 13.3 
1.1 2.5 11.1 13.9 11.8 1.0 3.0 8.8 7.7 7.4 
— : 1.8 3.1 2.7 2.0 . — 2.0 2.7 1.6 LI 
204.6 196.6 195.2 197.8 182.5 125.0 215.5 142.7 108.1 115.7 
b b 
15.7 25.4 33.6 25.1 8.2 16.2 19.4 25.9 18.2 6.8 
146.6 189.1 250.3 279.7 198.6 90.9 110.6 134.4 124.8 78.9 
182.1 323.2 208.5 • 228.8 139.6 147.3 229.7 148.1 144.8 87.4 
13.7 31.5 24.0 27.5 20.4 11.3 22.1 16.9 18.8 14.3 
20.9 35.0 13.4 29.5 
6.6 24.9 16.8 10.2 8.8 5.3 18.7 12.0 6.7 5.6 
3.7 40.0 27.6 21.6 15.7 2.9 25.8 16.7 12.8 8.5 
I0I.3 81.2 35.9 57.8 30.8 79.1 57.1 24.1 35.0 19.0 
5.8 77.1 65.2 60.6 21.5 6.1 52.5 43.7 44.0 12.9 
5.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 1.8 4.0 3.9 2.9 2.3 5.6 
3.2 2.3 2.3 6.4 i 7.7 3.3 2.0 2.0 4.8 5.9 
18.9 127.1 128.6 143.7 92.9 17.4 85.9 82.8 79.7 48.6 
405.6 712.8 , 672.1 , 740.1 469.6 290.1 477.5 427.4 407.9 240.6 
Latin America . . . 
United States. . . . 
Western Europe . . 
Denmark 
Netherlands . . . 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 




5.14 3.80 2.16 2.83 1.77 4.5 3.0 2.3 3.1 •1.7 
8.83 12.05. 13.92 12.00 14.38 22.8 27.0 28.0 25.6 28.8 
42.46 37.84 40.52 42.66 38.43 22.1 22.7 23.0 25.0. • . 22.5 
2.07 2.35 2.67 2.46 1.97 1.6 2.1 2.7 2.5 . 1:9 
7.33 4.29 7.25 9.66 7.71 3.8 2.5 4.2 5.9 5.0 
9.90 10.64 7.52 9.05 8.49 • 6.2 6.2 4.2 5.1 • 4:5 
66.08 60.84 65.44 '65.51 , 68105 . 53.6. . ' .57..8 58:8 Z . 60.1 : 60.3 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
Table 15 (Continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES BY DESTINATION 
Destination 
1950 1 9 5 4 1955 1956 1957 1950 1954 1955 1956 
• Quantities in thousands of tons Values in millions of dollars 
1957 
CHILLED AND FROZEN MEAT 
Latin America . . . 
United States. . . . 
Western Europe . . 
Italy . 
Netherlands . . . 
United Kingdom . 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 
Eastern Europe . . . 
World total . . . 
of 
7 .7 
0 . 4 
3 1 4 . 4 
11.2 
8.0 











2 5 5 . 6 
2 .0 
1.0 
2 4 7 . 3 
4 . 0 
8 .5 
5.4 
4 5 3 . 8 
19 .2 
2.1 
3 3 4 . 2 
82.1 
8.0 
9 . 4 




4 0 . 3 
4 .1 
0.2 
9 8 . 9 
4 . 9 
3 .2 
7 5 . 8 
5.1 
9 . 3 
3.3 
8 8 . 4 
1.0 
1.3 













0 . 7 
1 1 5 . 3 
29 .1 






9 . 2 
— 60 .0 29 .7 5 .7 11 .5 — 25 .1 8 .0 2.1 4 . 4 
3 3 4 . 7 2 6 8 . 8 306.4 4 2 8 . 3 5 0 6 . 0 108 .9 124.0 130.0 165.6 166.7 
WHEAT 
1 1 1 4 1 2 7 8 1 691 1 2 0 5 I 2 9 7 8 6 . 9 101 .9 121 .9 7 7 . 0 7 7 . 9 
9 2 8 1 329 1 7 5 9 1 6 1 1 1 0 9 7 7 7 . 9 7 9 . 9 117 .6 9 5 . 6 54 .0 
5 132 146 2 4 4 6 0 . 5 7 .9 10 .8 1.3 3.8 
513 107 568 3 8 5 131 4 6 . 8 6 . 7 37 .2 2 4 . 6 10 .0 
6 144 181 2 6 9 211 0 . 6 8 .4 11 .7 15 .9 12 .2 
• — 301 323 2 8 2 353 — 17 .8 20 .1 15 .9 20 .3 
1 8 4 535 2 5 6 378 335 14 .7 32 .6 18 .2 2 0 . 6 20 .1 
9 8 2 6 7 4 0 — — 5.9 16 .0 2 .2 — 
1 9 5 228 71 4 2 — 15 .7 17 .6 4 .3 2 .3 — 
2 7 6 9 3 104 4 028 2 9 6 0 2 7 9 6 2 0 8 . 5 2 1 5 . 8 271.9 180.7 166.8 
MAIZE 
39 4 7 — 2 4 2 . 4 0 .2 0 . 4 . — 1.5 
7 5 2 1 8 6 7 3 5 0 9 9 8 6 2 3 4 4 . 0 100.1 2 2 . 4 . . 5 9 . 4 37 .3 
2 3 6 2 2 8 57 231 11 13 .5 13 .0 3.8 14 .0 0 . 6 
16 9 4 73 1 2 4 2 4 3 1.1 5.0 4 . 7 7 . 8 13 .7 
37 309 20 130 2 1 9 2 .5 16 .5 1.2 7 . 6 12.3 
348 4 2 1 37 132 3 20 .1 22 .0 2 .2 . 8 .0 . 0 .2 
1 4 3 0 2 5 118 0.1 22 .2 1.5 10.1 
— 102 — 6 6 — — 5.4 — 3.8 — 
7 9 4 2 185 3 6 2 1065 7 8 9 46.2 H 7 . 3 2 3 . 3 63.3 44.6 
HIDES 
d . d 
1.8 10.2 11 .4 4 . 0 8 .9 1 .2 7 .3 5.9 1 .7 3 .3 
6 6 . 3 5.4 8 .2 9 . 7 9 . 4 3 5 . 4 3 .7 3.8 6 . 0 2.1 
189 .8 119 .9 117 .8 122.0 4 6 8 . 7 108 .0 6 2 . 3 57 .8 4 2 . 5 1 5 2 . 6 
22 .0 17.2 16 .8 24 .2 1 .2 15 .9 1 3 . 7 13 .4 13 .9 0 . 4 
7 .6 14 .6 11 .2 16 .8 3 6 . 6 4 . 8 6 . 2 3.2 5 .0 13 .4 
15 .7 22 .7 21 .1 12 .5 5.2 7 . 6 10 .4 7 . 7 3 .6 2.1 
64 .1 2 1 . 4 16 .6 15.5 3 6 2 . 5 33.1 10 .0 9 .3 4 . 8 120 .8 
27 .3 19.0 17 .2 18.2 57 .7 16 .0 10 .0 8 .0 5.1 13 .4 
54 .4 63 .5 6 9 . 6 6 0 . 6 9 . 9 39 .9 4 0 . 3 36 .6 20 .2 3.8 
9 . 5 1.1 4 . 5 9 .1 — , 6 .3 0 . 6 1.5 1.9 — 
3 5 0 . 0 207.1 217.5 2 5 9 . 2 2 2 3 . 9 J 9 9 . 0 118.7 113.9 90.8 70.4 
QUEBRACHO 
J 
33 .5 20 .5 19 .6 22 .8 22 .2 5 .7 4 . 8 4 . 5 5.5 4 . 8 
8 2 . 6 55 .9 59 .4 61 .5 32 .0 14 .6 11 .3 11 .6 . 12 .0 . 6 .3 
50.9 41 .3 39 .0 34 .0 4 0 . 9 9 . 3 8 .8 7 .8 7 .1 9 .3 
9 . 0 9 . 5 9 . 7 9 . 4 7 . 7 1 .6 2 .0 2 .0 2 . 9 . 1 .6 
9 . 5 9 .2 6 .9 4 . 7 5.5 1.8 1.9 : 1.5 1 .6 1.1 
15.2 10.1 6 . 8 1 6 5 4 . 8 2 . 8 •• 2 .2 1.4 3.2 1.0 
10 .8 3.0 8.8 7 .8 0 . 7 1 .9 0 . 7 1.9 1 .7 0.1 
246.0 1 5 5 . 2 : 150 .3 154 .0 121 .8 3 7 . 5 33 .3 31.1 3 2 . 9 2 4 . 8 
Latin America 




United Kingdom . . . 





Latin America . . . 
Western Europe . . . 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands . . . 
United Kingdom . , 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 
Japan 
World total . . . . 
of 
Latin America . . . 
United States. . . . 
Western Europe . . 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands .. . . 
United Kingdorn . 
Federal Republic 
Germany. . . . 
Eastern Europe . . . 
Japan . 
World total . . . 
of 
Latin America . . 
United States, . . 
Western Europe . 
France 
United Kingdom 
Eastern Europe . . 
Japan 
World total . 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
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Table 15 (Continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES BY DESTINATION 
1950 1954 1955 1956 1957 1950 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Destination 
Quantities in thousands of tons Values in miJ/ions of dollars 
GKEASY AND SEMI-WASHED WOOL 
Latin America 3.0 1.3 0.9 1.3 ^ 0.3 5.6 3.6 2.4 2.5 
e 
0.5 
United States 157.7 54.9 50.9 49.9 34.4 220.4 64.7 60.8 56.8 • 40.0 
Western Europe . . . . • 75.8 77.5 89.7 104.3 71.2 99.8 110.6 103.8 127.0 99.4 
9.9 3.7 5.7 • 4.9 3.9 14.9 4.1 5.2 5.1 • -5.0 
26.0 13.9 12.5 20.4 13.8 28.8 18.4 14.3 23.2 19.2 
13.1 3.6 6.9 8.5 12.9 4.9 4.6 8.9 11.9 
Netherlands 4.2 9.0 15.6 23.4 13.5 6.6 13.9 21.5 31.3 19.5 
United Kingdom . . . 9.7 29.8 33.8 :, 31.9 21.4 12.6 42.5 35.5 35.5 27.4 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 6.8 15.5 12.2 7.4 5.4 9.8 22.2 12.9 8.9 7.6 
Eastern Europe . . . . . 1.0 5.0 6.3 0.3 7.3 3.0 8.5 7.9 0.5 17.6 
2.7 17.8 10.4 22.0 6.4 4.3 30.9 17.9 29.8 12.0 
World total . . . . . . 246.8 JS9.2 . , J 65. J 186.3 16.3 344.1 222.9 202.9 228.9 43.4 
W O O L FABRICS 
Latin America 0.60 1.25 1.04 0.79 0.22 2.3 6.0 5.7 3.6 6.1 
1.39 9.13 10.41 13.11 4.80 • 4.6 25.6 25.2 30.0 13.1 
Italy. . • 0.25 0.56 0.90 1.97 0.90 0.6 1.7 2.3 4.6 2.5 
Netherlands 0.09 4.96 7.34 8.27 3.72 0.4 13.5 17.6 • 18.8 10.0 
Switzerland. . . . . . 0.35 1.19 1.16 1.46 0.01 1.2 3.3 2.8 3.5 
Eastern Europe 0.02 — 0.63 0.55 0.08 0.1 — 1.6 1.2 0,3 
World total 4.42 12.12 13.45 1626 7.43 14.9 36.7 36.1 39.3 • 48.4 
NCTRATE 
Latin America 132 113 142 127 6.0 5.2 6.9 5.2 
United States 590 674 589 471 25.5 28.9 24.6 18.7 
Western Europe . . . . 521 542 464 453 28.7 23.5 19.2 19.8 
Spain ' 192 115 ; 137 160 8.3 5.0 5.8 6.5 
France. . . • 147 133 84 95 6.1 5.8 3.7 4.0 
Federal Republic of 
Germany — 65 122 90 — 3.0 5.2 3.7 
Egypt 378 112 23 95 15.8 4.6 0.9 3.9 
World total . . . . . 1 664 ,1 575 1322 1217 1252 70.8 67.7 56.3 48.6 44.3 
IRON ORE 
Millions of tons 
f e f e 
United States 2.60 3.36 9.51 12.39 9.89 6.7 21.7 63.8 91.0 86.9 
Western Europe — 0.87. 1.69 3.02 4.47 — 10.4 16.0 27.1 42.0 
Italy — , 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.74 — 0.2 1.0 1.7 6.1 
Netherlands — 0.03 . 0.21 0.37 0.09 0.4 1.5 .2.7 1.2 
United Kingdom . . . — 0.46 0.69 1.28 2.08 — 5.8 7.1 12.0 19.6 
Federal Republic of . 
Germany — . 0.31 0.63 1.12 1.51 3.5 6.0 10.3 14.5 
Japan . . . . . . . . . — , 0.01 0.48 0.52 0.1 3.2 4.6 
Panama Canal zone . . . — 8.72 1.70 2.34 3.31 — • 5.7 8.0 12.8 20.3 
World total 2.60 5.33 . 13.29 18.39 18.72 6.7 42.4 92.6 136.2 161.6 
COPPER (ore, blister, electrolytic. sheet, bars and ingots) 
Thousands of tons 
e g e g 
Latin America 18.8 8.8 13.0 8.2 — 10.5 5.7 11.0 8.4 
United States 411.1 336.9 329.6 372.5 89.5 145.9 185.6 219.3 287.8 46.9 
Western Europe . . . . 54.0 173.4 213.3 206.0 14.1 24.1 100.1 165.4 181.6 7.2 
Belgium . . . 0.6 2.6 . 3.0 1.2 — 0.3 1.7 2.2 1.0 . 
France 16.4 0.9 0.3 3.0 • 7.0 0.5 0.2 3.1 — 
Italy 24.6 46.6 32.3 22.7 0.1 10.4 12.8 25.3 19.8 . 0.1 
Netherlands 1.2 16.3 31.9 50.0 5.7 0.6 10.8 24.0 39.6 2.7 
United Kingdom . . . 0.2 76.9 95.1 89.7 4.3 0.1 50.3 75.5 80.0 2.3 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 8.8 25.2 44.6 50.5 2.8 4.2 16.4 32.8 30.7 1-5 
Eastern Europe 2.0 1.0 
Japan . — 14.5 2.3 9.3 8.4 1.2 0.2 1.3 1.2 
World total 582.6 544.1 553.9 596.7 112.6 182.6 325.0 397.8 479.8 55.6 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
Table 15 (Continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES BY DESTINATION 
1950 J 954 1955 1956 1957 1950 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Quantities in thousands of tons Values in millions oí dollars 
LEAD (including refined lead) 
a b 
Latin America . . . 9.7 4.8 2.2 3.3 6.4 2.3 1.2 0.6 1.1 2.0 
United States 367.3 195.0 239.7 252.8 275.1 79.6 40.2 53.6 57.8 61.3 
Canada 19.6 4.8 9.7 8.5 2.3 0.6 — 1.5 1.2 
Western Europe . . , 8.5 170.2 133.0 111.5 85.2 1.6 44.7 35.6 29.9 23.6 
Belgium . . . . . 5.2 14.5 11.1 11.2 10.2 0.9 3.3 2.8 4.3 3.0 
Federal Republic of 
5.3 2.9 Germany. . . . 1.5 15.1 25.7 19.9 11.1 0.3 3.3 6.2 
Japan — 15.0 8.9 8.5 15.0 — 2.8 1.5 2.1 2.6 
World total . . . m.2 B91.9 3S4.0 386.3 421.0 85.3 90.1 92.1 94.8 91.9 
ZINC (ore and reiined zinc) : 1 
Latin America . . . 4.4 9.5 5.4 5.1 3.2 1.2 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.7 
United States. . . . 280.9 470.4 469.1 504.3 204 7 22.7 19.1 24.6 32.1 17.4 
Canada 13.3 — — 2.8 — 1.0 — — 0.1 — 
Western Europe . . , 108.5 57.4 145.3 III.O 70.3 14.0 6.7 11.2 8.6 4.5 
Belgium 75.9 24.4 100.2 90.1 49.2 5.9 1.3 5.6 5.6 3.1 
France 18.6 2.5 2.0 1.0 — 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 — 
Federal Republic of 
0.2 Germany 1.9 — 10.7 4.1 2.3 0.2 — 0.7 0.4 
Japan 0.9 — 1.6 7.1 4.5 0.2 • — 0.1 0.4 9.8 
WorH total . . . 411.7 538.1 550.6 589.5 285.5 35.9 27.8 38.8 43.9 15.8 
TIN 
Latin America . . . 0.28 0.33 0.23 0.69 0.51 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.6 
United States. . . . 19.18 33.83 32.60 26.34 2.39 28.0 22.0 23.5 17.0 • 1.9 
Western Europe . . 39.61 38.93 42.17 48.83 24.62 31.8 32.4 33.5 41.4 54.8 
United Kingdom . , 39.20 38.93 40.09 45.50 66.28 52.4 32.4 32.6 39.9 51.6 
Federal Republic of 
0.9 1.2 2.9 Germany. . . . — — 2.08 2.98 7.28 — — 









United Kingdom . . . 







Quantities in thousands oí millions oí tons 
3,34 7.25 9.28 11.37 13.77 64.2 146,2 173.2 239.8 254.7 
25.10 36.29 24,84 47.13 53.47 396.1 609.6 440.8 784.0 886.1 
1.88 1,96 9,48 2.59 2.45 31.5 32.7 173.9 48.2 46.7 
5.31 7,36 7,65 17.93 23.59 107.5 136.1 139.2 303.2 386.8 
0.17 0,55 0,19 0.63 0.59 4.0 11,5 3.7 28.3 26.6 
0.04 0.08 0.14 1.3 2,5 — — 3.8 
1.34 0,88 0.52 1.16 2.55 23.8 15,5 9.5 17.3 44.5 
1.04 1,70 2.89 3.86 3.29 15.0 32.2 56.2 58.3 51.7 
1.55 2.08 2.23 7.12 10.87 43.3 40.6 42.6 142.5 131.6 
0.31 0,46 0.50 0.63 1.05 5.3 7.6 8.1 10.6 17.0 
0,47 0.81 0.13 1.48 1.63 9.9 18.9 4.1 33.1 29.0 
24,90 22,38 24.22 25.50 23.23 166,4 375.4 446.1 372.1 323.7 
15.84 16,16 15.52 18.0Í. 16.98 228,5 242.8 280.0 268.4 232.1 
S0.58 102.51 114.64 131.38 142.76 1 282.4 I 718.5 2 059.1 2 134.8 2 320.3 
SOURCES AND METHODS: See Explaoatory Notes. 
NOTE: World totals include exports to other destinations not specified in the table. They may differ from the totals given in table 30 of the Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, Vo l . IIII No. 2, for the reasons stated in the Explanatory Notes, 
a Excluding exports from Honduras, 
b Excluding exports from Nicaragua. 
c Exports from Paraguay are included only in the total, 
d Excluding exports from Paraguay, 
e Excluding exports from Chile. 
Í Excluding exports from Peru, 
g Excluding exports from Cuba, 
h Excluding exports from Mexico, 
i Excluding zinc ore from Mexico, 
j Including petroleum derivatives. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
I M P O R T S F R O M L A T I N A M E R I C A F . o . s . a 






























Japan To-tal c 
of origin \ many ope b 
Argentina . . . 1957 I 76.5 2.0 57.5 23.0 28.5 37.5 37.6 145.6 7.8 7.6 374.9 7.1 460.5 
1957 11 52.8 2.8 58.6 17.9 17.5 45.7 26.8 117.4 5.0 10.5 325.3 9.3 390.0 
1958 I 62.8 2.3 61.3 23.0 15.0 29.1 28.7 124.5 10.2 6.6 325.5 7.7 398.3 
Bolivia . . . . 1957 I 7.6 1.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 19.5 _ _ 22.1 1.0 30.7 
1957 II 8.8 0.1 1.9 0.2 — — 0.2 19.5 — — 22.0 0.8 31.7 
1958 I 4.5 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 17.7 — — 19.4 0.2 24.2 
Brazil . . . . 1957 I 350.3 16.7 46.8 9.4 25.1 12.5 12.0 29.5 24.3 6.4 219.3 17.8 604.1 
1957 II 349.8 20.0 47.0 10.5 22.3 11.9 13.3 45.3 23.6 3.9 247.7 21.4 638.9 
1958 I 285.0 13.2 42.0 8.0 23.3 17.7 11.2 35.2 21.6 5.3 210.0 11.9 . 520.1 
Colombia . . . 1957 I 168.3 9.7 17.6 4.6 3.1 0.3 4.9 7.3 6.5 2.5 51.9 0.7 230.6 
.1957 II 215.1 9.2 20.2 3.1 2.0 0.3 4.1 3.4 5.2 1.8 43.9 0.2 268.4 
1958 I 146.7 8.7 21.3 3.9 1.0 0.5 8.1 3.8 5.5 2.8 48.8 0.7 204.9 
Chile 1957 I 107.4 1.5 40.2 1.7 5.9 11.5 1.0 35.4 3.6 3.9 110.2 4.9 224.0 
1957 II 88.9 0.2 36.4 3.1 5.1 7.4 0.8 26.5 3.4 2.5 •88.9 2.5 180.5 
1958 I 74.2 0.6 32.3 0.7 4.5 6.0 1.1 28.8 4.0 2.2 85.4 1.2 161.4 
Ecuador. . . . 1957 I 20.7 1.8 10.6 2.1 0.5 2.2 1.2 1.6 0.6 0.8 21.3 0.2 44.0 
1957 II 37.3 3.0 11.9 1.8 0.7 2.0 0.9 0.1 1.1 0.9 20.9 0.1 61.3 
1958 I 21.8 1.7 14.7 2.2 0.9 2.3 0.7 0.5 0.6 1.7 24.7 1.0 49.2 
Paraguay . . . 1957 I 3.6 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.4 2.2 0.1 0.2 5.2 0.3 9.2 
1957 II 3.0 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 3.6 0.1 0.3 6.9 0.3 10.4 
1958 I 3.0 0.1 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.6 5.1 8.2 
Peru 1957 I 65.5 1.6 21.3 6.0 4.6 3.6 4.0 18.4 1.2 3.0 66.8 14.0 147.9 
1957 II 71.7 1.3 25.2 5.4 6.4 2.2 3.8 15.9 1.1 7.7 70.0 20.1 163.1 
1958 I 60.6 0.6 19.1 4.0 4.4 3.3 2,6 12.6 1.2 4.2 53.4 8.0 122.6 
Uruguay . . . 1957 I 12.2 0.4 12.2 3.5 6.2 5.8 9:8 18.6 1.3 2.9 65.5 1.0 79.1 
1957 II 5.7 0.3 7.3 1.7 1.1 2.9 3.9 7.5 1.0 1.2 29.7 0.1 35.8 
1958 I 3.6 0.1 6.1 1.0 3.6 2.3 4.8 11.9 1.6 1.7 38.7 42.4 
Venezuela. . . 1957 I 464.4 129.0 37.8 11.8 33.7 23.0 60.8 88.0 28.4 2.3 310.5 1.4 905.3 
1957 II 435.3 130.1 31.3 8.4 37.5 11.8 64.8 95.8 19.4 1.5 283.1 1.9 850.4 
1958 I 443.9 99.3 45.8 9.9 25.8 13.7 31.6 83.9 18.1 1.8 249.6 1.2 794.0 
Total. . . . 19S7 I Í 276.5 162.8 246.0 63.6 107.9 96.6 132.0 366.1 73.S 29.6 I 247.7 48.4 2 735.4 
1957 II I 268.4 167.2 240.4 52.8 93.1 84.3 119.2 335.0 59.9 30.3 1 138.4 56.7 2 630.8 
1958 I 1 106.1 126.7 244.5 53.4 79.6 75.1 89.3 320.3 62.9 26.9 1 060.6 31.9 2 325.3 
See Explanatory Notes at end of table. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA F.o.B.a 
(Millions oí dollars) 




























of origin N many ope b 
Costa Rica . . 1957 I 15.3 4.2 9.8 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 in 14.3 — 33:8 
1957 II 12.2 4.9 12,2 0.1 0.4 0,2 O.l 0.4 0.6 14.3 0.1 31,5 
1958 I 18.8 3.2 10.6 0.6 — 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.4 1.4 15.0 0.2 37.2 
Cuba 1957 I 252.7 . 6.7 28.8 2.1 6.5 2.7 10.0 33.7 3.2 1.8 101.9 23.7 385.0 
1957 II 229.0 7.8 15.6 0.5 9.2 0.8 11.4 29.3 2.4 0.5 84.3 45.6 366.7 
1958 I 289.8 5.8 2.3 3.7 3.1 1.9 in 25.2 2.2 2.3 59.1 18.6 373.3 
El Salvador . . 1957 I 40.6 0.7 16.4 1.3 3.7 0.5 1.5 0.3 0.9 1.5 26.4 2.3 70.0 
1957 II 15.0 0.8 19.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.5 0.7 0.5 25.2 4.1 45.1 
1958 I 27.0 0.5 18.7 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.5 1.1 23.5 4.3 55.3 
Guatemala. . . 1957 I 36.2 2.5 9.2 1.9 1.3 0.1 on 0.2 2.7 2.2 19.3 0.2 58.2 
1957 II 38.1 I.l 9.2 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.3 2.9 0.8 16.2 0.3 55.7 
1958 I 37.8 1.7 in 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.4 3.1 1.4 15.4 0.3 55.2 
Haiti 1957 I 7.2 0.7 0.4 5.0 3.0 3.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 14.3 0.7 22.9 
1957 II 11.1 0.9 0.6 1.5 1.7 2.5 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.4 8.5 0.1 20.6 
1958 I 14.7 0.7 0.4 5.0 1.5 3.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.5 13.9 — 29.3 
Honduras . . . 1957 I 18.6 3.4 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 O.I 0.4 0.3 0.2 3.2 — 25.2 
1957 II 7.6 1.4 2.8 0.1 — 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 5.0 — 14.0 
1958 I 18.6 2.9 2.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.3 5.2 0.1 26.8 
Mexico . . . . 1957 I 228.1 9.8 26.7 5.0 12.9 5.5 5.6 6.9 2.5 5.9 73.3 35.4 346.6 
1957 II 202.0 12.1 29.2 6.5 4.0 2.9 3.7 9.8 2.3 5.6 69.7 39.8 323.6 
1958 I 255.9 17.9 14.1 4.7 6.3 2.8 6.1 6.0 1.5 3.7 60.9 42.7 377.4 
Nicaragua . . . 1957 I 15.5 0.2 5.7 0.7 2.3 0.1 2.2 3.6 0.1 0.5 15.4 2.6 33.7 
1957 II 6.8 0.3 6.5 0.7 1.1 0.3 2.2 1.3 0.1 0.1 12.5 2.0 21.6 
1958 I 16.7 2.6 7.4 0.4 1.4 0.3 4.0 1.0 0,3 0.5 15.3 2.1 36,7 
Panama. . . . 1957 I 11.8 3.3 0.5 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.2 — — 5.8 3.7 24.6 
1957 II 12.5 4.2 1.6 0,2 — 7.6 1.0 — — — 12.0 0.7 29.4 
1958 I 12.9 4.1 1.6 0.6 — 0.6 0.1 0.1 — — 10.4 0.9 28.3 
Dominican Re-
public. . . . 1957 I 2 28.1 0.3 12.0 2.2 0.3 0.6 5.3 35.1 — 0.4 59.3 3.5 91.2 
1957 II 35.0 1.0 3.6 0.8 — 0.8 2.0 16.2 0.1 0.2 25.6 1.5 63.1 
1958 I 42.9 2.0 1.7 1.4 0.5 0.8 1.4 20.0 0.3 0.5 27.1 1.9 73.9 
Total. . . . 1957 I 654.1 31.8 110.7 19.7 30.4 14.1 25.9 81.0 10.4 15.0 333.2 72.1 ] 091.2 
1957 II 569.3 34.5 lOO.S 11.7 16.9 16.7 23.1 59.8 9.5 9.0 273.3 94.2 971.6 
1958 I 735.1 41.4 77.4 17.9 13.6 12.6 21.7 54.1 9.6 12.7 245.8 71.1 1 093.4 
Grand total . 1957 I 1 930.6 194.6 356.7 83.3 138.3 110.7 157.9 447.1 84.2 44.6 1 580.9 120.5 3 826.6 
1957 11 1 837.7 201.7 341.2 64.5 110.0 101.0 142.3 394.8 69.4 39.3 1 411.7 150.9 3 602.4 
1958 I 1 841.2 168.1 321.9 71.3 93.2 87.7 111.0 374.4 72.5 39.6 1 306.4 103.0 3 418.7 
SounCES: Direction of International Trade, U. N. Statistical Papers, Series T , and Foreign Exchange Statistics Monthly of Japan, 
a Imports from Europe and Japan were given cj.f. but have been converted to approximate f.o.b. basis. 
b Including other countries of Western Europe. 
c Total for the countries specif ied. 
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Table 17 
EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA F.O.B. 
(Millions of dollars} 


























Sweden Switzer-land Japan 
To-
tal b 
of destination^ many ope b 
Argentina . . . 1957 I 159.0 ' 9,3 52.4 18,3 Í6,9 26,2 8,9 43.6 16.2 12,5 211.2 2.6 382.1 
1957 II 120.4 5,9 53.7 • 37,3 19.2 23,7 14,1 49.2 23.3 10,9 251.6 5.7 383.6 
1,958 I 103.1 5,0 51.4 34.2 19.6 24,1 10.9 47.1 11.0 10,4 • 226.5 8.6 343.2 
Bolivia . . . . 1957 I 19.1 0,6 4.5 • 0.8 1.0 0,4 0.4 2.1 0.8 0,6 11.1 1.0 31.8 
1957 II 13.6, 0,4 4.7 0.2 0.4 1,0 0.5 2.3 0.4 1.1 10.8 1.1 25.9 
1958 I 16.4 0,2 4.6 0,5 O.l 2,4 0.4 1.9 0.3 0.8 11.2 1.0 28.8 
Brazil 1957 I 224.5 11,3 54.4 11,2 25.5 16,5 5.3 25.5 23.1 : 10.0 222.2 12.0 470.0 
1957 II 244.5 16.1 71.6 9.5 20.9 19,6 5.3 26.3 24.2 10.4 232.0 13.0 505.6 
1958 I • 253.7 9.7 80.6 9.0 23.7 15,3 5.0 28.8 24.2 10.1 228,5 22.9 514.8 
Colombia . . . 1957 I 91.8 7.1 16.4 3.5 6.1 2.9 3.3 6.8 5.2 3.5 51,3 1,8 152.0 
1957 II 144.0 8.4 32.4 6,6 7.7 4,4 3.3 12.1 5.2 4,8 81,1 3.3 236.8 
1958 I 97.0 6,7 26.2 3,5 5.3 2,6 4.1 7.3 3.0 3,4 58,5 2.5 164.7 
Chile. . . . . 1957 I 101.1 2,7 26.2 . 2,8 4.0 2.7 1.1 8.7 3.8 • 3,2 59.8 3,4 167.0 
1957 II 89.8, 2,1 25.3 1.2 6.2 3.8 1.7 10.8 2.7 • 7,2 67.7 8.5 168.1 
1958 I 76.2 1,9 18.5 2.1 4.9 2.2 1.1 9.4 1.4 2,5 46.7 3,4 128.2 
Ecuador. . . . 1957 I , 22.2 1.3 5.9 1.2 2.0 1,1 0,9 2.6 0.7 1,0 16.2 0.7 40.4 
1957 II ' 25.9 • 1.7 • 7.1 1.2 1.6 0,9 1.0 4.8 0,9 1,0 19,8 0.7 48.1 
1958 I 23.3 1.3 6.0 1.2 1.9 0,8 0.9 3.9 1,8 , 1.1 18,5 0.7 43.8 
Paraguay . . . 1957 I 5.1 0.1 1.7 0.8 0.3 0,1 0.1 1.5 0.2 0.3 5,5 0.8 11.5 
1957 II 5.4 — • 2.3 0,5 0.5 0,1 0,3 1.7 0.8 0.4 7,5 0.7 13.6 
1958 I 6.3 0.1 2.4 0,6 0.2 0,1 0,2 1.1 0.3 0.3 5.7 0.9 13.0 
Peru 1957 I 99.6 5.4 16.3 4,6 4,9 . 3,5 . 4,9 16.0 3,9 4,3 62,0 6.4 173.4 
1957 II 94.0 5.2 18.1 3.5 4,3 3.6 5.7 13.7 3,5 5,0 60,7 5.5 165.4 
1958 I 86.1 7.9 15.5 4,8 3,0 3,8 3.9 12.0 - 3,2. 3.9 52,8 3.0 149.8 
Uruguay . . . 1957 I 27,9 2.2 11,0 4.5 3,3 2,0 2.1 11.1 • 3.6 2.8 43.8 1.1 75.0 
1957 II 20,1 1.9 10,7 2.6 4,1 1.9 1.8 11.2 2.9 2.0 41.7 0.6 64.3 
1958 I 8,6 0.5 2,3 0.4 7,5 2,0 1,3 3.6 0.7 20.9 30.0 
Venezuela. . . 1957 I 454,0 15.3 51,6 15,3 17,8 22,3 12,9 50.3 4.9' 7,2 193.1 8.3 670.7 
1957 II 568,7 26.6 81,1 20,7 18,4 39.9 16,1 61.5 5.5 11.5 275,8 15.0 886.1 
1958 I 432,5 22.2 57,5 20.0 17,9 36.2 18,5 53.8 6.9 11.3 238,0 11.4 704.1 
Total. . . . 1957 Í . .1 2043 55.3 240.4 63.0 ' 81.8 77.7 • 39.9 168.2 62.4 45.4 876,2 38.1 2 J73.9 
i 957 JI 1326,4 : 68.3 • 307.0 83.3 83.3 98.9 49.8 193.6 69.4 S4.3 1 048.7 54.1 2 497.5 
1958 I 1 103.2 55.5 265,0 76.3 84.1 S9.S 46.3 168.9 52,8 45.5 907.3 54.4 2 120.4 
See Explanatory Notes a f . end of table. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA F . O . B . 






















France Italy Nether-lands 







Japan To-tal 1» 
Costa Rica . . 1957 I 23.5 1.2 4.0 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.8 , . 2.0 0.2 . 0.4 12.3 4.1 41.1 
1957 II 23.3 1.4 4.0 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.6 • • 2.3 0.2 , , .0,5 12.3 • 1.1 38.1 
1958 I 22.1 1.5 4.6 . 0.6 0.6 0.5 , 2.2 2.4 • 0,3 0.4 • 12.2 • 2.5 38.3 
Cuba 1957 I 300.7 7.8 13.0 6.3 8.3, 3.0 , 2.4 11.5 2.2 . 2.8 61.4 2.1 ' 372.0 
1957 II 309.4 9.9 17.5 4.5 4.4 4.1 2.6 . 11.2 ; 1.2 3.6 57.1 • 2.8 379.2 
1958 I 277.8 8.1 12.4 6.5 3.9 3.4 , 3,1 . 12.9 . ; • 1.7 . 3.4 56.3 •3.2 345.4 
El Salvador . . 1957 I 27.0 1.4 5.0 0.9 0.9 , , 1.0 1,3 2.0 0.3 0.4 12.2 3.6 44.2 
1957 II 21.8 1.2 4.7 0.8 0.8 • 0.6 1,3 1.9 0.2 0.6 11,5 4,4 38.9 
1958 I 23.1 1.3 5.2 0.5 0.8 0.6 1.4 1.8 0.5 0.6 11.9 3.7 40,0 
Guatemala . . 1957 I 40.7 1.5 5.3 1.7 0.9 0.9 1.7 3.1 • 0.3 0,7 15,3 0.4 57.9 
1957 II 37.8 1.6 6.5 0.9 0.7 0.9 1.6 3.0 0.2 0,8 • 15.2 • 0.4 55,0 
1958 I 42.3 2.4 6.2 0.7 0.8 . 1.5 : 1.4 • 2.7 0.2 0.7 14.6 0.5 59.8 
Haiti 1957 I 11.1 1.3 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.5 ' . 0.4 ^ 1.1 0.1 ! 0.3 5.3 17.7 
1957 II 12.8 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.6 .: 0.4 1 , 0.4 ; 0.8 — O.I 3.5 0.1 17.5 
1958 I 13.4 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.1 0.3 4.3 — 19.0 
Honduras . . . 1957 I 21.4 0.7 2.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.1 4.9 2.2 29.2 
1957 II 19.5 0.6 1.9 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.3 4.6. 2.1 26.8 
1958 I 18.0 0.6 2.2 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.1 0,1 4.6 2.6 25.8 
Mexico . . . . 1957 I 439.2 24.0 28.6 4.2 7.4 12.7 4.4 ^ 14.4 6.1 • 8,3 92.0 3.3 558.5 
1957 II 453.6 20.8 33.3 4.0 6.8 15.1 3.8 21.9 7.0 9.8 109.4 4.3 588,1 
1958 I 466.7 18.2 30.3 7.1 5.2 12.5 4,7 16.5 ' 6,9 • 8.7 98.1 5.8 588.8 
Nicaragua . . . 1957 I 21.0 0.7 4.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5 1.3 . 0,1 0.2 8.5 0.9 31.1 
1957 II 17.0 0.9 5.6 0,6 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.4 — 0.3 9.5 1.2 28,6 
1958 I 17.5 1.1 3.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.7 3,3 0.1 0.2 8.8 1.5 28.9 
Panama. . . . 1957 I 38.1 21.7 4.7 0.8 12.7 3.5 1.0 . 14,2 0.4 0,6 45.7 10.8 116.3 
1957 II 45.0 10.5 3.4 0.7 1.0 5.5 5.4 3.7 1 5.8 0.9 43.3 11.8 110,6 
1958 I 35.0 3.1 1.8 0.6 0.9 11.7 3.8 3.0 1.0 0.8 25.3 19.7 83,1 
Dominican Re-
public. . . . 1957 I 34.1 2.7 3.2 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.8 2.3 0.2 0,3 10.9 1.3 49,0 
1957 II 38.0 2.7 3.0 1.6 1.0 1.2 0.9 2,6 0.2 0.4 11.9 2,0 54,6 
1958 I 38.8 2.9 3.3 1.4 0.7 1,0 1.0 2.5 0.3 0,6 11.7 2-3 55,7 
Total. . . . 19S7 I 956.8 63..0 71.6 17.6 33.9 25.1 14.7 52.7 10.2 14.1 268.5 28.7 I 317.0 
1957 II 978.2 50.7 80.5 15.0 16.7 29.4 18.2 49.7 14.9 17.3 278.3 30.2 1 337.4 
1958 I 954.7 40.5 70.2 18.9 13.9 32.0 19.2 46.8 11.2 ¡5.8 247.9 41.8 1 284.8 
Grand total . 1957 I 2 161.1 118.3 312.0 80.6 115.7 102.8 54.6 220.9 72.6 59.5 1 144.7 66.8 3 490.9 
1957 II 2 304.6 119.0 387.5 98.3 100.0 128.3 6S.0 243.3 84.3 71.6 1 327.0 84.3- 3 834.9 
1958 I 2 057.9 96.0 335.2 94.2 98.0 121.5 65.5 215.7 64.0 61.3 1 154.2 96.2 3 404.2 
SOURCES: See table 16. 
a Including other countries of 'Western Europe, 
b Total for the countries specif ied. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
W O R L D M A R K E T P R I C E S F O R P R I N C I P A L L A T I N A M E R I C A N E X P O R T S 
(Indices: 1955 = 100) 
Quarter Weight- 1956 J957 1958 
Commodity " . 
mg 
1955 I II III IV I II III IV I 11 III 
A. Tropica] commodities 
Bananas . . . . . . 184 105 105 105 104 105 104 104 103 
Sugar (a) 405 99 100 102 106 104 107 107 106 ÍÓ5 m i 09 
(b) 437 100 103 103 123 183 191 144 119 110 107 
88 
107 
Coffee (c) 1 821 97 100 105 106 105 102 95 96 95 80 
^ (d) 1052 109 111 124 115 109 103 96 89 85 84 80 
Cacao 231 72 68 73 69 61 75 95 105 117 125 128 
Cotton (e) . . . . 337 99 93 83 87 91 89 89 94 94 90 83 
(f) • • •• 238 94 87 85 83 86 86 86 84 78 76 
(g) • • : 123 101 120 121 132 136 122 115 108 ÍÓ3 84 77 
Group total 4 828 99 100 105 105 107 106 100 97 96 93 88 
B. Other agricultural commodities 
Meat 185 80 87 82 70 78 79 87 81 80 92 99 
Wheat 356 97 108 111 111 105 96 97 96 93 93 94 
Maize 122 105 113 111 113 119 100 99 95 82 81 80 
Quebracho 53 100 100 100 100 92 84 84 84 85 85 85 
Wool 320 99 102 102 103 105 105 105 101 91 79 76 
Linseed oil 55 133 144 123 129 123 107 100 106 106 107 114 
Group total 1091 98 105 104 102 102 96 97 95 89 S8 88 
C. Non-ferrous metals h 
Copper 631 116 97 86 80 71 67 59 53 48 52 58 
Lead 126 113 109 109 110 108 95 86 76 70 69 67 
Zinc 60 110 104 106 111 110 95 81 74 69 69 70 
Tin 93 109 102 104 111 105 104 101 99 99 99 98 
Group total 910 m 100 92 89 82 76 64 62 57 60 64 
D. Non-metallic minerals 
Nitrate. 69 100 100 100 97 97 95 94 97 97 97 97 
Crude petroleum 3 102 98 98 98 98 105 106 106 106 106 106 106 
TotaJ; 17 commodities . . . . 10 000 100 100 101 101 104 102 98 97 95 93 91 
SOURCES AND METHODS: See Explanatory Notes. 
a Exports to the United States. 






b The quotations refer to the London market. In the Economic Bulletin for Latin Ai merica, V o l . III, No. 2, table 33, referente was made to the New York market. 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
WHOLESALE PRICES IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(Indices: 1950 = 100) 
J 956 1957 1958 
Country Sep- De. Sep- De. Sep-
March June tem- cem- March June tem- cem- March June tem-
ber ber ber ber ber 
Brazil 244 266 282 292 302 297 297 302 309 323 348 
Colombia 178 B 4 139 147 156 177 179 183 188 198 204 
Costa Rica 96 95 95 96 97 97 95 94 94 98 98 
Chile 767 894 1008 1032 1 155 1 313 1401 1 387 1 536 1 595 1 728 
Guatemala 104 107 106 103 105 107 105 105 104 109 107 
Mexico 166 165 . 163 165 167 171 175 176 178 181 177 
Paraguay 1012 1087 1 146 1 149 1 273 1 288 1312 1 340 1 361 1 376 1433 
Peru 157 160 161 163 166 169 170 169 175 179 181 
Dominican Republic . . 103 110 107 106 118 109 118 122 123 121 114 
Venezuela 106 104 104 105 104 105 104 103 102 100 102 
SOURCES: O f f i c i a l statistical pub l i ca t i ons o f eacb country and United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
Table 20 
COST OF LIVING IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
(Indices: 1950 = 100) 
Country 
1956 1957 1958 
Sep- Dc. Sep- De. Sep-
March June tem- cem- March June tem- cem- March June tem-
ber ber ber ber ber 
240 268 267 286 296 324 347 360 360 416 461 
2 129 2 577 3 197 8 054 7 589 6 503 6 303 6 949 6 964 6 809 6 957 
266 276 293 303 316 326 332 341 363 370 381 
131 134 131 134 142 152 158 165 169 179 175 
111 111 110 112 114 115 114 , 116 117 118 117 
782 839 972 1 016 1 043 1 161 1 397 1 191 1 304 1 396 1480 
110 110 110 n o 112 112 113 114 115 113 113 
138 137 135 135 135 137 140 142 145 143 149 
111 117 106 111 108 115 111 109 107 113 110 
121 120 123 115 121 120 120 115 120 124 123 
165 159 161 159 161 170 177 182 189 189 191 
943 966 989 1012 1098 1 115 1 086 1 163 1 218 1 169 1 187 
147 149 152 153 158 160 164 164 170 173 177 
104 106 109 105 112 111 116 113 106 111 108 
176 180 179 189 193 213 216 224 232 239 250 















Uruguay . . . . . . 
Venezuela 
SOURCES: See tab le 19. 
NOTE: Ind i ces genera l ly re fer to the capital o f each country , 





This table brings up-to-date the series given in the Economic 
Bulletin Vol. Ill No. 2. All index numbers are however on the 
base 1955 = 100 which is the benchmark period chosen by ECLA 
for studies relating to recent years. 
Attention is again drawn to the fact that for trade with the 
United States and Western Europe, data are based on the figures 
of countries in the two last areas. In the case of imports into 
European countries (shown in Table 1 as "Exports to "Western 
Europe"), c.i.f, data have been converted to an approximate f.o.b. 
basis on the assumption that freight and insurance costs represent-
ed 15 per cent of the f.o.b. values. 
No index figures have this time been given for the quantum 
of imports as only provisional figures to the base 1955 = 100 are 
at present available. 
FINANCE 
(Tables 2 to 4) 
The series are fully comparable with those in Vol. Ill No. 2. 
MINING PRODUCTION 
(Tables 5 to 7) 
( 1 ) VOLUME OF MINING PRODUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA ( T a b l e 5 ) . 
The gross value of production has been estimated by ECLA at 
1955 international prices by aggregating the quantity data for the 
eleven products listed in Table 7. The "typical" 1955 prices listed 
at the right were used as weights: 
These prices have a number of deficiencies. They include, for 
instance, the cost of transportation from the mine to the coast; 
they fail to take into account the varying quality of the ores ex-
ported from Latin American countries; they are furthermore based 
on only one main market instead of being an average of all 
markets. However, they have been accepted on two main grounds: 
first, no other figures truly representative of the prices in dollars 
received by the producer were available to ECLA; and secondly, 
any distortions introduced through using inadequate price weights 
would probably not be too important in the period covered by 
the index. 
In this connexion, it may be of interest to note the index 
series compiled by the United Nations Statistical Offices with the 
use of national (rather than international) weights. These have 
been placed on the same base year as the ECLA series l and are 
listed on the following page. 
These series differ from those of ECLA in two main respects: 
(a) While ECLA data refer to gross production these series 
are based on the "value added" component —i.e. the value of 
production less the cost of raw materials, fuels, power, containers, 
supplies consumed, etc. 
(b) In the ECLA series, each mineral is given the same weight-
ing for all countries. The above series have however been obtain-
ed by combining country index series in accordance with weights 
which reflect the census value added in the country concerned. For 
each country, the index series are those calculated by national of-
fices with national price or added value weights. The same mineral 
may therefore be given a differing relative importance in the 
1 Data were published originally to the base 1953 rn 100. The 
figures have been converted by ECLA to a 1955 base by project-
ing 1953 value added weights with the aid of national indexes 
measuring changes in the volume of mining production between 



























Unit value c.i.f. of Latin Ameri-
can imports from outside the re-
gion 
Unit value f.o.b. United States 
imports from Venezuela 
Unit value f.o.b. of United States 
imports from Latin America 
Unit value f.o.b. of United States 
imports from Chile (ores and 
concentrates) 
Unit value f.o.b. of United States 
imports from Peru 
Unit value f.o.b. of United States 
imports from Mexico and Peru 
Unit value f.o.b. of United States 
imports from Bolivia (concen-
trates) 
New York quotation 89.1 cents 
per fine ounce 
International price of $35 per 
fine ounce 
Unit value f.o.b. of Latin Ameri-
can exports 
Unit value f.o.b. of United States 
imports from Chile 
® For ores, dollars per ton of metal content. 
7 2 
VOLUME OF MINING PRODUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA 
Net production, weighted by national prices 
(Index numbers: 1955 = 100) 
Country 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
Total from Latin Amer-
ica . . 73 81 86 35 90 100 111 124 
Of which: 
Argentina . . . . . 70 75 94 84 93 100 108 123 
Brazil . . 72 96 96 103 98 100 111 124 
Colombia. . . . . . 83 94 95 97 98 100 111 113 
Chile . . 86 91 94 84 87 100 107 110 
Mexico . . 90 90 94 90 93 100 99 99 
Peru . . 71 79 82 89 93 100 103 116 
Venezuela . . . . . 68 78 82 80 87 100 115 131 
various countries depending on differences in their price struc-
tures. (Hence in the regional index, the various minerals are com-
bined with weights which differ according to the country in which 
they were produced.) Note also that for the region as a whole, 
production data have been combined by applying selected ex-
change rates (generally the average "official" rate; or, if this 
was not appropriate, a free or so-called "parity" rate) in order 
to obtain constant value aggregates in terms of dollars. (For 
further information, see Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, United 
Nations, January and November 1958, and February 1959.) 
In practice, both gross and net data have their uses and any 
disparities in the two series quoted should not be considered as a 
reason for rejecting one or the other. They should instead be 
treated as complementary series, each measuring a similar, but 
not necessarily identical, aspcct of production. In the same way, 
differences resulting from the weighting methods used are a prob-
lem inherent in index number construction; and the particular 
type of weighting which should be preferred depends always on 
the use to which the index is put. 
( 2 ) REFINING OF NON-FERROUS METALLIC ORES ( T a b l e 6 ) 
The table relates only to those countries which produce the me-
tallic ores mentioned. It does not cover refining in countries which 
use imported ores. 
Production data were taken from the Yearbook of the Bureau 
of Metal Statistics. 
( 3 ) PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MINERALS ( T a b l e 7 ) 
Output in most of the producing countries of the region is cov-
ered for the following products: coal, crude petroleum, iron ore, 
copper ore, lead ore, zinc ore, tin ore, silver, gold, sulphur and so-
dium nitrate. Because of a lack of information some of the minor 
producing countries have not been included. Hence while totals 
relate, so far as was possible, to the whole region, for some prod-
ucts minor quantities may have been omitted. 











Statistical Yearbook 1957; 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. 
Boletín Mensual de Estadística. 
Exportaciones de minerales. Suplemento esta-
dístico, published by Banco Central de Bolivia. 
Produgáo mineral 1956, published by Ministry 
of Agriculture; Desenvoivimento e localizagao 
de industria extrativa de productos minerals 
no Brasil, published by Conselho Nacional de 
Estatística. 
Anuario General de Estadística: B) Minería. 
Estadística Chilena: Minería published by Ser-
vicio Nacional de Estadística. 
Revista de Estadística, producción minero-me-
talúrgica. For metallic ores, 1957 data were 
supplied by the Banco Nacional de México; 
for sulphur, data were taken from Examen 
de la Situación Económica de México N' 390. 
Boletín de Estadística Peruana. IX Sección: 
Producción minera. 
Memoria del Banco Central de Venezuela: Pro-
ducción. For metallic ores and metals, most 
of 1957 data were taken from the Yearbook 
of the American Bureau of Metal Statistics 
1957. 
MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION 
(Tables 8 to 10) 
( 1 ) VOLUME OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA 
(Table 8) . 
Basic data were compiled by the United Nations Statistical Of-
fice and are described in the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Feb-
ruary 1959. They are similar in nature to the index series compil-
ed by that office for mining production see above). Regional 
totals were computed as weighted averages of country series, each 
of the latter being weighted by the "census value added" of the 
industry group for the country concerned. While the original 
United Nations series were published to the base 1953 = 100, 
these have been converted for the purpose of comparability to a 
1955 base by projecting the 1953 added value weights (national 
production indexes for the two years involved being used for this 
purpose). 
( 2 ) MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN 
COUNTRIES (Table 9) 
Data relate to the index series which appear regularly in the of-
ficial publications of the countries concerned. In order to provide 
a means of comparison, however, all series have been placed on 
the base 1955 = 100. Original base years were: Argentina, 1943 
(recently published to a 1952 base year but using' 1943 weights) ; 
Brazil, 1948; Chile, average of 1936-38; Peru, 1954; and Vene-
zuela, 1948. It is to be emphasized that indexes for the countries 
concerned have been compiled in differing circumstances and 
with varying degrees of statistical accuracy. Some indexes are in 
fact extremely unreliable because of changes in the structure of 
industry, and at best reflect only production trends for the sample 
of industries upon which the original series was based. As in 
practice industries not covered adequately in the base year calcu-
lations for some countries have increased to a greater extent than 
the older-established industries, there is thus a down^vard bias 
in the index figure for the total and for some of the groups. No 
adjustments have however been made by ECLA on this account 
as in most cases the national statistical offices are now engaged 
in the planning of more reliable series. 
For purposes of presentation only, national group data have 
been rearranged to conform as far as possible to the component 
groups of the United Nations International Standard Industrial 
Classification of all Economic Activities (I.S.I.C.), the weights 
of the original index, being used in all cases where sub-indexes 
were combined with other groups. For Argentina, "Basic metal 
industries" was separated from "Metal products excluding ma-
chinery"; Shipbuilding and repairing" from "Vehicles and non-
electrical machinery"; while "Foods and Beverages" were divided 
into two separate groups. For Brazil, only those groups relating 
to manufacturing production were used —these being combined 
in accordance with the original weights so as to give an over-all 
7 3 
manufacturing index. For Chile, a rearrangement of certain groups 
was also made. Notwithstanding these changes, however, certain 
important groups are not comparable in coverage with those of 
the I.S.I.C. Thus "Food industries" excludes the slaughtering of 
animals and the refining of sugar; "Beverages" includes only the 
production of beer and mineral water; "Textiles" excludes yam 
and thread; "Chemicals" excludes pharmaceutical products; while 
the refining of petroleum is excluded completely from the index. 
For Peru, and Venezuela, data are reproduced without any basic 
change. 
Sources used were as follows: 
Argentina: Síntesis Estadística Mensual, published by Direc-
ción Nacional de Estadística. 
Brazil: Fundagáo Getulio Vargas; Anuario Estaástico do 
Brasil 1958, IBGE. 
Chile: Estadística Chilena año 1956, published by Ser-
vicio Nacional de Estadística; and infomation 
supplied directly by that office. 
Peru: Boletín de Estadística Peruana 1958, Año I, No. 2, 
published by Dirección Nacional de Estadística. 
Venezuela: Memoria año 1957, published by Banco Central 
de Venezuela. 
( 3 ) PRODUCTION OF SELECTED MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFAC-
TURES (Table 10) 
Manufacturing data does not generally lend itself to the presen-
tation of series for individual products which are fully comparable 
as between countries. They are furthermore subject to the limi-
tation that it is often impossible to cover all the production of a 
given product in any particular country. Nevertheless, certain 
series indicative of production in important industries in Latin 
America are given in Table 10, based on the following sources: 
(a) Cement: Data were taken mainly from the United Nations 
Statistical Yearbook 1957 and from the Anuario 1957 of the Aso-
ciación de Fabricantes de Cemento Portland, Buenos Aires. In 
addition the following national sources were used: 
Brazil: Anuario Estatistico do Brasil 1957 y 1958 Re-
latarlo do Banco do Brasil, 1957. 
Colombia: Boletín Mensual de Estadística, March 1958. 
Cuba: Data supplied by firms. 
Chile: Data supplied by the Servicio Nacional de Es-
tadística y Censos. 
Ecuador: 1956: Boletín del Banco Central del Ecuador 
(September and October 1957 issues). 
1957: Data supplied by the Banco Central del 
Ecuador. 
El Salvador: Anuario Estadístico, 1956. 
Mexico: Cámara Nacional de Cemento. 
Paraguay: 1956: Boletín Estadístico del Paraguay (Janu-
ary-March 1957). 
Peru: 1956: Direct information; 1957: ECLA esti-
mates. 
Uruguay: 1957: Banco de la República Oriental del Uru-
guay. 
Venezuela: Boletín Mensual de Estadística, December 1957. 
(b) Pig iron, crude and finished steel. Data were supplied 
by the following offices or taken from the sources mentioned: 
Argentina: Memoria 1957, published by Centro de Indus-
triales Siderúrgicos. 
Brazil: Anuario Estatistico 1957 y 1958; Relatorio do 
Banco de Brasil (April 1958) and Companhia 
Siderúrgica Paulista, Memoria Técnica 1956. 
Colombia: Production of Paz del Río as indicated by that 
company. 
Cuba: ECLA estimates. 
Chile: Compañía de Acero del Pacífico. 
Mexico: Altos Homos de México and Banco de México. 
Peru: ECLA estimates. 
Uruguay: Data supplied by producers; and ECLA esti-
mates. 
( c ) Selected chemical products. Data were taken from the 











Boletín Mensual de Estadística; also data sup-
plied by the Dirección Nacional de Industria. 
Sulphuric Acid: estimates of "Servicio Barros"; 
for other products, data supplied by the pro-
ducers. 
Sodium carbonate: Krijgenen report; for other 
products, data supplied by the producers. 
1950-54: Nacional Financiera, Annual report, 
1958. 
1955-57: Banco de México. 
Data supplied directly from the countries con-
cerned: or ECLA estimates based on partial 
information. 
(d ) Woodpulp, newsprint and other paper. Much of the data 
was supplied by the Pulp and Paper Advisory Group, established 
jointly by ECLA, FAO and TAB. In addition, the following na-
tional sources were used: 
Argentina: Official figures supplied directly by the Indus-
tries Department of the Finance Ministry. 
Brazil: Relatorio do Grupo de Trabdlho de Celulosa e 
Papel, Annexes 2 and 4, August and December 
1957; and Programa de Metas, 30 September 
1958, both published by the Presidencia de Re-
. pública, Conselho do Desenvolvimento. 
Mexico: Estimates based on information obtained direct-
ly from industries. 
Peru: Figures supplied by Grace and Co. (Peru). 
Venezuela: Figures supplied by the Industries Department 
of the Ministry of Development. 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(Tables 11 to 17) 
( 1 ) VALUE OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS ( T a b l e 1 1 ) 
Explanations regarding sources of data, the coverage and system 
of trade, methods of valuation and conversion factors used were 
given in the Explanatory Notes of the Economic Bulletin, Vol-
ume III No. 2. Modifications introduced in this issue are as 
follows: 
Coverage: In the interests of comparability, data for the ten 
countries in South America have been adjusted in order to in-
clude trade in silver and platinum (thus conforming more close-
ly to the definitions of merchandise adopted generally by the 
United Nations and already used for the ten countries in the 
northern part of Latin America). While only quarterly figures 
are shown in this Bulletin, revised annual series will be publish-
ed in the Economic Survey, 1958 or a later issue of the Eco-
nomic Bulletin. 
Adjustment of f.o.b. imports in order to approximate c.i.f. 
The last Economic Bulletin gave figures indicating the percent-
ages added to the imports of those countries where data were 
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received on an f.o.b. rather than a c.i.f. basis. Beginning in 1957, 
the percentages used for the countries in the Central American 
and Caribbean area are as follows : 
Cuba: 10 Panama 18 
Guatemala: 17 Dominican 
Honduras: 15 Republic 17 
Imports for Nicaragua, it should be noted, are now reported 
on a c.i.f. basis. 
(2)QUANTUM AND UNIT VALUE INDEX NUMBERS ( T a b l e s 12 a n d 1 3 ) 
(a) Adoption of new base year. In addition to quarterly num-
bers calculated to the base year 1950, this issue of the Economic 
Bulletin shows ixport data to a 1955 base which has been adopt-
ed by ECLA for studies relating to recent periods. To those 
familiar with problems of index number construction, there is 
little need to point out that the use of a base year remote from 
the period under study may cause a series to be very misleading. 
The extent to which this is true depends —-for quantum or unit 
value indices respectively— on the changes in the structure of 
^prices or quantities entering into trade, since such changes mean 
that the original weighting system has become out-of-date and 
therefore not relevant for recent comparisons. In the absence of 
marked correlation between price and quantity changes, the change 
of base period for weighting would make little difference. As a 
rule, however, there is such correlation in Latin American coun-
tries. Hence, numbers for two periods can be misleading if they 
are calculated with weights applicable to a date remote from them 
both. 
Particular difficulties arise in the case of unit value series 
of the Paasche type; for while the quantum series shown by 
ECLA are calculated with constant price weights, the weights for 
the unit value series are quantities which change in each period. 
The resulting indexes therefore reflect both price changes and 
structural changes and should be interpreted accordingly. This 
'can be of great importance in the case of exports where climatic 
factors often change the composition from one year to another. It 
is even more important for quarterly series where seasonal factors 
may result in widely divergent patterns of trade in each period. 
(b) Calculation of quarterly series. To simplify the calculation, 
ECLA's quarterly series are compiled on the basis of cumulative 
data for the year in question —January through March, January 
through June, etc. For each of these periods, data in current 
prices and at prices of the base year are calculated. Figures lor 
individual quarters are then obtained by subtracting one period 
from another—a comparison of the constant value figures with 
one-fourth of the base year data yielding the quantum index; and 
a comparison of the constant value figures with the corresponding 
current value figures yielding the Paasche-type unit value index. 
This system may give rise to errors in those quarters where data 
include adjustments for earlier periods—notably in the fourth 
quarter of the year when figures are often rectified before closing 
the annual trade and customs accounts. Insofar as adjustments 
are often contained in figures for individual months (and certain-
ly in annual totals), this problem can rarely be eliminated in 
any event. 
(c) Adjustment for incomplete coverage. A new system of 
adjusting the index numbers to allow for incomplete coverage 
has been introduced in the 1955 based series. For the 1950 series, 
the assumption was made that items not included directly in the 
index calculations belonged to commodity groups in the same 
proportions as the items actually used in the calculations; also 
that the average price changes for all included items would apply 
equally to the non-included items.^ 
2 Modifications of this general procedure were adopted in 
certain cases. For example, it was assumed that 100 per cent of 
the "fuels" group was already included in the calculation of both 
import and export indexes. Furthermore, the price of this group 
was not allowed to influence the price applied to non-included 
items. 
This system led at times to sizeable errors, particularly when 
dealing with current value and quantum data for individual com-
modity groups. In the new system introduced for the 1955-based 
series, the total current value of non-included items in each period 
is distributed amongst the various groups according to the pattern 
of non-included items in the base year (or some other selected 
year). Thus, if in the base year, mineral products represented 15 
per cent of the non-included items, it is assumed that in a sub-
sequent period, they also accounted for 15 per cent and the value 
of the mineral group is adjusted accordingly. The unit value 
index for the group (determined on the basis of included items) 
is then applied to the estimate of the non-included part in order 
to give a total for the group in terms of base year prices. Quantum 
indexes for the group are then calculated in the usual way. 
So far as the unit value index is concerned it will be noted that 
at the group level no change is introduced. For total exports, 
the unit value index is however obtained as a quotient of ag-
gregates which relate to adjusted current and constant values for 
all groups. As the aggregates are changed by the adjustments 
adopted, it follows that the index is also affected indirectly by 
the methodology which has been used. It should also be noted 
that, while the above methodology reduces the eiror attributable 
to incomplete coverage appreciably (since it gives a more reliable 
estimate of group totals and a better imputation of price changes), 
errors on this account are not eliminated entirely and some in-
accuracies will still remain. 
A similar system is being adopted in the case of imports, data 
for which will be published on a 1955 base as soon as the work 
of revision and verification is completed. 
Further details regarding the methodology used by ECLA in 
the construction of index numbers may be found in the Explan-
atory Notes of the Economic Bulletin, Vol. Ill, No. 2. 
( 3 ) EXPORTS OF PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES ( T a b l e s 14 a n d 1 5 ) 
Quarterly data shown in Table 14 are directly comparable with 
the annual series shown in Table 30 of Vol. HI, No. 2. Accordingly, 
the Explanatory Notes to that issue apply equally to the data 
now presented. 
Table 15 shows data for the exports of selected products, dif-
ferentiating between principal countries or areas of destination. 
The items chosen are virtually the same as in Table 14. (Bananas 
were omitted because of difficulties in obtaining accurate value 
figures according to country of destination). As far as possible, 
the data relate to the exports of Latin America as a whole, though 
figures for some of the minor producing countries may have 
been omitted. The following list is therefore given in order to 
clarify which countries are included for each individual com-
modity: 
Sugar: Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Peru; Dominican Re-
public 
Coffee: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Dominican Republic, Ve-
nezuela 
Cacao: Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Dominican Re-
public, Venezuela 
Cotton: Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, Nica-
ragua, Peru 
Tobacco: Brazil, Cuba, Paraguay, Dominican Republic 
Meat (frozen 
and chilled): Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay 
Wheat: Argentina, Uruguay 
Maize: Argentina 
Hides: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
Quebracho: Argentina, Paraguay 
Wool: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay 
Wool Yarn: Argentina, Uruguay 
Nitrate: Chile 
Iron ore: Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela 
Copper: Cuba, Chile, Mexico Peru 
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Lead: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru 
Zinc: Mexico, Peru 
Tin: Bolivia 
Petroleum and j 
derivatives: Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 
Totals for the various commodities differ from those shown in 
Table 30 of Vol. Ill, No. 2 and Table 14 of the present Economic 
Bulletin for a number of reasons; e.g. variations in commodity 
specifications, the use of revised figures in One series which were 
hot available for the other, differences in the countries covered, 












Table 15 includes the exports of Colombia 
(these were zero in 1954). 
Table 15 excludes Haiti in all years. 
Table 15 excludes Paraguay but includes Ar-
gentina. 
The composition of the item differs in the 
two sets of tables. 
The composition differs in the two sets of 
tables. 
In Table 15, data published by the Dirección 
Nacional de Estadística y Censos in its Bo-
letín Estadístico del Paraguay were used for 
that country. In Table 14 the source was 
the Boletín Estadístico of the Banco Cen-
tral del Paraguay. 
The composition differs in the two sets of 
tables. Figures for Brazil, Chile and Peru 
are also included in Table 15. 
Marked differences after 1955 are due to the 
inclusion of figures for Venezuelan exports 
in Table 15 (no trade was reported in earlier 
years). 
The composition differs in the two sets of 
tables; Table 15 covering exports of ore, 
blister and electrolytic copper as' well as 
copper in ingots, bars and sheets. Table 15 
also includes exports from Cuba. 
The composition differs in the two sets of 
tables. Table 15 including refined lead. It 





The composition differs in the two sets of 
tables. Table 15 including the export of 
ores, concentrates, bars, ingots and refined 
zinc. 
Differences exist in the basic sources used. 
Quantity differences are due to slight vari-
ation in the conversion factors applied in* 
order to convert cubic metres or barrels of 
petroleum into tons. Other differences in 
both quantities and values are due to the 
inclusion of refined products for more 
countries in Table 15. 
For four products—cacao, wheat, maize and nitrate—the figures' 
are the same in both sets of tables. 
With regard to sugar, it should be noted that while adjusted-
value figures are published for total of exports from Cuba, similar 
data are not given by country of destination. Adjustments have 
been made by the ECLA Statistical Section in the following way: 
(a) The value of exports to the United States as shown in Inter-
national Monetary Statistics was accepted; (b) The difference 
between this figure and the adjusted total was apportioned among 
remaining destinations according to the unadjusted value of Cuba's 
exports to each of them. 
Finally, it should be noted that for all commodities countries 
of destination have been tabulated according to the way they are 
shown in the statistics of the reporting country. Area totals may 
not therefore be complete (as occurs if any destinations are in-
cluded in a residual item relating to "other countries"). "West-
em Europe", it should be noted, relates to the sixteen OEEC 
members plus Finland, Spain and Yugoslavia. "Eastern Europe" 
comprises Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic. 
(4) I M P O R T S FROM A N D EXPORTS T O LATIN AMERICA (Tables 16 
and 17) 
The Explanatory Notes given in Vol. HI, No. 2 apply. In par 
ticular, attention is drawn to the fact that data relating to imports 
of Western Europe and Japan have been adjusted from a c.i.f. to 
an approximate f.o.b. basis. 
PRICES 
(Tables 18 to 20) 
( 1 ) WORLD M A R K E T PRICES FOR PRINCIPAL LATIN AMERICAN EXPORTS 
(Table 18) 
The commodity specifications given in the Explanatory Notes 
to Vol. HI No. 2 still apply, except in the case of copper, lead, 
zinc and tin where, because of a recent shift in the volume of 
transactions from the New York market to the London market, 
the following quotations have been used: 
Copper: United Kingdom, domestic/import price, stand-
ard electrolytic wire bars, spot price, ex-
warehouse, London. 
Lead: United Kingdom, domestic/import price ex-
warehouse London, spot,, purity 99.97 per 
cent Pb. 
Zinc: United Kingdom, domestic/import price ex-
warehouse London, spot, purity 98.75 perc 
cent Zn. 
Tin: United Kingdom, domestic/import price de-
livered to buyer, cash quotations London, 
standard tin. 
The method used for calculating group and total indexes has 
been described in Vol. HI No. 2. ' 
(2) WHOLESALE PRICES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (Table 19) and ' 
COST OF LIVING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (Table 20) 
The Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the United Nations has 
again been used as the source except for most recent data which 
in certain cases was taken directly from national publications. 
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